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ABSTRACT
The research problem was— to study the relationship between 
Maritain's concept of the habitus and the fine art of musical perform­
ance.
The purpose of the study was (1) to identify philosophical 
truths concerning the role of the habitus in musical performance; and 
(2) to apply these truths to the performance program in music education.
The research procedure was a philosophical analysis of Maritain’s 
treatises on the fine arts and on education. Source material also 
included additional related writings by Maritain and pertinent studies 
on Maritain's philosophy, as prepared by other researchers.
The main body of the study was designed in terms of four broad 
components. The habitus was related to (1) the fine arts in general;
(2) the aim of performance; (3) the action of performance; and (4) the 
use of performance.
As the study design evolved (through development), each component 
focused upon a particular selection of Maritain concepts for study and 
analysis. The habitus of fine art was discussed in terms of the intel­
lect, the practical order of art, and the rules of art. The aim of 
performance was examined by relating "the disinterested work" to beauty, 
technique, and communication. The action of performance was considered 
in terms of artistic judgment, imitation, and the creative idea. The 
use of performance was studied by relating morality to performance.
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From the foregoing analysis, the relationship of the habitus to the three
broad components of performance was discussed and summarized.
The conclusions were as follows:
1. The habitus of performance is an intuitive and operative dis­
position which empowers a performer to aurally produce music without a 
logical, conceptual understanding of his productive action.
2. The performer is only vaguely (preconsciously) aware of his 
habitus until its operative power is freed by intellectual connaturality 
with an object, the sound of a musical work.
3. The habitus relates to musical performance in the spiritual 
or internal sense; therefore, the material or external aspect of per­
formance is subordinated to the spiritual aspect.
4. The operation of the habitus flows through the sound of a 
work, as the sound pleases or displeases the intellect.
5. The performer's connaturality with the sound of his music is 
defined as the placing of his self into the work.
6. The habitus operates through its object comprehensively, 
thereby causing the artistic components (aim and action) of performance 
to be interrelated and overlapped in their contribution to the final 
product.
7. The aim, action, and use of performance can occur concur­
rently; however, the use (of the product) must be subordinated to the 
art (from which it was conceived).
8. It is apparent that the most intense operative practice of 
the habitus will occur during the performance rehearsal, while the final 
performance is, to a greater extent, the use of the aural product and,
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to a lesser extent, a continuation of the aural art.
9. A reciprocal relationship exists (within the intellect) 
between the operation and development of the habitus.
10. The relationship of the habitus to musical performance 
explains why musicians, possessing a habitus of great depth, are able 
to perform musical works without the assistance of a written score and 
without dependence upon conceptual terminology.
Applications to the performance program in music education were 
made by (1) comparing the aim of performance to Maritain's definition of 
the aim of education; and (2) relating the habitus to learner intuition.
The results of these comparisons had the following implications for the 
performance program:
1. The performance program must direct its attention toward the 
natural intelligence of the student; therefore, its aim should be to teach 
for the meaning of music rather than toward the habitus of performance.
2. The teaching of musical skills and concepts should not define 
the performance program. These material aims are contributory aims, neces­
sary but secondary to the classroom art.
3. Since the meaning of music prepares the intellect for the 
development of the habitus, an immeasurable degree of the habitus is 
developed as a natural result of the student performer's connaturality 
with his aural object.
A. The habitus, because of its internal depth, is the least 
accessible result of the performance program but one which has far- 
reaching implications for the student in possession of such virtue.
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5. The material means of performance, because of their external 
nature, are the most accessible results of the performance program, but
these are measurable only in the immediate sense.
6. The instructor encourages student intellectual adherence to 
an aural object by adapting his educative approach to the spontaneous 
curiosity of the student.
7. Intellectual adhesion to an object of sound relates to con- 
naturality; and the freeing of intuition, through connaturality, encour­
ages the student to place his self into his aural object. Consequently, 
the enjoyment of music is given a renewed priority in the performance 
program.
Pursuant to the applications discussed, the following recommenda­
tions were made:
1. The student performer should be designated as the primary 
agent in the classroom (in place of instructional and institutional 
primacy).
2. Classroom performance should focus its attention upon works 
rather than students because, as previously determined, such an emphasis 
(on artistic endeavors) best serves the primary agent.
3. The use of classroom works should be subordinated to the pro­
ductive action of classroom art; accordingly, the pursuit of nonmusical 
and extramusical objectives should be subordinated to the classroom 




Background of the Problem
Broadly defined, the habitus refers to . . qualities which are 
essentially stable dispositions perfecting in the line of its own nature 
the subject in which they exist."-*- The intellectual virtues are special 
energies which grow in intelligence through exercise in a given object as 
added perfections of native capacity or natural intelligence.^ The intel­
lectual virtues are an operative habitus because these faculties or powers 
tend to action by their very nature. The operative habitus is an acquired 
habitus, acquired through exercise and use and a dependence upon human 
effort. This kind of habitus is a natural habitus of the soul because 
the intellect resides in the soul of man.^
^Jacques Maritain, "Art an Intellectual Virtue," in Art and 
Scholasticism and the Frontiers of Poetry, trans. Joseph W. Evans (New 
York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1962; also in paperback edition by Uni­
versity of Notre Dame Press, 1974), p. 10; also see Edward H. Flannery, 
trans., Glossary to An Essay on Christian Philosophy, by Jacques Maritain 
(New York: The Philosophical Library, 1955), p. 110.
O
Maritain, "Thomist Views on Education," in The Education of Man, 
ed. Donald and Idella Gallagher (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame 
Press, 1962; paperback edition, 1967), pp. 48-49.
^Maritain, "Art an Intellectual Virtue," p. 10. The acquired 
habitus is antonymous to the infused habitus because the latter is 
imparted to the soul by God independently of human effort. The infused 
habitus is a supernatural habitus which pertains primarily to theologi­
cal virtues. See Maritain, Art and Scholasticism, p. 154, n. 8; and 
Flannery, Glossary to An Essay on Christian Philosophy, p. 111.
^Maritain, Art and Scholasticism, p. 154, n. 8.
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The habitus of the performing musician is a virtue of the prac­
tical intellect which grows through performance as an added perfection 
of native musical capacity.^ The virtue of art, an operative habitus, 
is acquired through the art of performance and through a dependence upon 
the personal effort of the performing musician. The virtuoso is a "man 
of habitus," that is, a musician who has perfected his virtue to a fine 
point of distinction. At the other end of the continuum are the student 
musicians who are developing the habitus of music through the art of per­
formance. Student musicians are the substance of the school performance 
program, a facet of music education in which student performers, through 
the use of an instrument or the instrumentality of the voice, experience 
the art of music by re-creating (performing) musical works.
Recent criticism of the school performance program and the amount
of technical mastery required of student performers has raised questions
about the habitus of the musician and the role of technical training in
the development of this habitus.
Can a performing group move in the direction of a laboratory 
for music exploration while retaining a high level of technical 
skill? Will time devoted to teaching add to or detract from 
the effectiveness of time available for rehearsing? Should the 
performance program be allowed to do its special thing, or 
should everything possible be done to help performance experi­
ence become a powerful influence on the musical understandings 
of the participants?^
^"Art is a habitus of the practical intellect. . . . This 
habitus is a virtue. . ." (Maritain, "Art an Intellectual Virtue," 
p. 12).
oFor Maritain's discussion of "the man of habitus" see ibid.,
pp. 11-12.
■̂ See Bennett R.eimer's discussion of the school performance pro­
gram in A Philosophy of Education (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 
1970), chap. 9 passim.
^Reimer, "Patterns for the Future," Music Educators Journal 63 
(December 1976), p. 24.
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The "specialism" of performance has been identified as the culprit 
responsible for the forcing of goals other than those characteristic of 
the art itself.'*' A paradox of musical performance is that a degree of 
technical proficiency is necessary to control an instrument or the voice, 
and yet "mastery of technique cannot by itself justify the enormous effort 
expended by so many children in learning to play or sing."^
When the major focus of teaching is on technique then the major 
effort of the student is expended on skill development, a practice inevit­
ably doomed to diminishing returns. "Novelty turns into routine, excite­
ment into boredom, the pleasures of progress diminish as limitations are 
realized."J Can the goals of fine performances, along with the increase 
of student musicianship through technical skill, be met without sacrific­
ing incentives for students to explore music independently or to expand 
their personal musical horizons?^
The specialization of performance brings to light the matter of 
extramusical objectives, that is, the use of musical technique for motives 
outside of the art itself. "Music in the schools has come to be recognized 
by the general educator as synonymous with entertainment and is evaluated 
and consequently financed as utilitarian bases of entertainment,
iReimer, A Philosophy of Music Education, p. 127; also see 
Abraham A. Schwadron, "Aesthetic Values and Music Education," in Per­
spectives in Music Education: Source Book III, ed. Bonnie C. Kowall 
(Washington, D.C.: Music Educators National Conference, 1966), p. 188.
^Reimer, A Philosophy of Music Education, p. 131.
3Ibid.
^Warren F. Prince, "Music Education’s Split Personality," Music 
Educators Journal 61 (November 1974), pp. 30-31.
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'background music' for school affairs, public relations, and school pres­
tige."^ When administrators or other school authorities view extra­
musical objectives as the prime purpose of music education, the pros-
2pect of meeting musical objectives seems dismal indeed.
The validity of nonmusical objectives in the school performance 
program is also in question. "Can music be regarded as an academic (or 
artistic) study when it is justified extrinsically because of its con­
tribution to health, citizenship, morality, and when it is conceived of 
as an instrument for the realization of non-musical [sic] values ['A' 
ratings and the like]?"^
The entire matter of specialization, and its derivatives, has
created a controversial issue in the performance field.
The music education profession is in a state of confusion appar­
ently unprecedented in its history. I doubt that there has ever 
been the disagreement, the lack of consistent orientation, the 
anxiety, or the willingness to jump onto any bandwagon that is 
mirrored in the pages of our recent publications.^
The move for changes in the performance program has caused 
much debate, a high level of discomfort for many performance 
directors, and a rethinking by the entire profession of its 
expectations for the children involved.^
Schwadron, Aesthetics: Dimensions for Music Education (Washing­
ton, D. C.: Music Educators National Conference, 1967), p. 70; also see 
Reimer, A Philosophy of Music Education, p. 135.
nzHarry S. Broudy, "Educational Theory and the Music Curriculum," 
in Perspectives in Music Education, p. 180.
Schwadron, Aesthetics, p. 72; also see Reimer, A Philosophy of 
Music Education, p. 29; and Phillip H. Phenix, Realms of Meaning (New 
York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1964), p. 348.
“̂Charles H. Ball, "Thoughts on Music as Aesthetic Education," in 
Toward an Aesthetic Education, ed. Bennett Reimer and associates (Wash­
ington, D. C.: Music Educators National Conference, 1971), p. 57.
^Reimer, "Patterns for the Future," p. 24.
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Proposed theories which suggest alternatives to the skill of per­
formance have focused upon the intellectualization of performance. The 
object of this focus is to replace technical emphasis with an emphasis 
upon musical knowledge, a knowledge refined enough to enable students to 
become "critically intelligent" about the art of music.^ The instrument
of this musical understanding is professed to be superior or high quality
oliterature carefully selected for use by the performance instructor.
There is evidence of concern with student musical taste and dis- 
crimination in professional publications. This concern has, however, 
paralleled a reduced professional concern with the amount and importance 
of enjoyment or personal meaning which students find in the aural experi­
ence of music. For example:
To describe a succession of musical sounds in such terms as 
beautiful, . . . ugly, or warm exemplifies a purely sensuous 
approach to aesthetic perception and, consequently, calls for 
little if any need for formal education. . . .  To educate for 
pure pleasure or for sheer sensuous enjoyment there is little 
need for . . . formal music studies, . . . the business of 
merely providing moments of sensuous pleasure is surely not 
the erudite task of the music educator.^
The criticism of "sensuous music," however, raises serious ques­
tions about the experience of music as music. How can the aural art of
"̂The intellectualization of performance is given theoretical sup­
port in Schwadron, Aesthetics, p. 76; and idem, "Aesthetic Values and 
Music Education," p. 187. Schwadron's use of the term "critically intel­
ligent" is analogous to Reimer's discussion of "musical understanding" 
in A Philosophy of Music Education, pp. 132-139.
‘The use of performance literature as an instrument of musical 
knowledge is given theoretical support in Reimer, A Philosophy of Music 
Education, p. 133; Broudy, "Educational Theory and the Music Curriculum," 
p. 179; and Ball, "Thoughts on Music as Aesthetic Education," p. 61.
^For examples of such concern see Schwadron, Aesthetics, p. 75; 
and idem, "Aesthetic Values and Music Education," p. 192.
^Schwadron, Aesthetics, pp. 81-82; also see Reimer, A Philosophy 
of Music Education, pp. 95-97; and Broudy, "Educational Theory and the 
Music Curriculum," p. 177.
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music be separated from sensory experience and remain an aural art? How 
can the fine art of music be separated from the pleasing experience of 
musical sounds and remain a fine art? Is not all human encounter with 
musical sounds fleeting in nature? Is it possible, then, that what is 
primary to music is being relegated to secondary status in music educa­
tion?
The implications of the opening discussion and the above ques­
tions infer that the habitus of the musician is more than technique and 
a select knowledge of musical concepts; furthermore, the development of 
the habitus is evidently more than technical training and a prescription 
of selective knowledge. What remains is the sensory nature of the crea­
tive act itself and the ensuing question: what is the role of the 
habitus in the creative art of musical performance, and how is it devel­
oped through the act of creation?
The answer to the foregoing philosophical question lies not in 
the unknown but in what is already known about creativity in the fine 
arts; and that is precisely why this researcher chose the philosophical 
writings of Jacques Maritain as a springboard and source for this study. 
In his treatises on the fine arts and on education, Maritain has con­
fronted the problem of the habitus and, although these writings have 
far-reaching implications, this valuable source has rarely been con­
sulted by researchers in the field of music education. Maritain's con­
cern with the object of creation and the impact of this object upon the 
creative process establishes an approach to the fine arts essential to 
an understanding of the habitus.̂
■̂For an overview of his approach to art and its object see 
Maritain, "Making and Doing," in Art and Scholasticism, p. 9; and
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Statement of the Problem
The research problem is to study the relationship between 
Maritain's concept of the habitus and music as a performing art.
Approach to the Problem
The research procedure is a philosophical analysis of Maritain’s 
treatises on the fine arts and on education. Relevant related writings 
by Maritain and studies pertaining to Maritain’s philosophy, as prepared 
by other researchers, are included as source material as they focus upon 
the research problem.
Purpose of the Study
The purpose of this study is to seek out and identify philosophi­
cal truths concerning the role of the habitus in musical performance, 
which can form the foundation of a philosophical aim or direction resist­
ant to the obsolescence of passing trends, and to apply these truths to 
the performance program in music education.
Need for the Study
The need for this study is established through evidence of dis­
orientation and misdirection among educators in defining a valid purpose 
of the performance program.^
idem, "Art as a Virtue of the Practical Intellect," in Creative Intuition 
in Art and Poetry (New York: Pantheon Books, 1953; also in paperback edi­
tion by Meridian Books, 1955), pp. 48-50.
■̂ See p. 4 above.
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Delimitations
This study will not enter into Jacques Maritain's extensive treat­
ment of theology, nor will it enter the Maritain realms of metaphysics, 
politics, and the philosophy of history. Research into the Maritain 
sphere of ethics will be confined to the ethics of fine art; similarly, 
research into the Maritain sphere of epistemology will be confined to the 
poetic knowledge of fine art. Within Maritain’s philosophy of fine art, 
the concepts of poetic knowledge, creative intuition, poetic experience, 
poetic sense, and beauty will be considered only in the context of their 
relationship to the habitus and will not be pursued as independent areas 
of research.
In limiting the study to the fine art of musical performance, the 
related subject areas: music analysis (visual and aural), music theory 
(composition), and music history (style periods) are delimited from con­
sideration in this study. In limiting the study to the performance pro­
gram in music education, the school general music program is delimited 
from consideration in this study.
Limitations
Maritain writings in untranslated French text are not included 
as source material; consequently, the scope of this study is limited to 
the English translations of Maritain's works.
The works of Maritain have a theological bias; accordingly, his 
treatises on the fine arts and on education must be considered in light 
of what permeates and transcends these discussions: man’s relationship
to God.
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Maritain's discussions of fine art pertain primarily to the fine 
arts in general; consequently, his philosophy of fine art must be trans­
lated to the fine art of music and applied to musical performance. Simi­
larly, Maritain's philosophy of education is generalized and must be 
translated to the field of music education and applied to the perform­
ance program.
Definition of Terms
Art is the realm of "making" or productive action. It relates to
the good or perfection of a work to be produced and not of the man making
the work. The action of art is in conformity with rules governing the
good of the work and the end of the work. In its formal sense, art is
ruled by the intellect of man, a practical intellect whose sole object
is to produce a work."*- The fine arts are arts which have beauty for 
2their object. The productive action of the fine arts tends to the
qcreation of a beautiful work, an end in itself.
Morality is the realm of " d o i n g . T h i s  sphere is concerned with
the practical activity of reason as directed toward the good of human life
5
through the expression of free will. " . . .  its distinctive object is
■^Maritain, "The Speculative Order and the Practical Order," in 
Art and Scholasticism, p. 6; and idem, "Making and Doing," p. 9.
OMaritain, "The Philosophy of Art; Ethics," in An Introduction 
to Philosophy, newly des. ed., trans. E. I. Watkin (New York: Sheed and 
Ward, 1962), p. 196.
%aritain, "Art and Beauty," in Art and Scholasticism, p. 33. 
^Maritain, "Making and Doing," p. 8.
^Maritain, "Art and Morality," in The Responsibility of the 
Artist (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1960), pp. 26-27.
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not the perfection of the works produced and fashioned by man but the 
good and perfection of the agent himself, or the use he freely makes of 
his faculties. . . ."
Intuition is the immediate or direct intellectual perception
which takes place each time the intellect grasps an object which is con-
onatural to it or most like itself. Beauty is that which delights or 
pleases the intellect through the senses of sight or hearing and their 
intuition.3 The intuitive perception of beauty, then, takes place when 
the intellect is delighted or pleased in that which is most like itself.
The creative idea is not an elaborate plan but rather a simple 
view or artistic vision of a work-to-be-made.^ The operative or creative 
idea is simply formative of things and is not formed by them because the 
activity of art is one of creating rather than knowing.
Imitation is the process by which the instrumentality of natural 
appearances is first presented to the mind of man and then recast or 
transposed by intuition to a productive end. Imitation uses sensible 
signs to intuitively express that which has been presented to the intellect 
through the senses.  ̂ " . . .  the sign is that which makes present for
%aritain, "The Philosophy of Art; Ethics," p. 196.
^Maritain, "Intuition and Duration," in Bergsonian Philosophy and 
Thomism, trans. Mabelle L. Andison in collaboration with J. Gordon Andison 
(New York: The Philosophical Library, 1955), pp. 150-152.
^Maritain, "Art and Beauty," pp. 23-24; St. Thomas Aquinas Summa 
Theologica, I, 5. 4. ad 1; and ibid., I-II, 27. 1. ad 3.
^Maritain, Art and Scholasticism, p. 181, n. 95.
^John W. Hanke, Maritain's Ontology of the Work of Art (The Hague, 
Netherlands: Marinus Nijhoff, 1973), p. 43.
^Maritain, "The Purity of Art," in Art and Scholasticism, p. 55; 
idem, "Beauty and Modern Painting," in Creative Intuition, p. 225; and 
Hanke, Maritain's Ontology, pp. 46-47.
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knowledge something which is other than itself."^ A sign takes the place 
of that which is signified and is infravalent to it.
Education, in its broadest sense, refers to any process by which 
the child of man is shaped and led toward fulfillment. In a narrower 
sense, education refers to the task of formation which adults intention­
ally undertake in regard to youth and, in its strictest sense, to the 
special task of the school in helping a student attain completeness as
9a human person. The essential aim of education is to equip, form, and 
liberate the intelligence to prepare for the development of the intellec-
Otual virtues or habitus. The essential aim of music education, then, is 
to equip, form, and liberate the creativity of the spirit or creative 
intelligence to prepare for the development of the habitus of music.^ 
Educational ends refers to the possible outcomes of the educa­
tional process as reflected from the direction which learning experi­
ences are taking.
Maritain, "Sign and Symbol," in Redeeming the Time, trans. Harry 
Lorin Binsse (London: Geoffrey Bles, The Centenary Press, 1943), pp. 191- 
192; also see idem, "Language and the Theory of Sign," in Language: An 
Enquiry into Its Meaning and Function, ed. Ruth Nanda Anshen (New York: 
Harper and Brothers, 1957), p. 86; and Hanke, Maritain's Ontology, pp. 
52-53.
p
Maritain, "The Aims of Education," in Education at the Crossroads 
(New Haven: Yale University Press, 1943; also in paperback ed. by the same 
publisher, A Yale Paperbound, 1960), pp. 1-2, 10; and idem, "Thomist 
Views on Education," p. 50.
^Maritain, "Thomist Views on Education," p. 49.
^The term: creativity of the spirit, or the creative intelligence, 
pertains to intuition or the intuitive power of the mind, in its opera­
tive functions, to seek and find beauty in an object. See Maritain, "Art 
as a Virtue of the Practical Intellect," pp. 54-56; and idem, "The Dynam­
ics of Education," in Education at the Crossroads, pp. 42-45.
^Maritain, "The Aims of Education," pp. 2-4.
12
Pragmatism is defined as the observable, measurable verification 
of truth through the use of experimental methods. Pragmatism tends to 
define human thought as an organ of response to actual stimuli and situa­
tions of the environment.3
Sociologism views the student as a potential citizen to be adapted 
to the conditions and interactions of social life.
Intellectualism holds supreme two distinct achievements of human 
intelligence: dialectical or rhetorical skill and scientific or technical
•5specialization.
Voluntarism consists of making the intellect of man subserviant 
to the will of man. The will is either disciplined according to a pre­
determined pattern as fashioned by the will of others, or left to the 
free expansion of nature and the inclinations of self-will.̂
The inclusive approach to learning maintains that everything can 
be learned through prepared learning experiences.3
Definitions of terms other than those presented in this section 
will be made explicit as they appear in the text of the study itself.
1Ibid., p p . 12
2Ibid., P* 15.
3Ibid., P. H1 00
4Ibid., P- ro o
5Ibid., p p . 22-
CHAPTER II
THE HABITUS OF FINE ART
The Habitus and the Intellect 
The Habitus and Natural Gift
The term "virtue" is used in a philosophical sense in this study.
The ancient philosophers referred to this type of virtue as a habitus or
state of possession, an inner strength possessed by man.'*' The operative
habitus is a stable disposition or inner force which is developed in the
2soul and which perfects its operative powers in a certain direction.
Being operative in nature, this kind of habitus is acquired through human
Oeffort or use. "Operative habitus, which attests the activity of the
spirit, resides principally in an immaterial faculty, in the intelligence
or will."^ Since reason takes place in the intellect, and since the
intellect resides in the soul, the operative habitus is defined as
5intellectual virtue.
Maritain, "Art an Intellectual Virtue," p. 10; and Clare Joseph 
Martini, Maritain and Music (Ph.D. dissertation, Northwestern University, 
1958; Ann Arbor, Michigan: Xerox University Microfilms, 58-5769, n.d.), 
p. 47.
^Maritain, "Art an Intellectual Virtue," p. 10; and idem, "Art 
and Morality," in The Responsibility of the Artist, p. 38.
^Maritain, "Art an Intellectual Virtue," p. 10.
^Ibid., p. 11.
"’Maritain, "Thomist Views on Education," pp. 48-49. See chapter 1
above for the initial discussion of the operative habitus as intellectual
virtue. Throughout the remainder of this study, the operative habitus
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The acquisition of the habitus is, in essence, a development of
an inborn disposition or natural gift of the mind.'*' The natural gift
or native capacity varies from man to man but in all men it is only a
prelude to the intellectual virtue. Although indispensable to the
acquired disposition, the inborn disposition must be cultivated and
disciplined in a manner which reflects the spontaneous nature of the
mind. Since the natural gift possesses a spontaneous nature, it is
best developed through the spontaneous effort or personal activity of
2the one in possession of a given capacity.
The Habitus and Habit
Maritain makes a distinction between the habitus and habit, a 
distinction which further defines the habitus as intellectual virtue.
The habitus, in contrast to habit, is an exercise or use of intellec­
tual powers which surpasses simple mechanical routine. This is the 
case because the habitus resides in the intellect of man and is sub- 
ject to reason, not routine. Only living intellectual beings can 
acquire a habitus because they have the capability or reasoning power
will be referred to as the habitus. The adjective is unnecessary because 
this concept will consistently be used in the operative sense.
^Maritain, "The Rules of Art," in Art and Scholasticism, p. 41.
2Ibid.
^Maritain, "Art an Intellectual Virtue," pp. 10-11; and Gerald C. 
Hay, Jr., Maritain's Theory of Poetic Knowledge: A Critical Study (Ph.D. 
dissertation, Catholic University of America, 1964; Ann Arbor, Michigan: 
Xerox University Microfilms, 64-11,084, n.d.), p. 9. Hay refers to the 
habitus as operative habits; he refers to instinctual habits as customary 
habits. The variance in terminology is the choice of the researcher and 
does not change the essential meaning of the concepts as defined by 
Maritain.
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to elevate the level of their being through personal activity.■*-
Habit resides in the nerve centers and is attained through repe­
tition or conditioning, which means that habit can be defined in terms of
2animal knowledge, that is, thinking without reason. Cogitative reason, 
or animal reason, takes place in the memory and is observable through the
Oempirical activity of habit. The habitus of man, which resides in the 
intellect, includes habit but goes beyond habit by retaining a sovereign 
power to make or break a habit through the movement of human will. The 
will is an integral part of the intellect, a capacity entirely lacking 
in animal intelligence.^ The activity of the habitus, which takes place 
in the intellect, goes beyond empiricism because the intellect is 
spiritual in nature and because it is moved by the will.
The Habitus and the Practical Order of Art 
The Practical Order and the Speculative Order 
The habitus, or intellectual virtue, is divided into two cate­
gories or orders based upon the ends intended by man's use of his virtue. 
Intellectual virtues whose primary end is "knowing" belong to the specula­
tive order, the best examples of which are science, knowledge through 
demonstration; and wisdom, knowledge through contemplation.^
Intellectual virtues whose primary end is "action" belong to the 
practical order which, in turn, has two parts: "making" and "doing."
%aritain, "Art an Intellectual Virtue," p. 11.
^Maritain, "The Aims of Education," pp. 12-13.
%aritain, "Art an Intellectual Virtue," p. 20.
^Ibid., p. 11. “’ibid., p. 20.
%aritain, "The Speculative Order and the Practical Order,"
p. 5.
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"Doing" is the exercise of man's free will for his personal "good" as a
man, the sphere of morality, the primary virtue of which is prudence.^
"Making" is man's productive action for the "good" of his work-to-be-
2made, the sphere of art. Art is the determination of works-to-be-
3made while prudence is the determination of acts-to-be-done.
Art is a habitus, an inner quality or deep-rooted disposition 
that raises the natural powers of the artist to a higher degree and 
gives him a possession of a certain strength entirely his own. Since 
the habitus resides in the soul, art also resides in the soul; since 
art is a virtue of the practical intellect, art and reason are related. 
The habitus of art is a virtue which sharpens an object to a point of 
perfection or operative efficiency. Conversely, while the object is 
being perfected, the artistic virtue within the intellect is also being 
perfected through the activity of art."* The habitus, then, is both
•̂ Ibid., p. 6; and idem, "Making and Doing," pp. 7-8. The term 
"good" used in this sense refers to that which is desirable to man him­
self. See idem, "Art and Morality," in The Responsibility of the 
Artist, pp. 26-27.
^Maritain, "Making and Doing," pp. 8—9; also see Samuel John Hazo, 
An Analysis of the Aesthetic of Jacques Maritain (Ph.D. dissertation, 
University of Pittsburgh, 1957; Ann Arbor, Michigan: Xerox University 
Microfilms, 24,744, n.d.), pp. 10-11. The term "good" used in this sense 
refers to that which is desirable for the work-to-be-made. See Maritain, 
"Art and Morality," in The Responsibility of the Artist, pp. 23-24.
^Maritain, "Making and Doing," p. 9; and idem, Art and Scholas­
ticism, p. 154, n. 5. This study is concerned with the practical order 
of virtues and the sphere of art within the practical order. The sphere 
of morality is discussed only in the context of its relationship to the 
art of performance. See chapter 5 below for this discussion.
^Maritain, "Art as a Virtue of the Practical Intellect," pp. 48- 
49; also see Martini, Maritain and Music, p. 47.
^Maritain, "Art an Intellectual Virtue," pp. 12-13; and idem,
"The Philosophy of Art; Ethics," p. 194.
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acquired from the creativity of art and applied _to the creativity of art 
The habitus of art is of the practical order because art is concerned 
with the productive activity of the practical intellect.
Generic Art and Fine Art
The realm of art is divided into the useful arts and the fine 
arts as determined by the intended end of the work.'*' The useful arts 
are subserviant or servile arts, ordered to the service of man; the 
fine arts are free or self-sufficient arts,each product of which is an
O
end in itself. The phrase "an end in itself" infers that a work of 
fine art is allowed to stand by itself with no particular use intended. 
This characteristic leads the fine arts to their most important end:
beauty. Beauty gives the fine arts their aesthetic nature as opposed 
to the utilitarian nature of the useful arts.
Art in general tends to make a work. But certain arts tend 
to make a beautiful work, and in this they differ essentially 
from all the others. The work to which all the other [useful] 
arts tend is itself ordered to the service of man. . . . The 
work to vrhich the fine arts tend is ordered to beauty; as 
beautiful, it is an end, an absolute, it suffices of itself.
A difficulty of fine art is that beauty, while being an end in 
itself, cannot be produced as an intended end of a work. Art in general 
as well as the fine arts in particular, intends to produce a good work
■^Maritain, "Art and Beauty," p. 33; idem, "Art as a Virtue of 
the Practical Intellect," p. 61, n. 13; idem, "Poetry and Beauty," in 
Creative Intuition, p. 175; and Hazo, Maritain's Aesthetic, pp. 14-15. 
Maritain's use of the phrase "end of the work" refers to the personal 
end towards which the artist is striving.
2Ibid.
^Maritain, "Art and Beauty," p. 33; also see Hanke, Maritain's 
Ontology, pp. 33-34.
18
rather than a beautiful work. Beauty is an end beyond the end and
transcends the created object; beauty is not produced but is mirrored 
2in the work.
How, then, can the artist create a beautiful work when his per­
sonal intention is to make a good work? The answer to this question 
lies in the relationship between beauty and the intellect. The intel­
lect has a natural desire to produce an object of beauty because of its 
spiritual nature. The intellect finds its delight in beauty and, left 
to the freedom of its nature, the intellect will strive for beauty.
This means that when an artist creates an object, beauty will accompany 
the creative act because of the natural inclination of the artist’s 
intellect. The creativity of the spirit is at the core of the fine 
arts and lies beyond the realm of the useful arts. Beauty, of itself,
has no use, only the joy of the intellect in finding its delight in
3beauty through the making of an object it has willed to make.
In the fine arts the general end of art is beauty. But in 
their case the work-to-be-made is not a simple matter to be 
ordered to this end, like a clock one makes for telling time 
or a boat one builds for the purpose of traveling on water.
A paradox of fine art, then, is that the work tends toward beauty 
but beauty is not the intended objective. To achieve the transcendental 
end of his work, the artist must love what he is making and refuse to 
deviate from this conscious end. In this light, beauty becomes connat­
ural to him and becomes a natural part of the product. If the artist
^Maritain, "Poetry and Beauty," p. 173, n. 22 
2Ibid., PP. 174-175.
3Maritain, "Art as a Virtue of the Practical Intellect," p. 55. 
^Maritain, "The Rules of Art," p. 46.
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is delighted, personally delighted, with what he is making, the intel­
lect is moved by his will and is guided straightly to the making of 
the work.'*'
Two crucial points concerning beauty and the fine arts need to 
be emphasized. First, the fine arts, because of their relationship to 
beauty— and the intellectual inclination toward beauty, are free and 
must remain free in order to attain their transcendental end: beauty. 
Secondly, reason plays an essential but secondary role in the fine arts, 
secondary because the intellect inclines toward beauty but cannot pro- 
duce it. Any attempt to produce beauty inevitably recedes into aca­
demicism because the latter fails to perceive beauty as a transcendental.^
A common error among aestheticians is to attribute the character­
istics of the fine arts to the arts in general. This, in effect, makes 
the fine arts sacred and ignores the true relationship between the arts: 
making.  ̂ Art is not confined to fine art alone, and the term "aesthetic" 
is not appropriate for art in general. The useful arts depend upon 1
1Ibid., p. 47.
oMaritain also refers to this intellectual inclination as the 
"creativity of the spirit." See chapter 1 above, p. 11.
"^Maritain, "Art as a Virtue of the Practical Intellect," p. 63.
^Maritain, "Poetry and Beauty," p. 174. Maritain further asserts 
(ibid.) that academicism is a perversion of the fine arts. Chapter 3 
below contains a more complete discussion of this concept.
^Martini, Maritain and Music, p. 46. In this study, the noun 
"making" is used synonymously with "producing" or "creating"; similarly, 
the "making of an object" is equated with "creating a xrork" or "produc­
ing a product." The interchange of these terms does not change the 
essential meaning of Maritain's philosophy of the arts.
^Maritain, "The Philosophy of Art; Ethics," p. 195, n. 1.
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being good for something else, that is, a particular service to man.'*'
A common misconception at the other extreme is to make an overly 
rigid distinction between the fine arts and the useful arts. The divi­
sion of the arts into such categories is taken from the ends pursued;
however, the same art can achieve beauty and utility at the same time
2in spite of one end being primary to the work. For example, architec­
ture is at the service of man; nevertheless, a degree of structural 
beauty is an inevitable part of the final product. Music stands by 
itself as a fine art; however, the beauty of music inevitably attracts 
listeners and gives rise to the performance of music in the presence of 
a listening audience. ". . . it is not a question of whether in fact a 
work of useful art is beautiful or a work of fine art is useful, but
rather of what is intended by the art— to what it is that a given art
3essentially tends."
The habitus of art applies to the useful arts and the fine arts
in a common fashion.^ Art in general tends to make a good work and the
ways of making this work are instrumental to the work, the instrument of
5the habitus, and an integral part of the habitus of art. The habitus 
of fine art takes the essential step beyond the arts in general by
^Maritain, "Poetry and Beauty," p. 175.
2Maritain, Art and Scholasticism, p. 158, n. 40; idem, "Art as a 
Virtue of the Practical Intellect," pp. 61-62; idem, "Poetry and Beauty," 
p. 174; and idem, "Apropos an Article by Montgomery Belgion," in Art and 
Scholasticism, app. 4, p. 114.
^Hanke, Maritain*s Ontology, p. 34; also see Hay, Maritain*s 
Theory, p. 18.
^Maritain, "The Rules of Art," pp. 38-39.
%aritain, "Art as a Virtue of the Practical Intellect," p. 63.
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allowing its product to stand as unique in itself and, consequently, tend­
ing toward beauty. The habitus of fine art cannot produce beauty concep­
tually; rather, it captures beauty in an object it has willed to make.
"The object of making is a trap to catch a transcendental."^
The Habitus and the Rules of Art
The Rules of Art and the Rules of Fine Art
Maritain defines the rules of art as ways of making or the tools 
2or means of art. The rules are fixed rules, but they are not externally 
imposed on the artist and his art. The rules of art, then, are fixed 
within the artistic action, which means that the artist uses rules to 
suit needs peculiar to the ends of his work.
The rules of art, of which Maritain speaks, are spiritual in
•3nature because they are a possession of the habitus of art. This
explains the very personal nature of these rules, something more than
a written list of directives. The spiritual rules exist only in the
philosophical sense and in the roots of the virtue of art.^1 These
spiritual rules, which form the foundations of intellectual virtue,
exist in the artist's intellect prior to the practical and technical
5manifestations of these rules. Since the spiritual rules exist in
^Maritain, "Poetry and Beauty," p. 174, n. 24.
OMaritain, Art and Scholasticism, p. 176, n. 79.
^Maritain, "The Rules of Art," pp. 38-39.
^Maritain also refers to these rules as "perennial rules" or 




the artist's intellect, they are a personal possession of the artist to
be applied to the artistic ends he has envisioned.
Properly speaking, he possesses them and is not possessed by 
them; he is not held by them, it is he who holds— through 
them— matter and the real; . . .  he will act, not against the 
rules, but outside of and above them, in conformity with a 
higher rule and a more hidden order.^
The higher rule, of which Maritain writes, is the primary rule of 
art, that is, a freeing of the creativity of the spirit to satisfy the 
need to create a work (a work toward which the will tends). Left to its 
inclination, the will tends to the good of the work, a work brought into 
existence by rules discovered by the intellect. In this way, the will 
and the intellect work together in observance of the primary rule. The 
rules discovered in the process of creation become a way or ways of mak­
ing a particular object; and as these ways of making are applied, more
discoveries are made and a constant birth and rebirth of xjays or methods
2to improve or refine the final product takes place.
The rules of fine art are the rules of art transfigured by beauty. 
The creativity of the spirit naturally tends toward beauty in the form of 
a work-to-be-made. The primary rule of the fine arts is to free the 
creativity of the spirit to pursue a desirable object, one x^hich it 
wills to make through natural inclination.
Thus for the apprentice . . . composer the primary rule is 
to follow purely the pleasure of his . . . ears in the . . . 
sounds he will be responsible for; to respect the pleasure, 
and pay total attention to it; at every instant to produce 
nothing but what the senses are fully pleased with. For the 
creativity of the spirit, in its longing for beauty, passes 
through the senses.^ *3
^Maritain, "The Rules of Art," p. 39.
^Maritain, "Art as a Virtue of the Practical Intellect," pp. 53-54.
3Ibid., p. 59.
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Reason alone is not enough to create an object which captures beauty.
The will must be left free to its natural inclination; in other words,
the artist must love, or be delighted in, what he is making. This is
beyond reason but connatural with it.^
Through the inclination toward beauty, a work of fine art is an
end in itself, a unique product; therefore, each work demands a new or
unique way of striving after the intended end. The rules are fixed or
determined at the time of creation rather than in advance, and they are
subject to perpetual renewal because the ways of capturing beauty are 
2infinite.
In comparison to the useful arts, the rules of the fine arts are 
more spiritual in nature because of their deeper relationship to the 
realm of the transcendental. The primary rule of fine art depends on 
the will to guide the reason; the rules are determined at the moment of 
creation through discovery, a unique approach to the uniqueness of the 
final product. Because beauty is infinite, the rules of fine art are
Osubject to a renewal more exacting than the rules of useful art.
The Rules of Art and Technique
Maritain insists that the spiritual rules of art exert control 
over the material rules or "conventional imperatives" of art,^ a posi­
tion which is consistent with his view of the habitus as a controlling 
force over habit. The spiritual rules are the essence of the habitus 
and they elevate the meaning of "technique," a term which refers to 1
1Ibid., p. 58. 2Ibid., pp. 56-57.
oIbid., p. 56.
^Maritain, "The Rules of Art," p. 38.
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the rules of art. Maritain's use of this term includes the material 
processes and manual skill of art but, above all, refers to the ways of 
operation of the intellectual sphere which the artist employs to attain 
the object of his art.'1' These intellectual ways of operation, then, are 
the spiritual rules of art, the essence of the habitus; the manual skill 
of art is equated with habit, a part of technique but subject to a higher 
rule, the primary rule of art; the material processes include the tradi­
tional rules of art which exist extrinsically and function as a resource
ofor the primary rule.
The habitus of art possesses certain fixed rules of operation; 
but they must be discovered along the way or at the moment of creation, 
as they are applied to the work, as they perfect it, and as they are 
adapted to the final product. The effort of discovery, or the via
Oinventionis, requires solitude and is not learned from others. The
1-Maritain, Art and Scholasticism, p. 176, n. 79.
^Maritain does not refer to the spiritual rules and material rules 
as the constituents of two separate kinds of habitus; rather, he views 
them as txro aspects of the same habitus. His concern is with the predom­
ination of the primary rule, which is spiritual, and the subordination of 
the material rules, which are external, within the context of the habitus, 
the totality of which serves the object of art, the intended work.
" . . .  the practical science of the work to be made and (practical) 
art are not two distinct habitus [sic] but rather two formal aspects 
of the same habitus [sic]. However, one of these aspects may be 
more marked than the other in different particular cases; the art 
aspect predominates, e.g., in a Moussorgsky, or in some physician 
who frequently cures his patients and seems to work by rule of 
thumb; the science aspect predominates in a da Vinci, or in a 
physician who is more learned but effects fewer cures" ("'Specula­
tive' and 'Practical,'" in Distinguish to Unite: or, The Degrees of 
Knowledge, trans. under the supervision of Gerald B. Phelan [New 
York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1959], app. 7, p. 464).
^Maritain, "The Rules of Art," p. 42; and Martini, Maritain and 
Music, p. 50.
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rules become discernible to the artist alone and are applied or adapted 
as he sees them and as the needs of his work spontaneously confront his 
intellect. *■
The discovered rules reach fulfillment through discipline, an 
intellectual discipline which strives for a personal balance between 
the internal effort of discovery and the external presence of tradi­
tional rules of art. The effort of discipline, or the via disciplinae, 
involves manual skill and the vast reservoir of material means from 
which the artist can draw to refine his product. These rules, exter­
nal to the product, must be adapted to the work as the artist sees it 
and applied in a way unique or new to the artist.^ If certain tradi­
tional rules do not meet the needs of the work at hand, they are not 
applied and remain external to the product.
There is no "proper proportion" between the via inventionis and 
the via disciplinae because the balance between the two will vary with 
the artist's ability and the requirements of the work pursued. There is 
overlap in the sense that the discovery of traditional rules renders 
them new to the artist and new to the product because they are applied 
in a unique way. There is also an important distinction:
The via inventionis is more intimately bound up with the 
primary rule. While the via disciplinae concerns itself more 
with the secondary rules of making.̂
^-Maritain, "The Rules of Art," p. 43.
^Ibid.; and Martini, Maritain and Music, p. 50.
%aritain, "The Rules of Art," p. 45; and idem, Art and Scholas­
ticism, p. 180, n. 91.
^Martini, Maritain and Music, p. 50.
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The via inventionis is necessary for the inclinations of the creative 
intellect; the via disciplinae teaches the artist to be the master of 
his virtue and reduces the tendency toward artistic anarchy.
The elevated use of the term "technique" applies to all rules 
of art but gives priority to the internal, spiritual rules which are 
concerned with the primary rule and the end of the work. The external, 
material rules (including manual dexterity) are used to serve the work 
and the needs of the primary rule.
Technique, in its lower sense, subordinates the primary rule to 
the external rules and inverts the priorities. A facet of this inver­
sion occurs through the temptation for technical display which is, in 
essence, a display of the artist’s skills. Manual skill or dexterity
is external to art in the formal sense; it exists to execute and exter-
2nalize the spiritual rules of the work as discovered by the intellect.
If the primary intent of the artist is execution then the primary rule 
is surely neglected because of the inverted priorities; consequently, 
the perfection is directed at the artist's skill rather than the work- 
to-be-made. Conversely, technique, in its higher sense, includes and 
requires a certain refinement of skill when the needs of a work demand 
that a particular skill be accomplished for the good of the work.
A second facet of technique, in its lower sense, occurs as dis­
covered rules, by nature, tend to become recipes or formulas for the
^Maritain, "The Rules of Art," p. 43; and idem, Art and Scholas­
ticism, pp. 179-180, n. 88.
^Maritain, "Art an Intellectual Virtue," p. 14. The term "for­
mal sense" refers to the spiritual or intellectual nature of art.
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future practice of art."*- Packaged rules are aids to the further prac­
tice of art, but they are also obstacles to art, and to fine art in 
particular, because the artist's work demands to be good in itself 
rather than a copy of the previous work. The traditional rules of art 
are discovered rules which have become recipes or methods of making a 
work. These rules are important to the via disciplinae; however, a 
preoccupation with method veers toward academicism or rules for the 
sake of rules. Method, of itself, only provides relief from thinking, 
especially for those artists who wish to create but lack the desire to 
pursue the laborious demands of creativity. In this sense, academi­
cism inhibits art because academic rules are too limited, restricted, 
and narrow in scope to serve the primary rule of art. Reason is essen­
tial to art but mechanistic calculation is extrinsic to the spiritual 
nature of the habitus.̂
Academicism and the Habitus
Academicism also inhibits the habitus in its development from 
the inborn capacity or natural gift of art.^ A reliance upon external 
rules to develop the habitus is contrary to the internal nature of the 
habitus. This is because the habitus is a living rule based upon
%aritain, "Art as a Virtue of the Practical Intellect," p. 54. 
". . . even in the useful arts, the rules are not ready-made recipes, 
taught by professors in schools and museums, but vital ways of operat­
ing discovered by the creative eyes of the intellect in its very labor 
of invention" (ibid., pp. 53-54).
^Maritain, "The Rules of Art," p. 40.
^Hay, Maritain's Theory, pp. 19-20.
^Maritain, "The Rules of Art," pp. 41-42.
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living, personal experiences and is formed as such within the mind.
Apart from the habitus, rules are extrinsic to the mind and to the work. 
An instructor might fill a student's mind with academic rules of art, 
and the student may work hard to apply them; nevertheless, the student 
may also never become an artist because a knowledge of rules does not 
imply actual possession of such rules internally. In other words, a 
mere knowledge of rules does not insure that an artist is able to apply 
them to the internal needs of a work. Carefully devised formulas for 
art remove the burden of thought, the originality of creation and, 
ultimately the experience of art itself.
The problem is posed for the modern artist in an insane man­
ner, as a choice between the senility of academic rules and the 
primitiveness of natural gift; with the latter, art does not yet 
exist, except in potentiality; with the former, it has ceased to 
exist at all. Art exists only in the living intellectuality of 
the habitus.
The acquisition of the habitus is a deepening of the mind, an 
indirect result of the practice of art or the relationship of the art­
ist to his object. The natural gift of art, which is also intellectual 
or spiritual, serves and enhances the development of the habitus, 
together giving the artist a unique intellectual power to make works.
Ibid., p. 40. Hay appears to contradict Maritain on this mat­
ter, as exemplified in the following quotation: "The rules of art exist 
for the purpose of establishing the artistic habitus in the artist" 
(Maritain's Theory, p. 21). By itself, the above quotation is ambig­
uous. The statement is true if_ the artist discovers the rules in ques­
tion through his making of an object. I f ,  however, the rules exist 
prior to the creative attempt, the threat of academicism is present 
because of the external nature of academic rules.
2Maritain, "The Rules of Art," p. 40.
3Ibid. 4Ibid., p. 41.
3 I b i d .  T h e  n a t u r a l  g i f t ,  t o  w h i c h  M a r i t a i n  r e f e r s ,  i s  a  g i f t  
o f  t h e  m in d ,  a  p o s s e s s i o n  o f  t h e  i n t e l l e c t .  T h e  p h y s i c a l
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The acquisition of the habitus, then, is synonymous with the development 
of the habitus.
In contradistinction to the case of Giotto or Moussorgsky, 
the case of Mozart provides us with the classic example of how 
fruitful can be the union of natural gift (and what a gift!) 
and education— the earliest, most perfect and most intense 
rational cultivation of the habitus.
The above quotation reveals something more of Maritain's view of 
the habitus and its development. Giotto and Moussorgsky acquired the 
habitus of art through the solitude and personal effort of the via 
inventionis. By contrast, Mozart combined his natural gift with the 
via disciplinae of tradition taught him by a master musician. This sort 
of education is the education of apprenticeship which contrasts with the 
academy and the type of academic training which teaches certain rules 
of— or approaches to— art as a prerequisite to the practice of art. 
Mozart, through the via inventionis of his mind, began with works and 
not with rules. In this way, the via disciplinae, in conjunction with 
a great gift, immediately served the practice of art, coinciding in the 
cultivation of a habitus of great strength and depth.
This is precisely the reason why Maritain concluded that the 
artists who expend the most effort to accumulate academic rules of art 
are often the least capable of applying them to a work, that is, creat­
ing a work of art.^
ability of the artist to competently execute a work pertains to the 
material externalization of an internal structure willed by the 
habitus. Physical ability, then, serves the intellectual gift; but, 
in its own realm, it is of equal importance to art.
^-Maritain, Art and Scholasticism, p. 179, n. 86.
^Ibid.; and idem, "The Rules of Art," pp. 42-43.
^Maritain, "The Rules of Art," p. 42.
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From this point of view one must deplore the substitition . . . 
of the academic teaching of the schools for corporate appren­
ticeship. By the very fact that art is a virtue of the prac­
tical intellect, the mode of teaching that by nature belongs 
to it is apprenticeship-education, the working-novitiate under 
a master and in the presence of the real, not lessons distrib­
uted by professors; and, to tell the truth, the very notion of 
a School of Fine Arts, especially in the sense in which the 
modern body politic understands this phrase, conceals as deep 
a misunderstanding of things as the notion, for instance, of 
an Advanced Course in Virtue.1
Maritain's conception of the academic professor can be defined in terms 
of one who teaches certain rules of— or approaches to— art and expects 
his students to create works using these rules, thus indirectly dictat­
ing the results. Maritain views the master teacher as one who first 
respects the will of his students in their intent to make a certain 
work and then assists and supervises the achievement of the desired 
result. The student provides the bulk of the via inventionis— because 
it is his work— and the instructor provides the bulk of the via dis- 
ciplinae, the result being an actual product and not a fabrication.
The instructor teaches a discipline by showing and correcting, through 
his personal example of artistic practice; the student learns his dis­
cipline by imitating the example and practicing or perfecting it for 
application to his work.^
1Ibid.
^Maritain, Art and Scholasticism, pp. 177-179, n. 85.
CHAPTER III
THE AIM OF PERFORMANCE
The Fine Arts and Performance
Musical performance is a fine art and the aim of performance is 
defined in terms of the fine arts. Performance, as an art, is primarily 
concerned with making an object, a musical work created through the aural 
production and perception of music. Performance, as a fine art, is intent 
upon creating a musical work and aiming at an aural end which stands by 
itself, "disinterested," to delight the performers who are the makers of 
the work.-*-
The beauty of a musical work, as an end beyond the end, delights
2the intellect through the sense of hearing; therefore, the aural nature 
of music defines performance as an aural art within the realm of the fine 
arts. Crucial to the aim of performance is the performer's satisfaction 
with the sound of the work he is performing. His work reflects beauty 
when he is delighted with it, an experience attributable to the fine
Oarts in general.
%aritain, "Art and Beauty," p. 33; and Hanke, Maritain's Ontol­
ogy, p. 12. A "disinterested" musical work is desired for itself by the 
performer and is not a work created to please others or with a concern 
for others (in the primary sense).
^Hanke, Maritain's Ontology, p. 13. The senses of taste, touch, 
and scent also provide pleasure to man but do not delight the intellect. 
Only the senses of sight and hearing delight the intellect of man and, 
consequently, are the windows through which beauty can be experienced. 
The former are a kind of good but not a kind of beauty. See St. Thomas 
Aquinas, Summa Theologica, I-II, 27. 1. ad 3.
^Maritain, "The Rules of Art," p. 47.
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T h e  a i m  o f  p e r f o r m a n c e ,  t h e n ,  i s  t o  c r e a t e  a  g o o d  w o r k  t h r o u g h  
t h e  s o u n d  o f  m u s i c ,  a  p l e a s i n g  s o u n d  b e i n g  t h e  p r i m a r y  en d  o f  p e r f o r m ­
a n c e  a n d  t h e  o b j e c t  f r o m  w h i c h  b e a u t y  t r a n s c e n d s . " ^ "
B e a u t y  an d  P e r f o r m a n c e
T r a n s c e n d e n t a l  B e a u t y  a n d  A e s t h e t i c  B e a u t y
T r a n s c e n d e n t a l  b e a u t y  i s  t h e  p r e s e n c e  o f  b e a u t y  i n  a l l  t h i n g s ;
i t  p e r m e a t e s  e v e r y t h i n g  an d  i s  f o u n d  e v e r y w h e r e .  A l l  t h i n g s  c o n t a i n  a
2
d e g r e e  o f  g o o d n e s s  a n d  a l l  t h i n g s  a r e  b e a u t i f u l  i n  t h e i r  own w a y .
A t  t h i s  p o i n t  i t  m ay b e  a d d e d  t h a t  i n  t h e  e y e s  o f  God a l l  
t h a t  e x i s t s  i s  b e a u t i f u l ,  t o  t h e  v e r y  e x t e n t  t o  w h i c h  i t  p a r ­
t i c i p a t e s  i n  b e i n g .  F o r  t h e  b e a u t y  t h a t  God b e h o l d s  i s  t r a n ­
s c e n d e n t a l  b e a u t y ,  w h i c h  p e r m e a t e s  e v e r y  e x i s t e n t ,  t o  o n e  
d e g r e e  o r  a n o t h e r . " ^
God a l o n e  s e e s  t h e  p e r f e c t i o n  a n d  i n f i n i t y  o f  b e a u t y ,  b e a u t y  a s  a n  
a b s o l u t e .  Man i s  l i m i t e d  t o  t h e  b e a u t y  h i s  s e n s e s  p e r c e i v e  a n d  t h r o u g h  
w h i c h ,  a s  a  r e s u l t ,  n o t  a l l  t h i n g s  a r e  b e a u t i f u l .  " T h e  b e a u t y  w h i c h  i s  
c o n n a t u r a l  t o  man m u s t ,  t h e n ,  b e  g r a s p e d  b y  t h e  a c t i v i t y  o f  t h e  s e n s e s  
i n  u n i o n  w i t h  i n t e l l i g e n c e . " ^  T h i s  k i n d  o f  b e a u t y  i s  a e s t h e t i c  b e a u t y .
"*"A good work is one which is pleasing to the performer.
^Maritain, "Poetry and Beauty," p. 163; and idem, "Art and 
Beauty," pp. 30-31. A metaphysical discussion of beauty is beyond the 
scope of this study; however, a brief comparison of transcendental 
beauty to aesthetic beauty is necessary to help clarify the relation­
ship of beauty to performance.
^Maritain, "Poetry and Beauty," p. 163; also see idem, "The Ways 
of the Practical Intellect," in Approaches to God, ed. Ruth Nanda Anshen, 
trans. Peter O'Reilly (New York: Harper and Bros., 1954), pp. 84-86.
^Hanke, Maritain's Ontology, p. 28.
^ M a r i t a i n ,  " P o e t r y  an d  B e a u t y , "  p p .  163-164. T h e  d e f i n i t i o n  o f  
b e a u t y  g i v e n  i n  c h a p t e r  1  i s  b a s e d  u p o n  t h e  i n t u i t i v e  p e r c e p t i o n  o f  
b e a u t y  w h i c h  i s  a n a l o g o u s  t o  a e s t h e t i c  b e a u t y .
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Aesthetic beauty is transcendental beauty confronting the intel­
lect of man through sense perception; consequently, things are divided 
into the beautiful or ugly depending upon whether they please or dis­
please the intellect-permeated sense.'*' This is the aesthetic experi­
ence. The limitation of the aesthetic experience is that man may not 
recognize the beauty of an object because his senses may completely miss 
the presence of beauty in the object confronting him. "Not every person 
sees beauty in the same object or under different conditions or even at 
different times.Aesthetic beauty is limited to a particular partici­
pation in the infinity of transcendental beauty.
The fine arts attempt to absorb transcendental beauty into the 
realm of aesthetic beauty, not by creating a concept but by creating an 
object. Since only God can see absolute perfection, the object of fine 
art is limited to the imperfection of the artist; consequently, no work 
of art can achieve absolute perfection.
The above paragraph is a synthesis of three important points. 
First, the spiritual nature of transcendental beauty cannot be produced 
as conceptual beauty, an entity in itself. Beauty, as a concept, is 
beyond man's understanding and is revealed to him only through the 
aesthetic experience, a minute glimpse of a universe and an experience 
which is nonconceptual in nature.^
^Maritain, "Poetry and Beauty," p. 164; and Hanke, Maritain*s 
Ontology, p. 28.
‘Hazo, Mari tain's Aesthetic, p. 27; also see Hay, Maritain's 
Theory, pp. 13-14. According to Hazo (Maritain's Aesthetic, p. 29), 
the ability to experience beauty is directly proportionate to the 
sensitivity of the beholder.
^Hanke, Maritain's Ontology, p. 27.
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Secondly, a work of art cannot be purely or totally disinterested 
because the artist cannot work in a void to attain his object. He must 
draw upon the world through sensory experience to practice his art, to 
make his object which becomes disinterested to him as it progresses to 
a unique end.'*' An artist cannot create a disinterested object concep­
tually because he cannot create beauty conceptually. The relationship 
between the two lies within the realm of the transcendentals; a disinter­
ested object reflects beauty.
Thirdly, since aesthetic beauty is never totally perfect, an
object of art always leaves something more to be desired. An artist
strives for perfection but never quite reaches the absolute summit of
his work. This lack of perfection functions as an incentive to reach
beyond reason toward disinterestedness and adds a certain mysterious
element to the creative process. Obviously, absolute perfection would
2leave nothing more to be desired and no mystery to be solved.
The foregoing discussion makes implicit several important con­
siderations for musical performance. The relationship of beauty to 
performance depends upon the aural experience of music because the 
aesthetic beauty of music is revealed to the performer through the 
aural experience, the sound being the object from which beauty is 
mirrored.
The object of performance is not a concept of created beauty but, 
rather, a certain sound of music from which beauty is reflected. A per­
formed work can never achieve absolute perfection because it is limited
■^Maritain, "Art and Morality," in Art and Scholasticism, p. 73.
^Maritain, "Poetry and Beauty," p. 167.
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to the aesthetic inclinations of the performer. On one hand, it is pos­
sible to perform a work without the delight or intellectual joy asso­
ciated with aesthetic beauty; and, on the other hand, the performer must 
follow his personal delight with the sound of his performed music if the 
spontaneous or unpredictable inclination toward uniqueness and disinter­
estedness is to be achieved in the work. Without intellectual joy, the 
transcendental beauty of a work will remain muted to the performer’s ear.
In pursuit of the intellectual joy of making, the performer 
expects to be delighted in the sound of his performed work-in-progress; 
however, sounds may occur which actually offend his aural sense.'*" For 
example, modern or contemporary music may offend the aural sense at 
first hearing because of the unusual complexity of such music, espe­
cially if the ear is unaccustomed to the sound of such music. Con­
versely, the same music may delight the aural sense of another per­
former, a proof of the very personal nature of sensory perception. 
Furthermore, that particular sound which may at first shock the aural 
sense may become acceptable and pleasing later as the ear-permeated 
intellect becomes accustomed to the sound of such music. The aes­
thetic experience, then, is unpredictable from performer to performer 
as well as within the intellect of the performer himself.
Each creative act of performance moves toward disinterestedness 
but never becomes totally disinterested. A performer can never be cer­
tain of what new heights of aural experience each performance may bring; 
each new glimpse of transcendental beauty provides incentive to pursue
^Martini, Maritain and Music, p. A3.
2Ibid., p. A4.
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the next glimpse, which lies somewhere beyond the performer's intuitive 
grasp of beauty.^"
Academicism and Beauty
Artistic attempts to make beauty positive rather than intuitive
veer toward academicism, which relies on method or formula to produce 
obeauty. Academicism in performance strives to remove the elusive nature 
of sound as an object of creation and the mysterious relationship of 
sound to the beauty if reflects. Accordingly, this kind of positivism 
tries to make positive what is not positive and belies an ignorance of 
the nature of transcendental beauty. If the artist could produce his 
own beauty, it would no longer be a transcendental; if beauty is not a 
transcendental, it could be reliably produced by artists who "under­
stand" the mystery of beauty.
The truth of the matter is derived from a limitation; man is 
limited to aesthetic beauty, the beauty of sensory experience. Sensory 
experience is a limitation because man can perceive beauty only as a 
reflection of a created object. Music, then, has a certain sound as 
its object and beauty is reflected from the sound heard by the musician.
The academicism of performance focuses upon the printed score as 
an object of beauty and attempts to produce beauty through a proficient 
reproduction of the score. Consequently, such preoccupation with a writ­
ten score shifts the artistic emphasis from aural experience to visual 
experience. If visual mechanics become the object of performance, a
•^Sense intuition is intellectualized sense perception; it is not 
logical and not something to be planned or solved. Hazo, Marltain's 
Aesthetic, pp. 35-37.
Maritain, "Poetry and Beauty," p. 174.2
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performer may proficiently execute a musical sequence while completely 
missing the beauty reflected by the sound of the exercise. Conversely, 
if a certain sound is the object of performance, the score will serve as 
the vehicle or instrument of that sound; hence, a visual certainty is 
subordinated to an aural uncertainty.
The academicist attempts to define what is beautiful in concep­
tual terms while, in effect, denying that the aesthetic experience is 
nonconceptual in nature. Such a practice also denies the personal 
nature of the aesthetic by attempting to provide beauty for a performer 
as if it could be a simple matter of reproducing the score. A degree 
of transcendental beauty is present in every musical work, but the ques­
tion of whether this beauty will reveal itself to the musician can be 
answered only through the obscure, personal actuality of the aesthetic 
experience. The true academicist must deny the mystery of transcenden­
tal beauty and the unpredictability of aesthetic beauty to preserve his 
academic method; the true artist must deny the positivism of conceptual 
beauty to preserve the spontaneous, intellectual joy of the aesthetic 
experience.
Because the aesthetic experience of music is rooted in aural 
perception, the performer's experience of beauty is subjective in nature. 
A performer may capture beauty in the sound of a work, but he cannot 
simply produce it by mere reproduction of a score, a way of focusing 
upon beauty as a conceptual object of music. The aim of performance 
is a created object, the sound of a musical work which reflects beauty 
for the performer to perceive aesthetically. In this respect, beauty 
is an end beyond the end, an end captured intuitively or non­
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c o n c e p t u a l l y  a s  t h e  s o u n d  o f  t h e  m u s i c a l  w o r k  i s  b e i n g  p e r f e c t e d .  B e a u t y ,  
a s  a  c o n c e p t ,  i s  n o t  a  d i r e c t  a im  o f  p e r f o r m a n c e .
Technique and Performance 
Manual Skill and Performance
The technique of performance is inextricably tied to the art of 
performance. This is especially true in the case of technical dexterity 
or the execution of the performance product. The skill of performance 
removes a physical obstruction to art and enables the performer to exter­
nalize his product or produce the sound of his work, the sound being the 
intended object.
The labor through which the zither player acquires nimbleness 
of finger does not increase his art as such nor does it engen­
der any special art; it simply removes a physical impediment 
to the exercise of art: . . . art stands entirely on the side 
of the mind.l
The performer’s skill is necessary to carry out the primary rule which 
is in the intellect. The execution of performance, then, is a means 
to an end, the end being a particular sound which has evolved from the 
primary rule of art and which must be externalized to become the aural 
experience of music.
If the aim of performance is execution, the means become the 
object and display for the sake of display is inevitable. The display 
of performance skill is a constant temptation to the virtuoso or refined 
performance group. Display tends toward trickery and athleticism to
^Maritain, "Art an Intellectual Virtue," p. 14; also see 
Martini, Maritain and Music, p. 52; and Hay, Maritain's Theory, p. 10.
2Martini, Maritain and Music, p. 52.
3Ibid., p. 186.
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capture the admiration of an audience, a practice which betrays a concern
with pleasing others rather than a concern with producing a pleasing
work.^ Musical display can also mask a lack of connaturality with the
beauty of a musical work because the performer's concern is with the
2sound of his skill rather than the sound of the work. Consequently, 
an impressive display can mask an unimpressive artistic intent.
Nevertheless, it is inaccurate to say that a refined skill is 
unnecessary. A well developed performance skill greatly enhances the 
sound of a work, but it must be at the service of the work itself. The 
point is that a good technician is not necessarily a good artist. A 
physical command of an instrument lends itself well to pleasing others; 
therefore, it must remain at the service of the primary rule and under 
the control of the habitus, which seeks to make a good work rather than 
a good performer. The physical dexterity of the artist is simply an
Qexternal and material requirement of art.
How does the skilled instrumentalist or vocalist serve the needs 
of a musical work? First, he must heed the creativity of the spirit in 
determining what the work demands and be undeviating with the direction 
his performance activity must take to meet these demands.
Secondly, the performing musician must be prepared to subordi­
nate himself to the creation of a musical work. For example, a powerful 
soprano must be able to sing softly and without prominence when the work 
demands it; a high-register trumpeter may need to develop a complimentary 
low register to meet the needs of a xjork; the instrumentalist who dazzles 1
1Ibid., pp. 191-192. 2Ibid., p. 186.
^Maritain, "Art an Intellectual Virtue," p. 14; and Hay, Mari- 
tain's Theory, p. 10.
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his admirers with his fingering facility may find long tones with a 
corresponding quality necessary to a certain work.
Thirdly, the performer must recognize the difference between a 
work performed to display an instrument or voice and a work performed 
for itself, but with an emphasis on an instrument or voice. In the 
latter case, the instrument ie an instrument serving the performed work 
while, in the former case, the work serves the instrument and falls into 
the emptiness of means.
A skilled performer is highly qualified to carry out his service 
to a work of art; however, if this service becomes self-serving, the 
creativity of the spirit is confined and reduced by the enhancement of 
the ego.
Academic Rules and Performance
The academic rules of performance— the traditional rules of per­
formance are included within the academic framework— are a technique 
related to the physical skill of performance. These rules may, in fact, 
use skill as a means to its ends, ends which are also a means of art.
The difference is that academic rules are more intellectual, but the 
similarity is that they are also material rules, external to the pri­
mary rule of art.
Academic rules are packaged rules which confront the performer 
with such traditional approaches to art as: the correct way to express 
a phrase; the proper interpretation of a style; or the right concept 
of tone quality. The problem associated with academic rules appears 
when a possible way to create in a given situation becomes the right
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way to create in all situations. This is academicism or rules for the 
sake of rules.^
Academicism threatens the via inventionis of performance because 
the rules tend to be applied in a stringent fashion to all musical works. 
The prototypal application of rules is natural to art because the sen­
sory experience of art cannot draw upon a void to attain its object.
But when the via inventionis is dominated by the via disciplinae, the 
product of performance becomes more of a stereotyped preconception than 
a unique object of art. "To the extent that the rules of the Academy
prevail, the fine arts revert to the generic type of art and to its
2lower species, the mechanical arts."
R.ules for the sake of rules can be expressed as "art for the 
knowledge of rules." Art for conceptual knowledge is of the specula­
tive order and is contrary to the nonconceptual, practical order of
Omaking. The activity of art is one of creation rather than procure­
ment of conceptual knowledge, a knowledge of academic rules.^ Art 
utilizes knowledge to create; knowledge is an instrument of art.^
^See chapter 2 above, p. 27.
^Maritain, "The Rules of Art," p. 48.
^See chapter 2 above, p. 15.
^Maritain, "Concerning Poetic Knowledge," in The Situation of 
Poetry, in collaboration with Raissa Maritain, trans. Marshall Suther 
(New York: The Philosophical Library, 1955), p. 49.
^Ibid. This brief consideration of conceptual knowledge is con­
cerned with the habitus of art and does not enter the Maritain treatment 
of poetic knowledge, a subject beyond the scope of this study. "The 
habitus [sic] of art produces its fruit in the practical judgment on 
the work to be made; poetic knowledge, in the xrork done" (ibid., p. 64, 
n. 14) .
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Conceptual knowledge may be presupposed to art but it is extrin­
sic to it.'*' Art does not intend to form a mind by an object-to-be-known; 
instead, the mind intends to form an object.and, through the practice of
nart, form itself as well. Rules, or the knowledge of rules, are an 
instrument of art and extrinsic to the activity of art.
Performance for the knowledge of performance is a simple accumu­
lation of ways to perform. The conscious concern is with how to apply 
conceptual rules to the performance of a work, the obvious lack being 
the artistic vision necessary to visualize intellectually the work-to- 
be-performed. In other words, vision ensures that the art of perform­
ance begins x-riLth an object-to-be-made and not a means-to-be-applied.
The means of performance are fixed at the time work on the musical 
selection begins because they become known as the sound of the selec­
tion makes itself known to the performer.
Accumulating conceptual rules of art is dissimilar to acquiring 
3the habitus of art. An artist who knows the most about art may be the
■'"Ibid., p. 50. It is not intended to infer that conceptual 
knowledge is a prerequisite to art. A knowledge of a certain aspect 
of art is gained through the artistic experience and is available for 
further use, as a part of the expanding habitus of art. Nevertheless, 
a product of art is made nonconceptually and without dependence upon 
conceptual knowledge.
^Ibid.; and idem, "On Human Knowledge," in The Range of Reason 
(New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1952; paperback ed., [1961]), p. 17.
•^Following the completion of a performed work, the performer can 
extract his material methods of execution from the score for conceptual 
use. In other words, after the work is established or "'situated,' the 
author can employ without disadvantage the special charm to be found in 
the barbarism of technical terms" (Maritain, Art and Scholasticism, p. 
188, n. 116). The material analysis of a score belongs to the specula­
tive order of knowledge and should not be confused with the initial mate­
rial application of rules to a work. The rules become an internal part 
of the work at the service of the habitus, in its operative intent to
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least able to apply his knowledge to a work being pursued.^ In musical 
performance, this occurs because the performer, while able to create 
various musical sounds, is reluctant to deviate from his known sound 
creations to find that unique sound which applies to the work being 
performed.
To become an internal part of the performance product, external 
rules must be a discovered necessity of the work at hand, a discovery 
made by the performer as he himself performs the work. What follows is 
a new adaptation of certain fundamental or perennial rules to the work 
which becomes an internal part of a unique product. In this way, old 
rules learned from past performances become new again.
The material rules of performance serve the spiritual rules, and 
the primary (spiritual) rule serves the object of performance, the sound 
of the musical work. This is because the release of the creativity of 
the spirit is closely tied to artistic vision, and the artist envisions 
the work as a whole, not a set of rules-to-be-followed.^ Technique is 
the ensemble of both material and spiritual rules;4 therefore, it cannot 
be a primary aim of performance.
Academic Rules and the Conductor
Academic rules present a special problem for the conductor of a 
performance group because, besides being the primary maker of the work,
make a work, to practice art. The abstraction of material rules from 
the work brings them back to their external position; at this point, 
they are rules and nothing more than rules.
^See chapter 2 above, p. 28.
2Maritain, "The Rules of Art," p. 45.
3Mantain, Art and Scholasticism, pp. 181-182, n. 95.
4Ibid., p. 176, n. 79.
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he is responsible for the artistic experiences of the group members. It 
is the conductor who is responsible, for the via inventionis and the via 
disciplinae of the work the group is creating; necessities of the work 
are determined and applications of rules are made as he sees them. This 
is a special situation. JEf the design of the work were to move in the 
various directions desired by each group member, artistic anarchy would 
result. The needs of the work itself could be entirely missed in the 
conductor's efforts to please his group membership.
The responsibility of the conductor, then, is the same as that 
of a performer, but in a higher sense. He is primarily responsible to 
the creation and perfection of a musical work and secondarily respon­
sible for the artistic experiences of the performers involved.
The latter responsibility is important because the performers 
are artists and not slaves. The conductor must constantly consider the 
performers’ involvement in the making of the product. Are they able 
follow the artistic innovations the conductor is applying to the work?
If the performers can sense that the conductor's artistic innovation 
and discipline— through the instrumentality of the group— is perfecting 
the work, they become a personal part of the practice of art.
On the other hand, if the conductor's expectations are self- 
serving, or serve another master (academic rules), the performers become 
removed from making and lose the connaturality with beauty so vital to 
the fine arts. In this case, the conductor's personal connaturality 
with his product must also be questioned. Without the primary respon­
sibility to the work, the secondary responsibility to the performing 
group is obstructed by expectations external to art.
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Since performance is a re-creation as well as a creation of 
music, composed works are generally presented to the conductor through 
a written score. A written score requires a visual interpretation, 
that is, an assessment through a knowledge of means as a prerequisite 
to the aural experience. The object of performance, however, cannot 
be attained apart from the aural experience; therefore, a score is only 
a potential work for performance and contains only the potentiality of 
beauty for the performer. It is an instrument of the conductor which 
he uses to create the object, the sound of the work.
A knowledge of re-creation lends itself to the oversimplifica­
tion of exact reproduction and thwarts the aim of art through the copy­
making of an established work.'*' If the conductor's aim stops at this 
point, the performance will fall short of the ends necessary to the 
creativity of art. A conductor's aim to create a good work depends 
upon the delight or enjoyment he derives from the sound of the work 
as he conducts it. Beauty cannot delight the artist's intellect unless 
he puts something of himself into the work and, as a result, allows
2the re-creative activity to become intertwined with creative activity.
When the concern of the conductor is the object of performance,
re-creation and creation occur simultaneously; if his primary concern is
(
with the means of score interpretation, re-creation is isolated from 
creation and is doomed to the sterility of impersonality, the motions 
of performance. Furthermore, the contemplation of a musical score is 
secondary to performance because the aural experience of music exists 12
1
Maritain, "The Purity of Art," pp. 54-57.
2Maritain, The Frontiers of Poetry in Art and Scholasticism and 
the Frontiers of Poetry, p. 126.
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therein as a potentiality and not as an object. The contemplative activ­
ity of the mind belongs to the speculative of knowledge rather than the 
practical order of art.^
A problem of academicism is that the artist who possesses rules,
through a knowledge of rules, may be unable to apply them to the indi-
2viduality of a work of art. The artist’s preoccupation with method is 
a hindrance to his art because rules are held in a higher esteem than 
the composition itself. A dogmatic loyalty to fixed traditional rules 
is unyielding or inflexible in the face of the spontaneous demands of 
creation. The demands of a musical work are unpredictable due to the 
aural nature of performance. The artist’s concern with method consider­
ably narrows the scope of the work and attempts to narrow the infinity 
of beauty as a result.
The dilemma of the conductor, then, is serving the needs of a 
work through the primary rule of art while, at the same time, consider­
ing the artistic needs of the performers who are making the x<rork through 
the externalization of the conductor's directives.
Communication and Performance
Communication in a work of art occurs when the artist "says some­
thing" to a perceiver of the work. It involves a communication of effect, 
nonconceptual in nature.^ The problem of communication is whether the 
artist intends such communication or whether communication is inherent
■*ilaritain, "The Speculative Order and the Practical Order, pp. 5-6.
oSee pp. 42-43 above.
^Maritain, "The Rules of Art," p. 44.
^Maritain, "The Purity of Art," pp. 61-62.
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in a work of art.
The Maritain position on communication in art is consistent with
1his general position toward foreign elements or external threats to art.
. . . the activity of art is not related in itself to a need 
of communicating tio others (this need is real and in fact inter­
venes inevitably in artistic activity, but it does not define it); 
it is related essentially to the need of speaking and manifesting 
in a work-to-be-made— by virtue of spiritual superabundance and 
even though there were no one to see or hear. . . .2
The quoted passage reinforces what has been said concerning the artist's
first priority in his work, that is, his self-satisfaction with what he 
3is making. In this sense, a work may present an obscure significance 
but resists any claims to a definite internal meaning.^ The externaliza- 
tion of the product involves communication but not necessarily a direct 
desire to communicate anything beyond the physical substance of the work 
itself. Furthermore, the physical presence of the work brings the art­
ist's vision to the consciousness of the artist himself, also obscurely.^ 
This is because the meaning of the x-rork surpasses the physical product 
and presents a certain difficulty for the artist in his attempts to con­
ceptualize what he has intended. It becomes evident that a perceiver is 
confronted with a certain obscurity, more or less, which should not be 
misrepresented as any sort of definite meaning for perceivers in general.
An artist's concern x<?ith being understood or misunderstood is 
beside the point. He creates first for himself, and his product must be
^See ibid.
, "Concerning Poetic Knowledge," p. 49.
■̂ See chapter 2 above, pp. 18 and 23. 
^Hanke, Maritain1s Ontology, p. 92.
5Ibid., p. 99. 6Ibid.
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left to stand by itself as a work of art.'*' Whether the work is accepted 
or rejected by others is an external concern and involves a question of 
the use of a product rather than the making of the product.^
The communication of effect involves emotion, either the emo­
tional expression of the artist or the emotional perception of the lis­
tener. There are two kinds of emotion in music: the intellectual joy or 
delight of perception; and a subjective emotion, a result of the first 
kind.^ This means that the expression and apprehension of beauty 
involves subjective emotion or personal feelings, a result of the joy 
or delight of the intellect in the perception of beauty in a work.^ *2
^Maritain, "Concerning Poetic Knowledge," p. 49.
2Martini (Maritain and Music, p. 67) criticizes popular music 
for its intent to communicate certain sensual qualities to listeners.
This seems to be a weak criticism of such music because it is based upon 
the assumption that (1) all popular music has such intent; and (2) only 
popular music depends upon the sensory experience for a connaturality of 
sound to the intellect of the listener. In respect to the latter assump­
tion, it is true that much popular music is simple in content and repeti­
tious by nature; but this, in itself, cannot be equated with the communi­
cation of sensuality. The simplicity of music is more connatural to the 
average listener, and the repetition of music makes it easier for the 
intellect to "find itself" and be delighted by the musical sounds. By 
contrast, complex musical sounds are apt to be less connatural to the 
average listener, at least until his aural-permeated intellect grows 
accustomed to the sound of such music. Obviously, such music tends to 
be less popular. In respect to the former assumption, a phase of popular 
music does appear to aim at intentional communication: commercial music. 
Commercial music is written primarily to please others; that is, the 
makers of such music intend to make a work which "sells" rather than a 
work which stands by itself as an object of art. Popular music, however, 
is not necessarily commercial music because works created for themselves 
can become popular without such intent— again, the question of use as 
opposed to creative intent applies here. If music created for itself 
becomes popular, it matters little that it pleases others in addition to 
the artist.
^Martini, Maritain and Music, p. 147.
^Hazo, Maritain’s Aesthetic, p. 50.
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Maritain terms the body of a work as the culmination of all the 
technique which produced the externalized product; the soul of a work 
is the operative idea, spiritual in nature, the realm of the habitus of 
art; the spirit of a work is the internal expression not under the con­
scious control of the artist.^- Normally, the body (technique) is the
instrument of the soul (habitus), and the spirit (personal expression)
ois a component part of the soul.
"Magic" enters a work when the spirit separates from the soul
3and controls both the body and the soul of the work. "Magic" in a 
work is the superabundance of internal expression, emotion, passion, 
or affect in a work which deepens the subjectivity of its content and 
provides emotive power to a perceiver.^
It is important to note that magic, in this sense, is not a con­
scious component of the artist's intent. Magic may or may not enter a 
work and is variable from work to work and from artist to artist. The 
problem of magic occurs when an artist seeks it in his work and diverts 
his attention from the concerns of the habitus of art. To strive after
magic in music is to strive toward an effect, an effect rooted in affect
5and external to the created product. To seek after magic forces a 
fabrication of the product of art.^ 2
^Maritain, "The Freedom of Song," in Art and Poetry, trans. E. 
de P. Matthews (New York: The Philosophical Library, 1943), p. 99.
2Ibid. 3Ibid., pp. 99-100.
^Maritain, "The Three Epiphanies of Creative Intuition," in 
Creative Intuition, pp. 402-403.
^Martini, Maritain and Music, p. 163.
^Maritain, "The Freedom of Song," p. 101.
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If the artist’s first concern is with the good of the work, the
emotive content is not entirely subjective. In other words, when the
aim is toward making a good work, the intellect works with emotion in
structuring the work and, as a result, the emotional content is neither
entirely objective (depicted) or entirely subjective (expressed).^ The
fine arts purify passion by developing it within the limits of beauty
2and in harmony with the intellect. Thus, the magic in a work is 
obscurely intertwined with the intellectual soul of the work.
Whatever magic is conjured up the man's imagination, pas­
sions and emotions will be subject to the light of the intel­
lect. Whatever is vital in magical thought will remain— what 
is magical will disappear.^
A work of art, then, can communicate an emotional effect without aiming 
at such an effect.1̂
It is perfectly true that art has the effect of inducing 
in us affective states, but this is not its end or its 
object: a fine distinction, if you will, but still an 
extremely important one. Everything gets out of hand if 
one takes as the end that which is simply a conjoined 
effect or a repercussion, and if one makes of the end itself 
. . .  a simple means. . . .
Communication has a natural part in the creative experience but it is
not the specified object of art, either for one who creates for effect 
or one who perceives for effect.^
■̂ Hanke, Maritain's Ontology, pp. 75-77.
^Maritain, "The Purity of Art," p. 62.
^Martini, Mari tain and Music, p. 192.
^Maritain, "The Purity of Art," p. 62.
%aritain, Art and Scholasticism, p. 204, n. 138. 
6Ibid., p. 205.
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The aural experience of musical performance lends itself well 
to the communication of effect.'*' A performer can bring a tear to the 
eye through the beauty of his music; he can shock a listener with dis­
sonance; or he can leave an audience awestruck with the power of his 
music. These kinds of experiences can occur without such intent and 
as a result of the sound of the work, created for itself. To avoid 
aiming at such effect, the performer must perform as if no one were 
listening to his music except he, the artist. The music will commu­
nicate something of the performer, obscurely, and may leave its effect 
upon the listener spontaneously and unintentionally.
. . . the magic in performance is quite indispensable since the 
nature of music demands its execution in time. Therefore, is 
there any performance without some magic, no matter how meager?
Is not the personality of the performing artist or lack of it 
thus displayed?"^
The nature of performance is such that the presence of magic 
is inevitable and unavoidable, but to aim at such effect is to aim 
away from the product of performance. The communication of perform­
ance, then, is a component of, but not an object of, musical perform- 
3ance. *23
" . . .  the possibility of magic exists in music to a higher 
degree than in the other arts: since music, taken in its nature, even 
before any consideration of magic, has the peculiar privilege . . . 
of expressing— beyond any possible meaning of words— the most deeply 
subjective, singular and affective stirs of creative subjectivity, 
too deep-seated to be possibly expressed by any other art" (Maritain, 
"The Three Epiphanies of Creative Intuition," p. 404).
2Martini, Maritain and Music, p. 186.
3A product of sound, pleasing to the performer, is the aim or 
formal object of performance. The formal object of performance is in 
contrast with the material object which simply intends to execute the 
written score. The aim of performance, then, transcends material exe­
cution and, in fact, submits the material object to the exigencies of
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the formal object. Consequently, the rules of execution are right or 
correct because they externalize sounds which please the performer and 
guide him in the direction of his formal object. In other words, the 
aim of performance is achieved by the submission of the art of perform­
ance to a work, the movement being in a direction which aurally satis­
fies or delights the performer.
"To say that art must be submissive to the object is therefore to 
say that it must be submissive to the object to be made as such 
or to the right rules of operation thanks to which this object 
will truly be what it ought to be. (Academicism with its recipes, 
pseudo-classicism with its cliches and its mythology, Wagnerism 
with its worship of effect, all fail in this submissiveness)" 
(Maritain, Art and Scholasticism, p. 225, n. 185).
CHAPTER IV
THE ACTION OF PERFORMANCE
Artistic Judgment and Performance
The performer is a creator of music; moreover, he is a re-creator 
of music as well. The performer is a re-creator when he begins his art 
with a work created by another artist, that is, a composition or arrange­
ment written by a composer and printed on a score. The performer becomes 
the window— perhaps a stained glass window— through which a composition 
shines.^ The intent of the work, and the composer, is commingled with 
the self-expression of the performer, another way of saying that the 
creation and re-creation of performance are inextricable.
The re-creation of a work for performance begins with a judgment 
of what the composer intended when he created the work. Artistic judg­
ment is never absolute because the performer cannot be entirely positive 
about a composer's intent, a degree of obscurity being a part of every 
created work. However, to be legitimate, a performer's intentions in 
re-creating a work must be faithful to the composer's intentions, so far 
as they are known and perceived by the performer.* 4 Obviously, several 
interpretations are possible and even the best interpretation is only a 
probability.^
\lartini, Maritain and Music, p. 129.
^Ibid. ^Ibid.
4Hay, Maritain's Theory, p. 64. ^Ibid.
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The judgment of a composed work occurs in two dimensions (sepa­
rate yet related). A visual contemplation of the score is the beginning 
of a judgment and a reflection upon, or assessment of, symbolic language 
through which something of the composer's intent is grasped.'*’ Score 
contemplation involves conceptual knowledge and concerns the material 
means by which the work was composed. Such an assessment of means, by 
itself, inclines toward academicism because the compositional mechanics 
can be accurately identified and readily applied to a conceptual vision 
of the work. If, however, artistic judgment ceases at this point, the 
inner, spiritual mystery of the work is muted and less likely to be 
revealed to the performer.
The second and primary phase of artistic judgment is the aural 
perception of the work by the performer. In this dimension, the per­
former is a perceiver, a listener as well as a maker. The aural per­
ception of a work generally begins when the act of performance, the
pmaking of the work, begins. To judge by perception, the performer 
must be open to what the work conveys through sound; that is, judg­
ment by perception requires a prior consent to the sound of the work 
before the inner work, the composer's intentions, reveals itself to 
the performer.^ Judgment by perception is intuitive and less positive *2
^"Vision, in this sense, refers to score contemplation through 
the sense of sight.
2Judgment by aural perception is possible apart from the action 
of performance; however, listening, by itself, cannot approach the depth 
of aural perception required by the performing (artistic) experience.
In judging a composed work, perceptive listening goes beyond conceptual 
contemplation but falls short of creative perception.
3"We must listen to the interiority of the work . . . [and] be 
open to what it conveys. . . . And this requires a sort of previous, ten­
tative consent. . . to the work and to the [artist's] intentions. . ." 
(Maritain, "The Internalization of Music," in Creative Intuition, p. 308).
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than judgment by conception. The inner intent, or spiritual mystery, of 
the work reveals itself to the performer through the act of performance, 
obscurely, spontaneously, and in depth when he has "lived with" the com­
position for a time.
Judgment by conception can assess the material intent of a work; 
but, if the material judgment is equated with the primary judgment, the 
spiritual intent, the sphere of beauty and the fine arts, can be missed 
or misinterpreted. Conceptual or material judgment is a judgment of 
preconception because it is made prior to the act of performance. This 
is in contrast to spiritual judgment which occurs at the moment of per­
ception and without preconception. Judgment through aural perception 
requires that the intellect be permeated with the sound of the work 
before a judgment is completed, a practice which transcends material 
observation and involves the aesthetic experience of beauty.'*' Since 
judgment by perception involves the aesthetic experience, it is properly 
an aesthetic judgment, a kind of judgment which moves to the deep, spirit­
ual roots of a work by means of the material, surface mechanics.
Aesthetic judgment confronts a double mystery: the secret of the
2work (the composer's intent) and the personality of the composer. In
this sense, the performer, as a listener, must be obedient to the music
3and what it may teach him. Prior consent neutralizes preconception and 
allows the work to reveal itself to the performer as he expresses the 
work, while, at the same time, uncovering something of the composer 3
•*"Hazo, Maritain's Aesthetic, p. 28.
^Hay, Maritain's Theory, p. 61.
3Ibid.
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himself through his compositional idea.
Unless the performer gives consent to the work, as it stands, 
the composition will be inhibited in its potential to teach him its 
inner secrets. In other words, if he asks that a composition conform 
to his personal view of what a musical work should contain, the work, 
already created, is judged by concepts previously formed in the intel­
lect.'*' Under such circumstances, there can be no accurate judgment of 
the work as a unique object of fine art.
Giving consent to the work is allowing the double mystery of
the composer's personality and the objective reality of sound he has
ocaptured to be received, perceived, and judged by the performer. The 
work teaches through revealment; consequently, whatever the performer 
perceives is dependent upon his ability to perceive that which is con-
Ocealed to the eye.
Through the receptive intuition of aural perception,^ the per­
former can judge whether the composer really has something to say, 
within the context of his creative idea, and to give of himself *2
"We shall judge the work of art as an article subject to our 
whim, an article the measure of which is our own bent of mind" (Mari- 
tain, "On Artistic Judgment," in The Range of Reason, p. 19).
2Receiving a work is hearing the sound of the work; perceiving 
a work is allowing the sound to permeate the intellect through the aural 
sense. Reception requires our presence; perception requires our full 
attention. The work reveals itself when x?e learn something about the 
work apart from the score, an inner secret not evident in print but 
obscurely present in the sounds we hear. We judge by intuition while 
we experience the aesthetic beauty reflected from the sound of the work.
O We shall judge the work of art as the living vehicle of a hid­
den truth to which both the work and we ourselves are together subject, 
and which is the measure at once of the work and of our mind" (ibid.).
^Maritain, "The Internalization of Music," p. 307.
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personally; or whether he is content to offer a purely technical display 
of his skills.'*' Still, it is necessary to respect an artist's effort, 
even if the effort falls short of intent or if the intent itself is 
found to be meager. A certain respect for the work, which involves 
the prospect of unraveling an inner mystery, is the receptive attitude 
necessary for, or prerequisite to, the artistic judgment.
Artistic Judgment and Artistic Criticism
Artistic or aesthetic judgment records or remembers an aesthetic
3experience after it has occurred; accordingly, the performer applies 
his perceptive judgment of a composed work, as well as the initial score 
evaluation, to his re-creation of the work through performance.
The judgment of art, however, is distinct from the judgment of 
taste.^ Taste relates to the perceptive powers of the performer rather 
than the expressive powers of the work. The judgment of taste uses the 
work to measure these perceptive powers, which is analogous to measur­
ing the work through preconceptions. Taste is more concerned with a 
general knowledge of art than with the specific perception of a work; 
and it is, consequently, a facet of the speculative order of knowledge 
rather than the operative or practical order or art.^ The judgment of
•*-Maritain, "On Artistic Judgment," p. 20.
^Ibid. "The only artist who does not deserve respect is the 
one who works to please the public, for commercial success or official 
success" (ibid., pp. 20-21).
^Hazo, Maritain's Aesthetic, p. 28.
^Maritain, Art and Scholasticism, p. 202, n. 137.
^Ibid.
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t a s t e  e x i s t s  a p a r t  f r o m  t h e  a r t i s t i c  h a b i t u s  w h i l e  t h e  ju d g m e n t  o f  a r t  
i s  a n  i n t e g r a l  p a r t  o f  t h i s  h a b i t u s . ^
T h e  ju d g m e n t  o f  t a s t e  p e r t a i n s  t o  t h e  p o w e r s  o f  c o n t e m p l a t i o n  
an d  " d e p e n d s ,  n o t  on  h a b i t u s  p r o p e r l y  s o - c a l l e d ,  b u t  on  h a b i t u a l  d i s -
n
p o s i t i o n  a n d  c l e v e r n e s s ,  a s  d o e s  a l s o  t h e  t a s t e  o f  t h e  w i n e - t a s t e r .
Th e p r e c o n c e p t i o n s  o f  t a s t e  a r e  a t  t h e  m e r c y  o f  a  w o r k  u n i q u e  t o  t h e
i n t e l l e c t  b e c a u s e  t a s t e  i s  t h r e a t e n e d  b y  t h a t  w h i c h  i t  d o e s  n o t  k n ow .
T h e  ju d g m e n t  o f  t a s t e  i n e v i t a b l y  b e c o m e s  r e s i s t a n t  t o  w o r k s  i t  " d o e s
n o t  u n d e r s t a n d "  a n d  m o r e  c o m f o r t a b l e  i n  t h e  p r e s e n c e  o f  k n o w l e d g e ,
h o w e v e r  u n s t a b l e ,  t h a n  i n  t h e  p r e s e n c e  o f  a  c o m p o se d  w o r k ,  u n i q u e  t o
o
t h e  i n t e l l e c t  b u t  s t a b l e  i n  i t s e l f .
T h e  c r i t i c i s m  o f  w o r k s  an d  t h e  ju d g m e n t  o f  w o r k s  a r e  g e n e r a l l y  
s y n o n y m o u s  i n  i n t e n t . ^  T h e  d i f f e r e n c e  b e t w e e n  c r i t i c i s m  a n d  j u d g m e n t  
i s  i n  t h e  r e - c r e a t i o n  w h i c h  f o l l o w s  t h e  j u d g m e n t .  T h e  c r i t i c  j u d g e s  a  
c o m p o s e d  w o r k  a n d  t h e  p e r f o r m e r  t h r o u g h  i t ;  h i s  c r i t i c i s m  o r  ju d g m e n t  
i s  u s e d  b y  t h e  p e r f o r m e r  i n  h i s  ( t h e  p e r f o r m e r ' s )  p e r s o n a l  r e - c r e a t i o n  
o f  t h e  w o r k .  T h e  p e r f o r m e r  j u d g e s  a  c o m p o se d  w o r k  f o r  h i s  p e r s o n a l  
r e - c r e a t i o n  o f  t h e  w o r k ,  b u t  t h e  j u d g m e n t  i s  m ad e t h r o u g h  p e r s o n a l  
p e r c e p t i o n  a n d  i s  a p p l i e d  t o  h i s  own p e r f o r m a n c e  o f  t h e  w o r k .  T h e  
ju d g m e n t  o f  t h e  c r i t i c ,  t h e n ,  i s  e x t e r n a l  t o  r e - c r e a t i o n  Xsrhile t h e  
ju d g m e n t  o f  t h e  p e r f o r m e r  i s  a n  i n t e r n a l  p a r t  o f  t h e  r e - c r e a t i v e
■ ' ■ I b i d . ,  p p .  202-203. "M an y  g r e a t  a r t i s t s  h a d  v e r y  p o o r  t a s t e .  
And m any men w i t h  p e r f e c t  t a s t e  w e r e  m e d i o c r e  c r e a t o r s .  . . "  ( i b i d . ,  
p .  203).
2 I b i d .
^ I b i d .  K n o w l e d g e  i s  u n s t a b l e  a p a r t  f r o m  a  c o m p o se d  w o r k ;  i t  
b e c o m e s  s t a b l e  w h e n  d i s c o v e r e d  t o  b e  a  c o m p o n e n t  p a r t  o f  a  c o m p l e t e d  
w o r k .
«
^Maritain, "The Internalization of Music," p. 324.
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p r o c e s s .  M o r e o v e r ,  t h e  ju d g m e n t  o f  t h e  c r i t i c  i s  t y p i c a l l y  a  s i n g l e  
ju d g m e n t  w h i l e  t h e  p e r f o r m e r ' s  ju d g m e n t  i s  a n  o n g o i n g  p r o c e s s ,  t e r m i ­
n a t e d  a l o n g  w i t h  t h e  t e r m i n a t i o n  o f  t h e  p e r f o r m e d  p r o d u c t .
C r i t i c i s m ,  . . . w h i l e  d r a w i n g  i t s  i n s p i r a t i o n  f r o m  p h i l ­
o s o p h i c a l  p r i n c i p l e s — w h i c h  i s  a l w a y s  g o o d ,  b u t  d a n g e r o u s —  
r e m a i n s  on  t h e  l e v e l  o f  t h e  w o r k  a n d  o f  t h e  p a r t i c u l a r ,  w i t h ­
o u t  h o w e v e r  b e i n g  i t s e l f  o p e r a t i v e  o r  m a k in g  a n y  c r e a t i v e  
j u d g m e n t ,  b u t  r a t h e r  j u d g i n g  f r o m  w i t h o u t  a n d  a f t e r  t h e  
e v e n t . ^
T h e  c r i t i c i s m  o f  p e r f o r m a n c e  i s  d i s t i n c t  f r o m  t h e  c r i t i c i s m  o f  
t a s t e .  T h e  c r i t i c i s m  o f  t a s t e  i s  a  " b e n t  o f  m in d "  w h i c h  a s k s  t h a t  a  
c o m p o s e d  w o r k  c o n f o r m  t o  t h e  c o n c e p t u a l  v i e w s  o f  t h e  c r i t i c  a n d  t h a t  
t h e  p e r f o r m e r ' s  p o w e r s  o f  p e r c e p t i o n  b e  m e a s u r e d  b y  t h e  sam e s e t  o f  
v i e w s .  I n  o t h e r  w o r d s ,  t h e  p e r f o r m e r ' s  " c o n c e p t "  o f  t h e  w o r k  i s  m ea­
s u r e d  b y  t h e  c r i t i c ' s  " c o n c e p t "  o f  t h e  sam e w o r k ,  t h e  " c o n c e p t "  h a v i n g  
i t s  r o o t s  i n  a  g e n e r a l  k n o w l e d g e  o f  a r t .  I n e v i t a b l y ,  t h e  p e r f o r m e r  i s  
c r i t i c i z e d  f o r  h i s  f a i l u r e  t o  p e r c e i v e  c e r t a i n  e l e m e n t s  i n  a  c o m p o se d  
w o r k ,  c o n c e p t u a l l y  d e f i n e d  b y  t h e  c r i t i c .
T h e  c r i t i c i s m  o f  t a s t e  j u d g e s  o n e  w o r k  t o  b e  m o re  b e a u t i f u l  
t h a n  a n o t h e r  a c c o r d i n g  t o  p r e c o n c e i v e d  s t a n d a r d s  o f  a r t  a n d ,  i n  t h i s  
s e n s e ,  j u d g e s  t h e  c o m p o s e r ' s  t a s t e  a s  w e l l .  T h e  c r i t i c i s m  o f  a r t  a l l o w s  
p e r f o r m e d  w o r k s  t o  r e v e a l  t h e m s e l v e s  a s  m o re  o r  l e s s  b e a u t i f u l  a c c o r d i n g  
t o  p e r s o n a l  p e r c e p t i o n .  T h e  b e a u t y  o f  a  w o r k  i s  h i d d e n  i n  t h e  i n f e r i o r ­
i t y  o f  t h e  w o r k  a n d  c a n n o t  b e  p r e j u d g e d  b y  t a s t e .  T h e  p r e c o n c e p t i o n s  o f
Maritain, Art and Scholasticism, p. 223. n. 173. The quotation 
further clarifies the difference between the judgment of the critic and 
the performer. The performer's judgment is operative or creative because 
it applies to the making of his work. The critic's judgment is similarly 
artistic or aesthetic but dissimilarly external to the creative action; 
that is, the criticism occurs following the action of performance rather 
than as a part of the action itself.
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taste suppresses the beauty in a work with material concerns validated 
by material rules.
The gift of critique is not necessarily synonymous with the gift 
of art.-*- The gift of critique pertains to the contemplative or reflec­
tive faculties of the mind while the gift of art pertains to the opera-
2tive or practical faculties of the habitus. Aesthetic criticism, 
defined by the gift of critique, combines a knowledge of art with the 
skills of critique, thereby encouraging the critic to become a dilet­
tante. A true critic of art defines aesthetic criticism as the judg­
ment of art, and not of taste, and uses the skills of critique to com­
municate his judgment to the performing musician.
In reference to the critic, Maritain states: "Before judging 
of the work as to its ways of execution, he must discover the creative 
intentions from which it proceeds and the more secret things which
Ostirred the soul of its author.'0
Artistic Judgment and the Sign
A created work is an object and a sign; that is, it has a physi­
cal presence in matter or notation and a significance, apart from the 
object, which is perceivable through a sensory experience of the work.^ 
The intentional being, or sign aspect of the work, has a significance 
which lies deeper than the entitative being or material existent.”* 2
^-Maritain, "The Internalization of Music," pp. 324-325.
2Ibid. 3Ibid., p. 324.
“̂Maritain, "Creative Intuition and Poetic Knowledge," p. 128.
^Maritain, The Degrees of Knowledge, p. 114; also see Hanke, 
Maritain's Ontology, pp. 55-65.
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T h e  w o r k  i s  t h e  m a t e r i a l  s u b s t a n c e  o r  p h y s i c a l  s u r f a c e  o f  t h e  a r t i s t ' s  
i n t e n t .  H i s  i n t e n t i o n a l  b e i n g ,  o r  c r e a t i v e  i n t e n t ,  p a s s e s  t h r o u g h  t h e  
e n t i t a t i v e  b e i n g  i n t o  t h e  i n t e l l e c t u a l ,  s p i r i t u a l  r e a l m  o f  t h e  o b j e c t .  
T h i s  r e a l m  c o n t a i n s  t h e  i n t e n t i o n a l  s i g n  o f  t h e  c r e a t e d  w o r k . ' 1'
2
T h e  c r e a t e d  w o r k ,  t h e n ,  i s  a  d i r e c t  s i g n  o f  t h e  a r t i s t ' s  i n t e n t .  
T h e  d i r e c t  s i g n  p e r t a i n s  t o  t h e  s p i r i t u a l  i n t e n t  o f  t h e  w o r k ,  and  t h e  
p e r c e p t i o n  o f  t h i s  s i g n  i s  a  p e r c e p t i o n  o f  t h e  s e c r e t  s i g n i f i c a n c e  c o n ­
t a i n e d  w i t h i n  t h e  e n t i t a t i v e  s t r u c t u r e . " ^  A t  t h e  sa m e  t i m e ,  t h e  c r e a t e d  
w o r k  i s  a  r e v e r s e d  s i g n  o f  t h e  a r t i s t ' s  p e r s o n a l i t y  ( a s  h e  h a d  p l a c e d  
h i m s e l f  i n t o  t h e  x<rork i n  p u r s u i t  o f  h i s  c r e a t i v e  i n t e n t ) . ^  T h e  e n t i t a ­
t i v e  w o r k ,  t h e n ,  s i g n i f i e s  t h e  c r e a t i v e  i n t e n t  o f  i t s  b e i n g  an d  t h e  
s u b j e c t i v i t y  o f  t h e  a r t i s t ,  b o t h  o b s c u r e l y  r e l a t e d  a n d  r e v e a l e d  i n  t h e  
u n i t y  o f  t h e  w o r k .
T h e  p e r f o r m e r ' s  j u d g m e n t  o f  a  c o m p o se d  w o r k  i s ,  i n  e s s e n c e ,  a  
p e r c e p t i o n  o f  t h e  d i r e c t - r e v e r s e d  s i g n  r e l a t i o n s h i p  i n  t h e  t o t a l  s i g ­
n i f i c a n c e  o f  t h e  w o r k .  T h e  e n t i t a t i v e  w o r k  i s  t h e  p r i n t e d  s c o r e ;  t h e  
s i g n i f i c a n c e  l i e s  i n  t h e  i n t e n t i o n a l  b e i n g  o f  t h e  w o r k ,  t h e  s p i r i t u a l
•1
T h e  i n t e n t i o n a l  s i g n  i s  a n a l o g o u s  t o  t h e  c r e a t i v e  i n t e n t .  T h e  
a u r a l  p r e s e n c e  o f  s o u n d  i s  t h e  v e h i c l e  b y  w h i c h  t h e  e n t i t a t i v e  b e i n g  
( s c o r e )  i s  p e r m e a t e d  a n d  t h e  i n t e n t i o n a l  b e i n g  ( s i g n )  i s  r e v e a l e d .
^Maritain, "Sign and Symbol," p. 223; and idem, "Language and 
the Theory of Sign," p. 98.
OJMaritain, "Creative Intuition and Poetic Knowledge," p. 128; 
idem, The Degrees of Knowledge, p. 114; and idem, "The Experience of 
the Poet," in The Situation of Poetry, p. 84.
^ M a r i t a i n ,  " S i g n  a n d  S y m b o l , "  p .  223; i d e m ,  " T h e  E x p e r i e n c e  o f  
t h e  P o e t , "  p .  84; a n d  i d e m ,  " C r e a t i v e  I n t u i t i o n  a n d  P o e t i c  K n o w l e d g e , "  
p .  128. T h e  r e v e r s e d  s i g n  i s  a l s o  t e r m e d :  t h e  i n v e r t e d  s i g n .  S e e  id e m ,  
" L a n g u a g e  a n d  t h e  T h e o r y  o f  S i g n , "  p .  98.
^Maritain, "Creative Intuition and Poetic Knowledge," p. 129.
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interiority of the scored composition. As with the artistic judgment 
(and its access to a work's interiority), access to the sign quality of 
a composition is facilitated by means of aural perception. In other 
words, the secret significance of the printed work is contained within 
the sound, or combination of sounds, perceived aurally by the performer. 
Artistic judgment, then, perceives and judges the sign quality of a 
musical work.
The Creative Idea and Performance 
The Creative Idea and the Conceptual Idea
The creative idea is not an elaborate plan; rather, it is a simple
view or artistic vision of the work-to-be-made.̂  The creative idea is an
operative or practical idea because it moves the intellect toward the
production of an object, a work of art. In a work of fine art, the will
intervenes in the artist's vision of his work because the intellect is
naturally inclined to go beyond itself, toward the transcendental realm 
3of beauty.
The creative idea is dissimilar to the conceptual idea; that is, 
it is not an abstract idea or an intellectual theme or thesis from which 
creation takes place.^ Furthermore, the artist does not envision an 
ideal model to be copied by his art; rather, he envisions the
■*-Maritain, Art and Scholasticism, p. 181, n. 95.
ôMaritain, "Concerning Poetic Knowledge," p. 48; and Hanke, 
Maritain's Ontology, p. 43.
JMaritain, "Concerning Poetic Knotvdedge," p. 48. The creative 
idea is also termed: the artist's vision, or artistic vision.
^Maritain, "The Freedom of Song," p. 81; idem, "Creative Intui­
tion and Poetic Knowledge," p. 136; and idem, Art and Scholasticism, 
p. 181, n. 95.
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intellectual or spiritual form of an object, in a complex unity, within 
which few of the details of the object are consciously known.^ The 
work must be externalized before the details of the work are "worked 
out," thereby becoming the material structure of the original spirit­
ual form. In contrast to the conceptual idea, the creative idea and 
the externalized work reveal themselves simultaneously and both become 
known when the work is completed. The conceptual idea precedes its 
object in conscious detail; the creative idea precedes its object in 
a detailed unity but with obscure or imperfect knowledge of specific 
details. The operational concept, or conceptual idea, forms and com­
pletes an object prior to its externalization as a work of art (object 
copies idea). The creative idea is formed but not completed while in
its spiritual form; therefore, the object-to-be-made is only a poten-
2tiality and not yet a reality. The creative idea is revealed through 
its object, and the details are fixed or "worked out" at the moment of 
externalization.3 A work completed is a creative idea achieved.^
The creative idea is an intuitive flash . . .  in x^hich the
whole work is potentially contained and which will unfold
^Maritain, "Creative Intuition and Poetic Knox^ledge," pp.. 135- 
137; and idem, "The Concept," in The Degrees of Knowledge, app. 1, p. 
397.
2Maritain, The Concept," pp. 396-398.
^Hanke, Maritain* s Ontology, p. 99.
• • it is only x̂ hen the symphony is made and finished that, 
in the mind of the composer, its creative idea is itself achieved" 
(Maritain, "The Freedom of Song," p. 80). The externalized product of 
the artist's vision cannot, however, be an exact copy of the original 
idea because the externalization of an idea is tempered by human limita­
tion, thereby rendering the final achievement an imperfect product of a 
more complex original intent. See pp. 64~65 below for a further discus­
sion of this point.
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and explain itself in the work, and which will make of the work 
itself an original and a model; incomparably more immaterial 
than is believed by academicism. . . .1
The academicist believes that the creative idea is a model of 
a work which the artist carries in his head to be copied into the final 
product. The work, already made, is given a presence, an externaliza- 
tion by preconception.
Maritain confronts the academicist with the subjective nature of 
sensory experience. When the artist, as any man, attempts to copy an 
ideal, the product inevitably leads to an original work, not a copy.^
". . . there is no tracing in the world of God.,,<!t The creative idea is 
the artist's subjectivity intertwined with the objectivity of things 
from which forms are drawn through sensory perception. Subsequently, 
a completely subjective creative idea is also unattainable by the intel­
lect of man. God's ideas precede things; man draws upon things for his 
£ideas. °
The Creative Idea and the Means of Art
The creative idea is envisioned in a flash of intuition which
•jcontains the essentials of a work in a united whole. The flash of 
intuition, although complete, is obscure and the work must be completed 
before the details of the work, or the structure of the idea, become
1Ibid. ^Ibid.
^Ibid., p. 79. 4Ibid.
^Hanke, Maritain's Ontology, p. 77.
^Maritain, The Frontiers of Poetry, pp. 120-121. 
^Hay, Maritain's Theory, p. 55.
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more fully known. The externalized details of the work reveal to the 
artist something of the internal structure of his vision. As creation 
occurs, the artist, through certain additions and adjustments along the 
way, probes for details of his initial intuitive flash. In this way, 
details of the work are, consciously and unconsciously, validated by 
intuition.^ In other words, the artist knows when the work is "right" 
but he may not be able to explain how he knows.
The external work is an imperfect imitation of the creative idea
because the idea discloses detail in the context of a complex unity, all
in an instant and much of which is lost through actual production.^ The
idea is an uncreated form; therefore, the details must be worked out
through creation. Due to the limitations of memory, the created work
can only approach the original intuitive flash in moving from the uncre-
3ated, spiritual form to the created, material form. In addition to 
memory block, the creative intent may be further obstructed by faulty 
craftsmanship, or poor technique in its lower sense, and external influ­
ences which threaten the practice of art.^
The premature calculation of means is an academic plan which 
denies the mystery of the artistic vision. The academicist is skeptical 
of the necessity of "working out" such a vision; he is inclined to doubt 
that the completed work will teach him anything not contained in his 
prepared plan.
• ' - I b id .
9  3■^Maritain, "The Concept," p. 398. Ibid.
^Hay, Maritain's Theory, p. 56. Foreign elements of art, that is, 
external threats to the practice of art, in the pure sense, are manual 
dexterity, taste, slavish imitation, emotional effect, and art seeking to 
please others. See Maritain, "The Purity of Art," pp. 61-62.
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Maritain, to the contrary, believes that the artistic vision is 
obscure by nature and that the means of art exist to serve and probe the 
mystery inherent in the creative idea. The gap between the vision and 
the accomplished work is "filled by an interplay of deliberate combina­
tions" which serve the work envisioned.''" This sort of deliberate cal­
culation is useful and acceptable at various points of creation because 
it is fixed at the moment of making and is an exploratory process. In 
this sense, the manipulation of means is a search for a certain fulfill­
ment of the creative idea, spontaneously done and with both the conscious 
and unconscious depths of the intellect involved.
The means are the proper domain of the artistic habitus. . . .
But means exist only in relation to an end, and the means 
which "are everything" would be nothing themselves without 
the conception or the vision which they tend to realize and 
on which the whole activity of the artist hinges.2
The Creative Idea and Inspiration
The artist's ability to view a work-to-be-made depends initially 
upon imagination, an inborn disposition or natural gift served by the 
external senses.^
. . . imagination proceeds or flows from the essence of the 
soul through the intellect, and the external senses proceed from 
the essence of the soul through imagination. For they exist in 
man to serve imagination, and through imagination, intelligence.^
^Maritain, Art and Scholasticism, p. 199, n. 131.
“̂Ibid., p. 182, n. 95. Conception, in this context, refers to 
the creative idea rather than to the conceptual idea.
^Ibid., p. 181; and idem, "The Rules of Art," p. 41.
^Maritain, "Creative Intuition and Poetic Knowledge," p. 107.
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A point for amplification is that the imagination serves the 
intellect, the creative intellect of art. The imagination is diffi­
cult to distinguish from the creative intellect because it is inti­
mately related to it, a part of the intellect itself.'*' The creative 
intellect, however, deepens with each improvement of the mind or as 
the development of the intellect, takes place. The creative idea has 
its roots in the creative intellect and grows beyond the reach of 
imagination alone.
Similarly, the working out or externalization of an artist's
vision does not occur in the imagination alone because such a view
3cannot come out of a void. The use of materials to externalize a 
work involves the imagination, but the means of making are validated 
by the creative intellect through its connaturality with the intended 
object. The connaturality of the intellect with its object defines 
the intuitive procedure by which creation takes place.^ The connat­
urality of intuition is a kind of conformity in the manner of action 
between the artist and the intended work.”*
"*"Maritain, "The Rules of Art," p. 41.
^Ibid.
OJHanlce, Maritain's Ontology, p. 98.
^"A virtuous man may possibly be utterly ignorant in moral 
philosophy, and know as well (probably better) everything about vir­
tues— through connaturality" (Maritain, "Creative Intuition and Poetic 
Knowledge," p. 117). Similarly, a musician may possess little or no 
knowledge of music; and yet, he may perform works entirely through his 
connaturality with the sound of music.
^Maritain, "Art an Intellectual Virtue," p. 12.
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I n  t h e  f i n e  a r t s ,  t h e  c r e a t i v e  i d e a  d e p e n d s  on  a  s e c o n d  i n b o r n  
d i s p o s i t i o n :  s e n s i t i v i t y ,  w h i c h  i s  t h e  a r t i s t ' s  a b i l i t y  t o  p e r c e i v e  
b e a u t y . ^  S e n s i t i v i t y  i s  s e r v e d  b y  t h e  e x t e r n a l  s e n s e s  a n d ,  i n  t u r n ,  
i t  s e r v e s  t h e  c r e a t i v e  i n t e l l e c t  b e c a u s e  c o n n a t u r a l  b e a u t y  d e l i g h t s  
t h e  i n t e l l e c t  t h r o u g h  t h e  s e n s e s .  S i n c e  t h e  c r e a t i v e  i d e a  e n v i s i o n s  
a n  o b j e c t  w h i c h  r e f l e c t s  b e a u t y ,  i m a g i n a t i o n  a n d  s e n s i t i v i t y  a r e  
i n t e r r e l a t e d .
T h e  i n t u i t i v e  f l a s h  o f  a  c r e a t i v e  i d e a  i s  n o t  a  m y s t i c a l  e x p e ­
r i e n c e .  T h e  m o m e n t a r y ,  s u d d e n  a p p e a r a n c e  o f  a n  a r t i s t i c  v i s i o n  i s  a n  
i n s p i r a t i o n a l  e x p e r i e n c e .  I n s p i r a t i o n  i s  t h e  moment t h a t  l a t e n t  p o e t i c  
k n o w l e d g e  i s  r e l e a s e d  t o  t h e  c o n s c i o u s  m in d  f o r  e x p r e s s i o n ,  i n  t h e  fo r m
•5
o f  a  x r o r k i n g  i d e a .
^Maritain, Art and Scholasticism, p. 181, n. 95.
■^Maritain, "Art and Beauty," p. 24. Connatural beauty is aes­
thetic beauty which pleases, rather than displeases, the sense-permeated 
intellect.
^ H a z o ,  M a r i t a i n ' s  A e s t h e t i c , p p .  74 a n d  84. I n  d e f i n i n g  p o e t i c  
Im n rw led ge  M a r i t a i n  s t a t e s :
"This is a very different knowledge from what is generally called 
knowledge; a knox^ledge which cannot be expressed in notions and 
judgments, but which is experience rather than, knowledge, and 
creative experience, because it xtfants to be expressed, and it can 
only be expressed in a work. This knowledge is not previous or 
presupposed to creative activity, but integrated in it, consub- 
stantial with the movement toward the work, and this is precisely 
what I call poetic knowledge" ("On Human Knowledge," p. 18).
I n  a  c o m p a r i s o n  t o  c o n c e p t u a l  k n o w l e d g e  M a r i t a i n  s t a t e s :
" .  . . i n  s u c h  a  k n o w l e d g e  i t  i s  t h e  o b j e c t  c r e a t e d ,  . . . t h e  sym ­
p h o n y ,  i n  i t s  own e x i s t e n c e  a s  a  w o r l d  o f  i t s  ox«m, w h i c h  p l a y s  t h e  
p a r t  p l a y e d  i n  o r d i n a r y  k m w l e d g e  b y  t h e  c o n c e p t s  a n d  j u d g m e n t s  p r o ­
d u c e d  w i t h i n  t h e  m i n d "  ( " C r e a t i v e  I n t u i t i o n  a n d  P o e t i c  K n o w l e d g e , "  
p. 118).
L a t e n t  p o e t i c  k n o w l e d g e  c o n t a i n s  t h e  s e e d s  o f  t h e  c r e a t i v e  i d e a .  I n s p i r  
a t i o n  p r o v i d e s  t h e  i n i t i a l  c o n s c i o u s  e x p e r i e n c e  o f  t h i s  k n o x ^ le d g e ,  an d  
t h e  i n t e l l e c t  b e c o m e s  m o re  f u l l y  c o n s c i o u s  o f  t h e  i d e a  t h r o u g h  t h e  com­
p l e t e d  w o r k .  H a z o ,  M a r i t a i n ' s  A e s t h e t i c , p p .  48-49.
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I n s p i r a t i o n  i s  n o t  a  c o n t i n u o u s  e x p e r i e n c e ,  n o r  i s  i t  a  f r e q u e n t  
e x p e r i e n c e ;  i n s p i r a t i o n  i s  n a t u r a l  t o  a r t  b u t  i t s  o c c u r r e n c e  i s  s p o n ­
t a n e o u s  an d  u n p r e d i c t a b l e . ^  T h e  s u d d e n  b r i g h t n e s s  o f  t h e  v i s i o n ,  h o w -
2
e v e r ,  f a d e s  a n d  c h a n g e s  a s  i t  i s  d e v e l o p e d .  I n  o t h e r  w o r d s ,  a s  m a k in g  
b e g i n s ,  i n s p i r a t i o n  d e c l i n e s .
I n s p i r a t i o n  m ay r e s u l t  f r o m  t h e  h a r d  l a b o r  o f  c r e a t i o n  a n d ,  on  
t h e  o t h e r  h a n d ,  i t s  s u d d e n  p r e s e n c e  may l e a d  t o  t h e  h a r d  l a b o r  o f  c r e a -
O
t i o n .  I n  t h e  l a t t e r  c a s e ,  t h e  i n s p i r a t i o n a l  e x p e r i e n c e  p r o v i d e s  i n c e n ­
t i v e  b e c a u s e  t h e  a r t i s t  b e c o m e s  e a g e r  t o  p u r s u e  t h e  d e t a i l s  o f  h i s  new 
i d e a .  T h e  d e p t h  a n d  f r e q u e n c y  o f  i n s p i r a t i o n  d e p e n d s  p r i m a r i l y  on  t h e  
c r e a t i v e  i n t e l l e c t  a n d  s e c o n d a r i l y  on  i n d i v i d u a l  t e m p e r a m e n t  an d  n a t ­
u r a l  i n c l i n a t i o n s . ^
The Performer and the Composed Work
The performer's vision of his work occurs as a result of, and 
in connection with,his judgment of the composed xrork. In this respect, 
vision and judgment are commingled since a judgment can hardly occur 
without some vision of the work's potential in relation to the per­
former's ability as a musician. The judgment of a composed work, then, 
can spawn the creative idea. In other words, as the composer's intent 
is judged, the potential sound of the work in performance is envisioned 
through the judgment. As the performer seeks the inner, spiritual 
intent of the x̂ ork, he may also "see" the work as it should be
^Maritain, "Poetic Experience and Poetic Sense," in Creative 
Intuition, p. 244.
^Maritain, "The Concept," p. 398.
%aritain, "Poetic Experience and Poetic Sense," p. 244.
^Ibid.
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p e r f o r m e d ,  c o n s i d e r i n g  a l s o  h i s  own p o t e n t i a l  a s  a  p e r f o r m i n g  m u s i c i a n .  
I n  t h i s  w a y ,  t h e  o b j e c t i v e  i n t e n t  o f  t h e  w o r k  i s  c o m m in g le d  w i t h  t h e  
s u b j e c t i v e  p e r c e p t i o n  o f  t h e  p e r f o r m e r .
T h e  u n e x p e c t e d  a p p e a r a n c e  o f  a  w o r k i n g  i d e a  t h r o u g h  i n s p i r a t i o n  
i s  a n  e x p e r i e n c e  a v a i l a b l e  t o  t h e  n o v i c e  a s  w e l l  a s  t h e  v i r t u o s o .  T h e  
d i f f e r e n c e  i s  o n e  o f  d e g r e e  b u t  n o t  o f  i n t e n s i t y .  T h e  v a r i a n c e  o f  
i n s p i r a t i o n  r e l a t e s  t o  t h e  d e p t h  o f  t h e  c r e a t i v e  i n t e l l e c t  an d  n a t i v e  
c a p a c i t y ;  n e v e r t h e l e s s ,  i n s p i r a t i o n  c a n  r e m a i n  u n p e r c e i v e d  b y  e v e n  t h e  
m o s t  g i f t e d  m u s i c i a n .
A  p r e r e q u i s i t e  t o  i n s p i r a t i o n  i n  t h e  f i n e  a r t s  i s  a  c e r t a i n  
a t t i t u d e ,  a  w i l l i n g n e s s  t o  f o l l o w  t h e  c r e a t i v i t y  o f  t h e  s p i r i t  i n  i t s  
i n c l i n a t i o n s  t o w a r d  b e a u t y .  M e t h o d i c a l  a p p r o a c h e s  t o  p e r f o r m a n c e  a r e  
l e s s  c o n d u c i v e  t o  i n s p i r a t i o n  b e c a u s e  t h e  c o n c e r n  i s  w i t h  m o re  imme­
d i a t e ,  c o n t r o l l e d  p r o g r e s s .  C o n v e r s e l y ,  p e r f o r m e r s  g u i d e d  b y  t h e  
c r e a t i v e  i n t e l l e c t  a r e  s u b j e c t  t o  s p o n t a n e o u s ,  a b r u p t ,  f a r - r e a c h i n g  
i n t e l l e c t u a l  m o v e m e n ts  o f  t h e  m ind  t o w a r d  i t s  w o r k .
T h e  m e t h o d i c a l  p e r f o r m e r  h a s  l e s s  c o n f i d e n c e  i n  t h e  u n c e r t a i n t y  
o f  i n s p i r a t i o n  a n d  t h e  e l u s i v e  i d e a  t h a t  a p p e a r s  c l e a r l y  b u t  m o m e n t a r i l y  
an d  n o n c o n c e p t u a l l y . He i s  r e l u c t a n t  t o  p u r s u e  a  s p i r i t u a l  i d e a  w h i c h  
t h r e a t e n s  t h e  o r d e r  o f  h i s  m a t e r i a l  p l a n s .
T h e  c r e a t i v e  p e r f o r m e r  i s  e a g e r  t o  p u r s u e  h i s  v i s i o n  w h i l e  
r e t a i n i n g  a n  a w a r e n e s s  t h a t  h e  m ay n e v e r  c o m p l e t e l y  a c h i e v e  i t .  T h e  
e x c i t e m e n t  o f  p e r f o r m a n c e  l i e s  i n  t h e  p u r s u i t  o f  a  p e r s o n a l  v i s i o n  o f  
a  w o r k .  T h e  m o m e n t a r y  b r i l l i a n c e  o f  t h e  i d e a  s p u r s  t h e  c r e a t i v e  p e r ­
f o r m e r  on  t o  d e p t h s  u n a t t a i n a b l e  b y  t h e  p l a n n e d  e x p e r i e n c e  and  e v e r '  
c l o s e r  t o  t r a n s c e n d e n t a l  b e a u t y .
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The performer's vision of a composed work must be heard in per­
formance (externalized) to be fulfilled. A musician envisions the 
potential sound of the work but only upon hearing it can he gain some 
certainty of his intended idea. The performer probes and experiments 
with details until he discovers in sound the idea envisioned in the 
mind. The discovery is nonconceptual; the performer intuitively recog­
nizes the "right" sound but he is only vaguely aware of how or why a 
particular sound is a necessary component of the intended work. The 
necessity of the discovered sound to the work is confirmed at the 
moment it is heard. Following externalization, the performer can bet­
ter analyze conceptually the details of the work in retrospect or by 
reflection.
When is the performance complete? A musical work, as time, can 
flow without limitation or cessation.’*' The transcendental beauty of 
music does not stop; it surpasses its object. The performed work has 
a practical end and is subject to human limitation in its confinement 
to certain parameters. The practical end of a work is a mere pause in 
the ceaseless potential of music and the transcendental realm it reflects.
The performance idea, in its original form, is never absolutely 
fulfilled; therefore, each performance of a composed work may move pro­
gressively deeper into its spiritual intent. On the other hand, a 
repeated work, performed at its human limits, may simply run its course 
and no longer be in fulfillment of any creative idea. In this case, 
the work expends itself on repetition rather than intent.
%aritain, "The Freedom of Song," p. 82.
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The Creative Idea and the Sign
The performer's judgment or perception of the intentional sign 
within a composed work begins his view of the potential sound of the 
work in performance. Since the performance potential of a work is tem­
pered by personal capacity and unique musical abilities, the performer 
views the work only as he can perform it. The performer's intention, or 
performance idea, is the new direct sign of the work; it becomes com­
mingled with the reversed sign of the performer, his subjective expres­
sion which inevitably and unintentionally enters the performed work.
As a result, the intentional sign of the composed work is transformed 
into the intentional sign of the performed work.
The conductor, as a performance leader, uses the practical sign 
to communicate his creative idea, along with conceptual score notation, 
to the musicians of a performing group.’*' Since the conductor's vision 
of the work is of primary importance, the practical signs make manifest 
his intent in producing the work, the practical sign being an instrument 
of his will.^ The conductor's practical signs are gestures of command, 
facial expressions and glances, and spoken words. These signs, both
natural and conventional, express an intention or direction of the prac- 
4tical intellect. The practical signs used by the conductor are also 
1-Maritain, "Sign and Symbol," p. 197; and idem, "The Concept,"
p. 395.
^Maritain, "Sign and Symbol," p. 197. ^Ibid.
^Ibid. The natural sign expresses a natural or real relation­
ship between the sign and that which is signified. An example of the 
natural sign is an expression, gesture, or appearance of quietude.
The conventional sign is an artificial or arbitrary sign which must 
be learned as a sign before that which is signified becomes apparent. 
Examples of the conventional sign are gesticulative patterns, symbolic 
language, and denotative expressions. See ibid., p. 192.
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sensory signs.^
Conceptual ideas, transmitted by musical notation, are infra- 
valent to the creative idea and are of secondary importance to the per­
formed work; nevertheless, they are also communicated to a performing 
group by practical signs. What is communicated to performers is, in 
essence, the conductor’s definition of the particular notation or his 
understanding of these operational concepts inasmuch as they can be 
signified.^
The conductor begins x̂ ith score notation but moves beyond such 
means in pursuit of his creative idea of the work, an intent which is 
spontaneously signified by practical signs during the act of perform­
ance. The conductor’s responsibility to the intentional sign of a com­
posed work, and its transformation to a sign of the performed work, is 
similar to that of a performing musician; nevertheless, his responsibil­
ity to the performing musician is unique. The conductor must communi­
cate his creative idea to the performer through practical signs, signs 
spontaneously expressed as discovered details piece together the puzzle 
of his artistic vision.
Imitation and Performance
Artistic imitation is the intuitive manifestation of natural 
appearances or sounds. The instrumentality of natural forms is first 
presented to the mind of the artist through the senses and then recast 1
1Ibid., pp. 194-195, n. 2.
^Maritain, "The Concept," p. 395.
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or transposed by intuition to a productive end, a work of art."*" Imita­
tion renders,
through certain sensible signs, something other than these 
signs spontaneously present to the spirit. Painting imi­
tates with colors and plane forms things given outside of 
us. Music imitates with sounds and rhythms . . . the 
invisible world which stirs within us.^
Imitation, in its formal or higher sense, involves the represen-
Otation of a form, an artistic intent. It uses material elements or
sensible signs to externalize the creative idea and, through imitation,
the work expresses in matter what began in the intellect.^ Sensible
signs are objects in themselves; however, imitation requires these
signs to signify something more than themselves: the creative idea
cor spiritual intent of a work.
Imitation, in its lower sense, pertains to the duplicative
£
process of servile art and to the strict originality of pure art. 
Normally, the essence of imitation is a tension between the need to 
create for itself and the dependence upon the existing world for the 
forms of art.^ The extremes of precise representation and
Hanke, Maritain's Ontology, p. 46. The artist's intuition, 
which pilots artistic imitation, is a creative intuition. Maritain 
defines creative intuition in this way:
"His [the artist's] intuition, the creative intuition or emo­
tion, is an obscure grasping of himself and things together in 
a knowledge [poetic knowledge] by union or connaturality, which 
only . . . finds expression in the work, and which, in all its 
vital weight, seeks to create and produce" ("On Human Knowledge," 
p. 18).
^Maritain, "The Purity of Art," p. 55.
3Ibid., p. 57. 4Ibid., p. 56. 5Ibid., p. 55.
^Hanke, Maritain's Ontology, p. 45.
^Maritain, The Frontiers of Poetry, pp. 122-126; also see idem,
"The Experience of the Poet," p. 85.
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nonrepresentation, however, refuse to recognize that imitation is a 
"spiritual marriage" of a given reality to the artist's intellect.'*'
A "human stamp" is present in every representation. In other words, 
the artist puts himself into an art work and, at the same time, he is
affected by that which he has received into his mind through sensory 
3experience.
Imitation, in its lower sense, occurs when the artist mistak­
enly looks for freedom from something— freedom from originality through 
servile imitation or copy-making, or freedom from the existential world 
through making without any sort of representation, the intent being 
absolute originality.^ The former freedom relies on technical accuracy 
while the latter freedom dissociates art from existing material forms. 
Both practices overlook a primary freedom: a freedom _of the creativity 
of the spirit to guide the intellect in the creation of that which it 
wills to create."*
An artistic surrender or resignation to existence by precise
£
representation is termed as a "sin of materialism."0 This is because 
slavish imitation is materially oriented, an artistic means which goes *2
%aritain, "The Purity of Art," p. 60.
2Ibid.
O
Hanke, Maritain's Ontology, pp. 45-46.
“Hlaritain, "Beauty and Modern Painting," p. 223.
-*Ibid.
%aritain, The Frontiers of Poetry, pp. 124-126; and Hanke, 
Maritain's Ontology, p. 45. Maritain's use of the term "sin of mate­
rialism" is analogous to precise representation, servile or slavish 
imitation, strict or exact reproduction, copy-making, and duplication.
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hand in hand with manual dexterity in its preoccupation with means as
ends. Sensible signs, such as notated sounds and rhythms, are the
"remote matter" of art.'*' To regard these material elements as ends
in themselves promotes the practice of imitation, in its lower sense.
If there were no element of the creative subject in the work, 
it would not be a creation or a work of fine art but would 
simply mimic in some way that which already exists indepen­
dently of the artist. The human artist is always dependent 
upon his surroundings for his materials; but if he is truly 
to create, he cannot be wholly dependent with respect to the 
form of the work.^
The isolation of art from all things except its own rules of
o
operation, and a concern with uniqueness, is termed "angelist suicide." 
Such strict originality sacrifices the representation of imitation to a 
void and rejects traditional rules and existing forms in favor of its 
pure aesthetic.* 4
The imitative arts aim neither at copying the appearance of 
nature, nor at depicting the "ideal," but at making an object 
beautiful by manifesting a form with the help of sensible 
signs.̂
The paradox of imitation, in its lower sense, is that neither 
servile art nor pure art can actually reach their proposed extremes. 
First, to copy an object may seem simple, but since the object is 
presented to the subjectivity of the intellect, the result is a
%aritain, "The Purity of Art," pp. 55-56.
^Hanke, Maritain's Ontology, p. 77.
%laritain, The Frontiers of Poetry, pp. 122-123; and Hanke, 
Maritain's Ontology, p. 44. Maritain's use of the term "angelist 
suicide" is analogous to nonrepresentative art, strict or absolute 
originality, pure art or aesthetically pure art, and sin of idealism.
4Ibid.
^Maritain, "The Purity of Art," p. 59.
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commingling that transfigures the objective reality of the object.^
Subjective reality is reality as the artist sees or hears it.
Secondly, to make an object by drawing upon the conscious mind
alone is an attempt to deny the internal presence of latent poetic
knowledge in the spiritual unconscious, and to ignore the spontaneous
frequency of sensory experience which persistently permeates the intel-
2lect with objective reality. The attempted severance of the material 
world turns the mind in on itself and forces an enclosed intellect into 
a void for its materials. Pure art imitates but it is imitative of what 
the conscious mind knows. This kind of imitation is in contrast to the 
formal definition of imitation because only God can draw upon His crea­
tive intellect or proceed from His own essence; man is limited to the
3perception of things created by God.
Furthermore, it is important to emphasize that the aesthetic joy 
of intellectual perception is experienced through an object. An obscure 
object can be more fulfilling than a clear, "perfect" object; neverthe­
less, something too obscure loses sensory signification, due to a lack 
of connaturality, and is repulsed by the intellect.^ *2
Maritain, Art and Scholasticism, p. 193, n. 127; and Hazo, 
Maritain's Aesthetic, p. 18.
2The spiritual unconscious, or preconscious of the intellect, 
is "a deep nonconscious world of activity, for the intellect and the 
will, from which the acts and fruits of human consciousness and the 
clear perceptions of the mind emerge . . . "  (Maritain, "The Precon­
scious Life of the Intellect," in Creative Intuition, p. 94). The 
spiritual unconscious lies deeper than memory. The memory is con­
cerned with what the conscious mind remembers; the preconscious mind 
releases perceptions and insights into the conscious mind through 
connaturality, and it does this unpredictably and illogically. See 
ibid., pp. 90-95.
^Maritain, "The Purity of Art," p. 59 ^Ibid., p. 58.
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The action of imitation in performance begins with a given real­
ity, the written score and the various combinations of sounds symbolized 
by the score. The materiality of the object, however, is soon trans­
posed, transfigured, or recasted to suit the creative vision of the 
artist.* 23 The composed work, then, is the entitative reality from which 
the performer derives his material to be imitated into the performed 
work.
The performer does not merely copy the score but, rather, he 
grasps from the score something not notated which is revealed through 
the performance experience. The performer may be unexpectedly delighted 
by the beauty of a particular passage as he hears the passage performed. 
He then structures a new sound by imitating the notated sound. The per­
formed passage of music, as restructured, is an expression of the 
notated sound, transformed by the performer as he puts himself into 
the passage.
To imitate, the artist transforms a given reality but is, ordi-
2narily, unaware of his deformation. He is, after all, expressing his 
personal vision of a work. Transformation occurs as a spontaneous 
expression of the artist's vision and not as a planned distortion by 
deliberate calculation.3 The expression of the vision proceeds from 
the work itself;^ accordingly, the performer expresses the composed 
work, his vision through the work, and himself through his vision.
%aritain, "Beauty and Modern Painting," p. 225.
2Maritain, Art and Scholasticism, p. 197, n. 131.
3Ibid.
^Ibid., p. 198, n.
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Imitation, in its higher sense, is the way a performer transforms
the reality of a composed work into his reality of a performed work. To
him, the performed work becomes more real than the composed work first
presented to his intellect in the form of sounds symbolized by visual 
1notation. What he performs more closely resembles a spiritual form in
nhis mind than the material appearance of the score. Imitation, then, 
is an imitation of inner form, the sound of the work as the performer 
hears it, and not simple score duplication.^
The variance between performing musicians, in their imitative 
action, is caused by personal tendencies and not dogma. An artist may 
tend towards the via disciplinae of precise representation, or he may 
tend toward the via inventionis of originality; however, neither ten­
dency can exist by itself, as a personal dogma, and remain within the
4parameters of imitative action, in a higher sense.
i
"For each work, he recomposes. . . a world more real than the 
real offered to the sense" (Maritain, The Frontiers of Poetry, p. 127).
^Ibid., pp. 127-128.
%azo, Maritain's Aesthetic, p. 19. " . . .  imitation for Mari­
tain is essentially the imitation of the spirit of the object as the 
artist sees it" (ibid., p. 17).
\laritain, The Frontiers of Poetry, pp. 125-126. In the case of 
improvisation, the musician begins with sounds previously heard and imi­
tates these sound figures into new combinations of sound. Improvisation 
is more dependent upon the element of discovery and tends more toward 
the via inventiOnis of creativity than does score reading. Consequently, 
originality is the dominant component of improvisation while the via 
disciplinae of art is more predominant in creation based on the written 
score. The latter circumstance is true because of the responsibility of 
re-creation confronting the performer. Improvisation is more subjective, 
by comparison, and the performer, as an improviser, performs intuitively 
while allowing complete freedom to his creativity of the spirit in envi­
sioning and externalizing an object or particular sound. The action of 
improvisation occurs in a single, sweeping, simultaneous event.
CHAPTER V
THE USE OF PERFORMANCE 
M o r a l i t y  a n d  P e r f o r m a n c e
The aim of art is outside of the sphere of human good. Art is 
concerned with making a product well and not with using the product, 
the realm of morality.
Morality is concerned with the practical activity of reason as 
directed toward the good of human life, through the expression of free 
will. " . . .  its distinctive object is not the perfection of the work 
produced and fashioned by man but the good and perfection of the agent 
himself, or the use he freely makes of his faculties. . . .
The primary moral virtue is prudence because it commands man’s 
actions as a man. Like art, prudence is a virtue of the practical intel­
lect; consequently, art and prudence are related and yet distinct in 
respect to their ends.^ The artist, as an artist, relies on the habitus 
of art but the artist, as a man, relies on the virtue of prudence. In
■^Maritain, "Art an Intellectual Virtue," p. 16. "The artist may 
choose not to use his art, or he may use it badly, . . . and yet the 
virtue of art in him is not for all that any the less perfect" (ibid.).
ôMaritain, "Art and Morality," in The Responsibility of the 
Artist, pp. 26-27.
%aritain, "The Philosophy of Art; Ethics," p. 196.




reference to its object, art is not subordinate to morality; but, in
reference to the artist, art _is_ subordinate to morality. ̂
The above comparisons underline the inevitable conflict between
art and morality (autonomous yet related).
Morality has nothing to say when it comes to the good of the 
work, or to Beauty. Art has nothing to say when it comes to 
the good of human life. . . .  In other words it is true that 
Art and Morality are two autonomous worlds, each sovereign in 
its own sphere, but they cannot ignore or disregard one 
another, for man belongs in these two worlds, both as intel­
lectual maker and as moral agent, doer of actions which engage 
his own destiny. And because an artist is a man before being 
an artist, the autonomous world of morality is simply superior 
to . . . the autonomous world of art.^
[Art] . . . depends by its object neither on wisdom nor on 
prudence; all its dependence on them is on the side of the 
human subject who practises [.sic.] art. . . .  It can be mad 
and remain art; it is the man who will pay the cost. If in 
the end the work must suffer, it is by a repercussion owed 
to material causality. . . .̂
Art has for its end the object and it despotically dominates matter in 
pursuit of this object. The purity of art, then, is not synonymous 
with the purity of man, regulated by prudence.4
Morality and Gratuitous Performance 
The habitus of performance is intent upon the work-to-be-per- 
formed because fine art has for its end the created work and the
^Ibid., p. 40; and idem, "Art an Intellectual Virtue," p. 15.
oMaritain, "Art and Morality," in The Responsibility of the 
Artist, p. 41.
Maritain, "Answer to Jean Cocteau," in Art and Faith, in col­
laboration with Jean Cocteau, trans. John Coleman (New York: The Phil­
osophical Library, 1948), p. 117. According to Maritain (ibid.), art 
and wisdom are also autonomous or independent of each other. Science 
is subordinated to wisdom because of its object: knowledge; art is not 
subordinated to wisdom because of its object: making.
4Ibid., pp. 92-93.
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beauty it reflects."^ The art of performance, then, is defined by the
element of gratuity, or disinterestedness, which means that the artist,
as an artist, must be true to his habitus, thereby allowing no foreign
element to enter his work. Maritain concludes that the first respon-
3sibility of the artist, as an artist, is to his work.
The performer, as a man, however, cannot perform his art to 
the exclusion of everything else in life. The musician, as a man, is 
subject to the realm of morality and this, in essence, subordinates 
his art to God. It follows that the first responsibility of the artist, 
as a man, is to the proper good of his person.^
Art causes an artist to act in the right way in regard to making 
a work but not in respect to the rightness of human will for the good of 
his person. Art, however, exists in the person and, if the person
^Maritain, "Art and Morality," in Art and Scholasticism, p. 70.
2Ibid. Maritain defines these foreign elements as empirical 
attempts to establish principles of practice (or tear down such prin­
ciples) ; shock the public (or avoid shocking the public); and estab­
lish a reputation or position as an artist. "An Essay on Art," in Art 
and Scholasticism, app. 1, p. 89. These foreign elements relate to, 
and expand upon, his previously defined foreign elements listed in 
chapter 4 above, p. 65, n. 4. The matter of disinterestedness in 
relation to beauty was taken up in chapter 3 above, pp. 31-36.
O
Maritain, "Art and Morality," in The Responsibility of the 
Artist, p. 40.
4Ibid.; and idem, "Art an Intellectual Virtue," p. 16. Prudence 
perfects the intellect only through the presupposition that the will is 
as straight in its own alignment with the proper good of man. It is 
possible that the movement of the will, in its desire for good, may cor­
rupt the judgment of prudence by displacing spiritual pleasure in favor 
of carnal pleasure. The judgment of prudence also depends on the right 
intention and not on the event. The observable results of an act may 
be properly good but immorally conceived. Idem, "Art an Intellectual 
Virtue," pp. 16-18.
■^Maritain, "Art as a Virtue of the Practical Intellect," p. 50.
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deteriorates, so must the art. In other words, the artist is a man 
before becoming an artist; if he fails as a man, his art will even­
tually decline.^ The fact of an artist being a drug addict may have 
no immediate bearing on his artistic virtue; however, in the long run,
if the person suffers ill effects from the drug use, it will eventu-
2ally be harmful, and perhaps devastating, to his art.
Gratuitous performance, misunderstood, aims not only at the 
perfection of a composed work but at an absolute independence of the 
performer as a man. This misconception is caused by the belief that 
the artist is an artist, and more than a "mere" man.^ "Art for art's 
sake" is art abstractly cut off from man, the artist.^
The motto Art for Art's sake simply disregards the world of 
morality, and the values and rights of human life. Art for 
Art's sake does not mean Art for the work, which is the right 
formula. It means an absurdity, that is, a supposed necessity 
for the artist to be only an artist, not a man, and for art to 
cut itself off from its own supplies, and from all the food, 
fuel and energy it receives from human life.^
The severance of art from humanity eliminates, or attempts to 
eliminate, human ends in art; the artist must be totally or purely 
delighted in his artistic activity to the exclusion of any other 
"human" emotion, vrhich is considered a sacrilege against art.
Delight, in this sense, is in contrast to the delight or intellectual
•*-Maritain, "An Essay on Art," p. 95.
^Maritain, "Art as a Virtue of the Practical Intellect," p. 51. 
^Maritain, "An Essay on Art," pp. 89-90.
^Maritain, "Art for Art's Sake," in The Responsibility of the 
Artist, p. 48.
^Ibid.
^Maritain, "An Essay on Art," p. 92.
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joy experienced by a performer in his performance of a particular work, 
a joy which results in an emotion, not abstract but subjective and very 
human indeed.
To dehumanize art is to sterilize art because self-expression
is inhibited. The substance of the artist is extrinsic to art, but it
influences the artist in his art and cannot simply be cut off from art-
1istic practice without simultaneously repressing self-expression.
The expression of the self is distinct from the expression of
the work, which is directed by the habitus of art. Self-expression is
analogous to the reversed sign of the artist as he puts himself into a
2work, his subjectivity being subordinated to his creative intent.
The personality of the artist is rooted in his spiritual self,
3the soul of man. The inferiority of the spirit requires, by nature,
communication with others or a giving of the self, the definition of
4self-expression. In contrast to personality, the individuality of 
the artist refers to the narrowness of the ego, which does not give 
of itself but rather grasps for itself.-* "The creative self of the 
artist is his person as person, in the act of spiritual communication,
Maritain, "Art for Art's Sake," p. 58. 
oSee chapter 4 above, pp. 61 and 78.
^Maritain, "Creative Intuition and Poetic Knowledge," pp. 141-142.
^Ibid. The spiritual communication of self-expression is a nat­
ural part of art but it is not the primary intent of art. In its proper 
sense, a certain communication with others occurs unintentionally through 
the reversed sign, but this kind of communication contrasts with communi­
cation as a conscious intent of the artist, as an artist.
5Ibid.
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not his person as material individual or as self-centered ego."x
Gratuitous performance engages the self but not the ego because
2the self reveals itself in the work and sacrifices itself to the work.
In contrast to self-sacrifice, the ego is self-centered and thrives on
material individuality. It seeks, not communication, but glory; the
3sacrifice is to the world but not to the work.
The above distinction is important because expression of the
C
artist's self sacrifices his ego to the primacy of the work. This 
cannot occur if the ego is dominant because, through his ego, the art­
ist unloads his complexes into the work, thereby poisoning it through
5the self-centered expression of the ego. The creative self reveals 
itself because it is given in disinterestedness; the ego cannot sub­
ordinate itself to a work because it is "interested" in self-enhancement. 
The normality of art ensures that an artist's personality be at play in 
his art, unconsciously and unintentionally, because his inner substance 
will enhance the work, rather than warp it, when the concern is with 
the work and not the self.^
The purporters of "art for art's sake" fail to make a distinction 
between the self and the ego. While such an approach may be successful
^Ibid., p. 142; also see idem, "Individuality and Personality," 
in The Person and the Common Good, paperback ed., trans. John J. Fitz­
gerald (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1966), p. 31 passim.
^Maritain, "Art for Art's Sake," pp. 51-52.
OJMaritain, "Creative Intuition and Poetic Knowledge," p. 145. 
4Ibid., pp. 143-144.
6Ibid., p. 55.
^Maritain, "Art for Art's Sake," p. 54.
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in suppressing the ego, it simultaneously represses the creative self. 
This sort of repression is an extreme reaction to the "anathema" of 
human ends in art. In other words, "art for art's sake" distorts the 
meaning of gratuitousness by forgetting that, while art has a primary 
end (the good of the work), the artist, as a man, can have as many 
ends as he pleases.^ If the artist pursues a human end in his work, 
apart from the artistic end— and resulting from it, the danger of ruin- 
ing the work is present, but not insurmountable. In this case, the 
performer must retain an awareness of the perpetual temptation to 
ignore the habitus of performance in favor of self-enhancement, that 
is, increased status as a performing musician.
The suppression of human ends in art, then, is not a valid rea­
son to purport "art for art's sake." The artist, dehumanized, develops 
personal standards to serve his art; he feeds himself to it and sacri­
fices his being to an ideal.^ Art is equated with life itself. Inevit­
ably, the art becomes warped because self- sacrifice to the work, which 
engages the habitus, is subordinated to self-sacrifice to an ideal,
Maritain, "An Essay on Art," pp. 93-94. The purporters of "art 
for art's sake" view with disdain the commercial musicians who are paid 
wages for their art. Maritain, however, insists that there must be a 
differentiation between the aim of the artist, as an artist, and the aim 
of the artist, as a man.
" . . .  the workman should work for his wages, but the work should 
be ruled and shaped and brought into being only with regard to its 
own good and in nowise with regard to the wages. Then the artist 
may work for any and every human intention he likes, but the work 
taken in itself must be made and constructed only for its own 
beauty" ("Art and Morality," in Art and Scholasticism, p. 73; also 
see idem, "Art for Art's Sake," p. 56). 
oMaritain, "An Essay on Art," p. 96.
^Maritain, "Art as a Virtue of the Practical Intellect," pp.
51-52.
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xtfhich engages the artist's entire being as a man.^
"Art for art's sake" is often a reaction to the more worldly art: 
"art for the people." "Art for art's sake" disregards the values of 
human life and the artist as a man; "art for the people" disregards the
Ovirtues of the creative intellect and the artist as an artist.
"Art for the people," sometimes termed "art for the social group,"
ignores the autonomy of art; that is, the social value of a work precludes
3the aesthetic value. Through preclusion, the good of a work is subordi­
nated to the good of human life and the work is shaped, not with creative 
intuition, but with social requirements.^ It matters little whether the 
artist is pleased with his work; it matters much whether others are 
pleased x̂ ith it. Consequently, "art for the people" becomes warped or 
bent as it attempts to meet the needs, purposes, or interests of a par­
ticular social group or community.^ Performed works are used for ideol­
ogical purpose or to capture attention, to entertain, or to provide 
background music for a social occasion. Performance bent in any direc­
tion to "sell" monetarily or indoctrinate ideologically is an art xtfhich 1
1Ibid.
2Maritain, "Art for the People," in The Responsibility of the 
Artist, p. 69.
■̂ Ibid. , p. 72.
4Ibid.
-*Ibid., p. 73. Conceivably, this is the reason why Maritain 
makes a distinction between church or sacred art, an art of religious 
purpose, and Christian art, an art of religious inspiration. See Mari­
tain, "Christian Art," in Art and Scholasticism, p. 64 passim; idem,
"Some R.eflections on Religious Art," in Art and Scholasticism, app. 2, 
p. 100 passim; and idem, "Reflections on Sacred Art," Liturgical Arts 
4 (Third Quarter 1935): 131 passim.
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subordinates aesthetic experience to social values.
If "art for the people" refers to art for future generations, or 
mankind as a whole, the meaning of the term is significantly different 
from art for the social group or community, the art of immediate social 
value.^ Art can be developed for mankind only if the aesthetic values 
outweigh the community interest, purpose, or use of art. The primary 
duty of the community is to respect the spiritual dignity of a work of 
art and to give it the same prior consent granted by an artistic judge 
or critic.^
If the anarchistic nature of "art for art's sake" undermines cer­
tain community values, "art for the people" can be a totalitarian reaction 
to such a threat, as perceived by the community.^ The duty of the artist, 
then, is to separate himself from the anarchistic nature of "art for art's
sake" which disregards human values and the entire issue of morality in
5art. The duty of the critic is, primarily, to judge the work for its 
aesthetic value; and secondarily, to judge the moral implications of the 
work for the sake of the community.^
"''The purporters of "art for the people," ignore or deflate the 
formal purpose of art, the spiritual value of art to humanity. Man, by 
nature, seeks pleasurable feeling. The spiritual nature of art can be 
of utmost pleasure to man; however, deprived of such pleasure, man is 
subjected to an increased magnitude of carnal pleasure or material 
pleasure because he cannot exist without pleasurable feeling. See 
Maritain, "Answer to Jean Cocteau," p. 94; idem, "Art and Morality," 
in Art and Scholasticism, pp. 75-76; and St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa 
Theologica, II-II, 35. 4. ad 2.
^Maritain, Art for the People," p. 69.
•̂ Ibid., pp. 89-90. ^Ibid., p. 74.
^Ibid., p. 69. ^Ibid., p. 84.
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The responsibility of the artist to the community, and the com­
munity to the artist, is reciprocal in terms of gratuitousness. The 
work, and the beauty it reflects is of paramount importance. The 
extremes of "art for art's sake" and "art for the people" are equally 
threatening to the gratuitousness of art; art left to itself is God's 
because all beauty, aesthetically perceived, is part of the transcen­
dental realm of beauty.
The artist has great trouble in making use, without hurting 
himself, of a creative virtue that is too hard for him as a 
man. But art itself goes spontaneously to God.
Art has trouble defending itself against an impure angel 
that slaps it in the face, that wants to make use of everything 
for self-love, of the very gift the heart makes of itself, of 
its weakness; even of God.* 23
The performer's use of the habitus, or creative virtue, depends 
upon gratuitousness; gratuitous performance is God's because of the 
presence of God in the soul of man.^
Since the primary responsibility of the performer is to his 
habitus and the performance action it directs, a complete exclusion 
of human values (in relation to the self) exposes his habitus to exter­
nal forces which may weaken or reduce the primacy so vital to the prac­
tice of art. In fact, the possession of certain moral virtues serve 
the habitus by protecting it from nonartistic forces. These virtues 
of the performer, as a man, exist apart from the artistic virtue, 
except to protect it.3 The presence of such moral virtue, if the
^Maritain, "Answer to Jean Cocteau," p. 97.
2Ibid. 3Ibid., p. 86. *Ibid., p. 105.
3Maritain, "Poetry and Perfection of Human Life," in The Respon­
sibility of the Artist, pp. 99-100. Maritain lists the following moral
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performer pays heed to it, causes the performer to be ascetic and undevi­
ating in regard to his habitus and perpetually on guard against the 
attraction of easy execution, instant success, or the immediate goals 
prompted by external concerns (and the consequent relaxation of crea­
tive intent or spiritual effort).'* ’ The habitus of art diminishes as
2the interior effort is relaxed.
The highest moral virtue, however, cannot replace a lack of art­
istic virtue.3 The morality of art exists to (1) influence or enhance
virtues as being essential to protecting the habitus of art from exter­
nal temptation: humility, magnanimity, prudence, integrity, fortitude, 
temperance, simplicity, and ingeniousness. "Art and Morality," in Art 
and Scholasticism, p. 78; also see idem, "Poetry and Perfection of 
Human Life," pp. 99-100; and idem, "Answer to Jean Cocteau," p. 125.
*1
Maritain, "Art and Morality," in Art and Scholasticism, p. 78.
2Ibid.
ÔMaritain, "Art for the People," p. 92. An artistic dilemma 
occurs when a work is artistically good but morally bad. Maritain 
offers no positive solution because the artist is bound by his primary 
responsibility; and yet, his moral responsibility demands that he change 
the \<rork. A possible solution is that the artist change himself and 
allow his conscience to change the work or to pursue another kind of 
xrark of art. A beautiful work is a work that the artist loves; however, 
if the work contains an element which distorts truth or causes a deteri­
oration of spiritual values, the work may come to displease the artist 
in spite of its beauty. A work which repulses or insults others loses 
its radiance in the same way. If the artist, as a man, serves a divine 
end, through Christianity, he spiritualizes his inner self to an extent 
which can rise above the human narrowness which limits art. This is not 
a practice of a particular religious style or philosophy, but rather, 
art left to itself and the inner influence of Christian inspiration.
I t  i s  a l s o  i m p o r t a n t  t o  n o t e  t h a t ,  s i n c e  a r t  a n d  m o r a l i t y  h a v e  s e p a r a t e  
e n d s ,  a  C h r i s t i a n  c o n v e r s i o n  may a l s o  r e d u c e  t h e  a r t i s t i c  v i r t u e  b y  
c h a n g i n g  t h e  a g e n t ,  t h e  m an . T h e  s u b j e c t i v i t y  o f  m a n ’ s  p e r s o n a l i t y  
i n f l u e n c e s  h i s  a r t  b u t  i n  a  w a y  n o t  c o n s c i o u s l y  know n t o  t h e  a r t i s t .
Art, by itself, depends on the habitus of art, and the question of 
subjective influence upon this habitus is answerable only through the 
externalized work itself. See idem, "Art for Art's Sake," pp. 60-64; 
idem, "An Essay on Art," pp. 96-97; and idem, "Poetry and Perfection 
of Human Life," pp. 97-98.
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the habitus through self-expression, and (2) protect the habitus through 
self-discipline. The extrinsic or indirect role of morality leaves the 
habitus free to pursue its object, the making of a work.
CHAPTER VI
DISCUSSION, SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
Discussion
The habitus of performance, an artistic virtue, is an inner, 
intellectual, and spiritual disposition which enables the performing 
musician to perform or aurally "make" a musical work. The very per­
sonal nature of the habitus gives it a unique content because it is the 
possession of a unique intellect. The inborn or innate disposition, 
from which the habitus proceeds, is a certain musical ability, a gift 
of capacity which is also a possession of the intellect. Since the 
acquiring of habitus is synonymous with the development of habitus, the 
virtue of art is an intellectual virtue or formation of the mind in a 
given direction.
The relationship between the inborn disposition and the acquired 
disposition appears to be a complex one. This is because it is possible 
for a musician to rely primarily on the former with little regard for 
the latter. Maritain states that the natural gift is a prerequisite to 
the practice of art, the implication being that an artist cannot reach 
his full potential (as an artist) without developing his ability (and 
extending some personal effort). It is also apparent that, through the 
effort expended in the practice of his art, a performer acquires habitus 
without the conscious intent or effort to do so. The habitus of perform­
ance, then, is acquired or developed through the practice of the art
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of performance (the production of a good performed work or one which is 
pleasing to the performer).
The acquiring of habitus involves the deepening of the intel­
lect rather than expanding the capacity itself. The natural gifts of 
imagination and sensitivity are served by the external senses and, in 
turn, they serve the intellect in its operative practice of art. From 
this it can be gathered that native capacity is essential to development, 
but it is the mind which acquires the habitus and which uses native 
capacity to serve and cultivate this development.
While saying that an inborn disposition must be developed, Mari- 
tain also refers to the difficulty in making a clear distinction between 
the habitus and its prerequisite. All musicians, highly gifted and less 
gifted alike, will acquire habitus through performance, but the depth of 
the habitus does not necessarily reflect the depth of the gift. A 
musician of average ability may perform a work well because his inte­
rior effort is intense and because his effort meets or exceeds his poten­
tial. The gifted musician may perform a work well with less effort; how­
ever, he may also inhibit his development of the habitus through a 
greater concern with the display of his gift than with the production 
of his work. The musical gift is a potentiality but the development of 
this potentiality, or the acquiring of a habitus, depends on the crea­
tive relationship between the performer and the work being performed. 
Since musical ability serves the musical habitus, the two become com­
mingled in the practice of performance. As a result, the distinction 
between the habitus and its prerequisite is not easily perceived, nor 
is it clearly apparent to the performer himself. The essential point 
is that the habitus is a deepened or changed intellect.
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The contrasting characteristics of habitus and habit are perti­
nent to this study because the contrast, by itself, defines the habitus 
of performance as an intellectual virtue. Briefly, the habitus pertains 
to reason; habit relies on memory. The habitus is spiritual in nature; 
habit is empirical. The habitus is spontaneous; habit is repetitive.
The habitus is ruled by the will; habit is subject to routine.
Ultimately, the habitus controls habit because the power of 
reason, which proceeds from the spiritual self, transcends memory (which 
is subject to the limitation of the conscious mind). The habitus wills 
its end through the exercise of reason and is spontaneously inclined as 
a result. Habit operates instinctively and consistently when reinforced 
with repetition or routine.
Maritain's discussion of the rules of art, or the technique of 
art, contains the essential characteristics of the habitus-habit rela­
tionship. The spiritual rules of art are equivalent to technique in its 
higher or formal sense; the material rules of art are equivalent to tech­
nique in its loxtfer sense. The spiritual rules are a possession of the 
habitus while the material rules are concerned with the execution of 
habit. The primary rule of fine art is a spiritual rule which governs 
technique, in its higher and lower sense, in the direction of a product; 
that is, the primary rule guides the habitus in its intellectual inclina­
tions toward beauty and its desire to create a good work. In this sense, 
the material rules are subordinate to the spiritual rules because the 
material rules, by themselves, are concerned with method, physical skill, 
or any external means of art (which also make a work but without concern 
for the primary rule). In other words, the means of execution are pri­
mary to the material rules of art.
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The technique of performance, in its lower sense, is identified 
with its preoccupation with fingering facility, tone production, and 
rapid or efficient reading skill (or any good habits of performance 
execution which focus upon the performer's physical and mental dex­
terity) .
Still another facet of technique, in its lower sense, is the 
preoccupation with a knowledge of performance methods or conceptual 
ways to perform. While the performer's skill is physical or manual, 
or mental— both closely tied to innate ability, the performer's method 
is conceptual and is attained by conscious abstraction of terminology 
and broad academic principles. Skill is concerned with execution while 
method is concerned with contemplation. The method must also be exe­
cuted but, in contrast to the habitus, the execution of method serves 
the method rather than the work. Performance for knowledge, then, uses 
knowledge to enhance or advance itself and equates the efficient use of 
method to be good for the work whether, in its aural reality, it serves 
the work or does nothing for it.
The habitus of performance views knoT'/ledge as external to the 
work it xtfishes to create and perfect. If a certain method is required 
to create and enhance this work, the particular approach becomes an 
internalized part of the product, subordinated to it and abstractive 
after the performance has been completed. The habitus does not inter­
nalize a method unless it serves the work in performance. Since the 
necessary means of performance are determined and fixed during the 
momentary aural experience of the work, the starting point is an 
intuitive, general view of the work as suggested by the symbolic
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notation of the score. As aural production begins, however, the means 
are altered as the envisioned end of the work is more clearly (and 
aurally) defined.
The habitus executes its determined method because it has been 
discovered to be necessary to the goodness of the work in performance. 
Similarly, the performer must refine the necessary skill to execute the 
creative intent willed by his intellect. Obviously, both method and 
execution are instruments of the habitus of performance, a habitus 
which serves the product of performance by observing the primary rule 
of fine art.
Technique, in its lower sense, is impatient with the personal 
inclinations and spontaneity of the habitus because the product is 
intended to be the result of predetermined rules. Deviation from the 
material rules is regarded as inefficient and impositive either because 
the structure of a prepared plan is threatened with revision or because 
the display of a particular skill is threatened with refinement. More­
over, the positivistic level of performance disregards, or is skeptical 
of, the intellectual power of the habitus (in its operative ability) to 
create a good work intuitively.
Whether the performer senses beauty in a work is not important 
to the positivist because beauty is (erroneously) believed to be an 
automatic result of the "right" conception of rules. Consequently, 
the operation of performance is confined to motions or the objectivity 
of execution. Moreover, little or no effort is made by the performer 
to put himself into his work, to follow the primary rule, or to freely 
adapt or alter his means in the direction of a good or pleasing product 
of sound, the work as he hears it.
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The aural result of a work, limited by material rules, may be 
satisfactory conceptually but unsatisfactory aurally and nonconceptually. 
In other words, the performer is forced to operate against the inclina­
tions of his habitus if the aural product is lifeless or repulsive to 
his intellect. He may, in fact, elect to maintain the objective pres­
ence of the sound without probing the work to discuss why it causes 
displeasure or tedium. The habitus of performance guides the intel­
lect in its search for the "right" sound or a sound that brings plea­
sure through the aural sense. To repress the will of the habitus is 
to limit or confine performance to its lower or material level.
The habitus of performance is also undeviating, but in a differ­
ent manner. The habitus is strictly adherent to the primary rule and 
the inclinations of the intellect to produce a good work. The performer 
performs his work with an intuitive idea of what he should do to perfect 
it; the habitus, however, cannot provide a precise plan in advance 
because the details must be discovered and validated by intuition. It 
is possible that much detail may be known in advance; nevertheless all 
detail is subject to change as the sound of the work is reflected upon 
the intellect. In its desire to make a pleasing work, the habitus dis­
covers requisite performing habits by altering, recasting, or discarding 
old habits and uncovering new ones. These material means are chosen 
along the way, or during the process of performance, as they are heard 
to be necessary to the work. The identification of detail causes the 
material structure to evolve spontaneously, a definition of creativity 
in contrast with external, material structures which impose themselves
upon a work and dictate the results to be sought.
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After the performance is completed and the working idea exter­
nalized, the newly discovered material framework can be abstracted, from 
the produced sound it serves, for conceptual use. Material analysis not­
withstanding, the spiritual rules, which framed the material rules, 
remain an intangible, nonconceptual part of the aural product.
The guidance of the habitus is anything but a "safe" and unevent­
ful routine for the performer. The habitus demands that the performer 
follow his creativity of spirit in judging the role of detail and execu­
tion in the end to be sought. A personal detachment from intent is alien 
to the primacy of the habitus in situating the performed work.
Consistent with his view of the external nature of technique, in 
its lower sense, Maritain deplores the intent of academicism, or rules 
for the sake of rules, to develop the habitus of art. The academicist, 
through the transmission of rules (and their execution), disciplines the 
student with a process of making which is equated with the development 
of the habitus. Maritain disputes this conception of art by stating 
that what the artist actually possesses, through academicism, is knowl­
edge and good habits but not necessarily the habitus. This is because 
material rules are external to a work and are useless to the production 
of an intended work unless they are discovered to be necessary to the 
internal intent.
It is important to emphasize that the habitus begins with an 
intended or envisioned work while academicism begins with material rules. 
The acquiring of the habitus is a natural result of a direct intent to 
make a specific work. The term "acquiring" refers to a development or 
deepening of the intellect pursuant to the relationship of the performer
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to his work-to-be-made. This is in contrast to the conscious, delib­
erate attempts by the academicist to develop the habitus. The fact that 
a student performer's mind be literally filled with methods gives little 
or no indication of whether he is able to apply them to a work. Conse­
quently, academicism inhibits, rather than facilitates, the acquiring 
of the habitus.
The acquiring of the habitus is a careful, though variable, bal­
ance of the via inventionis and the via disciplinae of art. The via 
inventionis reflects the personal relationship of the artist to his 
work-to-be-made while the via disciplinae is the application of tradi­
tional, material rules to the same work. By itself, the via inventionis 
may tend to artistic anarchy, or total disregard of traditional artistic 
practices, and a total reliance upon the discovery of rules. The via 
inventionis is vital to artistic practice but, by itself, is a gift 
without guidance. The via disciplinae provides the via inventionis 
with an order upon which to fixate or a discipline with which to unite.
Similarly, the via disciplinae, by itself, disregards the per­
sonal nature of art by operating primarily or solely through the exter­
nal application of rules, a practice which is synonymous to academicism. 
The via inventionis provides the via disciplinae with inventiveness or 
the freedom to adapt material rules in a spontaneous manner and in sub- 
serviance to the work-in-progress (to perfect the work as the artist 
sees it).
The presence of both the via inventionis and the via disciplinae 
within the habitus of art is presumably the reason Maritain advocates 
apprenticeship education for the student artist. In this way, the
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student apprentice is confronted with the "real"; that is, he wills or 
intends to create works, not rules, and he begins his art with intended 
works. The via inventionis of the student is combined with the via 
disciplinae of the master teacher to create and refine an actual pro­
duct of art. The master teacher instructs through correction and 
example; the student apprentice imitates through practice and appli­
cation.
Above all, the apprentice musician is subject to the primary 
rule of fine art: to produce only that with which the aural sense is 
fully pleased. Through the primary rule, the via inventionis is more 
intimately involved with the spiritual interiority of the habitus; con­
sequently, the via disciplinae is subject to the will of the via inven­
tionis in the production of a good work. This is the reason that the 
master teacher must respect the will of the student in the production 
of a work connatural to his (the student's) intellect. Moreover, this 
principle of making is consistent with the control of the spiritual 
intent of art over the material intent of art, as discussed in terms 
of the technique of art.
In Maritain's careful distinction between the practical order of 
art and the speculative order of wisdom, the thrust of his argument 
becomes evident. Academicism is pseudoscientific in its worship of 
conceptual art, the rational art of wisdom. Maritain, however, argues 
that the habitus is not fertile in such a seedbed and cannot be sub­
jected to an external structure if it is to retain the necessary free­
dom to pursue a good work. The observance of the primary rule, then,
assures that the via inventionis will exercise its inventive nature
101
through operational freedom and exert intuitive control over the via 
disciplinae, the material aspect of the same habitus.
The aim of performance is a performed work, a product of sound 
created for itself. The aim of performance depends on the principle of 
disinterestedness or gratuitousness because the performance of music is 
a fine art. This principle has two contributing parts: first, a product 
of fine art has no necessary use other than its own existence as a good 
work; secondly, a good work is created to please its creator.
A pleasing sound conveys beauty to the performer; therefore, a 
product of sound is created for itself when the performer produces a 
sound which satisfies or delights his intellect through the aural sense. 
The sound is the object of performance, an object which reflects beauty 
when it is good or pleasing to the performer. The beauty of a performed 
work, then, transcends the object, the sound of the work; nevertheless, 
sound and beauty are inseparable when the former is a product of dis­
interested performance.
Since the aim of performance is an internal one, the use of per­
formance for external aims— such as concerts, entertainment or background 
music, or wages— is outside of the internal realm. If the external use 
or aim of performance is the primary object, the principle of disinter­
estedness is violated and the internal aim of performance is threatened.
A product of useful art is created primarily for use by man; con­
versely, musical performance is a fine art and its product is created 
primarily for itself, thus having no necessary use other than its own 
existence. This is because beauty can delight the intellect but has no 
use, only an essence. It reflects from the sound of a work and cannot 
be produced directly through specifications (as is the case with a
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product of useful art). If the product of performance is produced for 
use by man, the presence of beauty In the work may be Ignored or 
regarded as a "by-product" of the use intended.
The use of a performance product, however, is a probable occur­
rence because of the overlap of art in general: the making of a good 
xrork. Because of this overlap, a performance product can be used for 
any external purpose desired by the performer; however-, to remain fine 
art, a musical work must first delight the intellect of the performer 
through his aim to make a good work for itself. This is the essential 
difference between the internal and external aims of performance. A 
good work created to please the performer inclines toward beauty by 
nature. When the internal, spiritual aim is met, the external aims 
can be undertaken without harm to the primary aim of performance.
A performer's personal delight in the sound of a work ensures 
that the creativity of the spirit, or the creative intellect, is free 
to find itself in the work and to do its will in producing a pleasing 
work. If the performer refuses to deviate from pleasing ends— -if he 
performs only that which pleases him— he binds himself to the work 
through a love of the particular sound being produced. Beauty is con­
natural to him because the will of the creative intellect has guided 
him to beauty. The creativity of the spirit inclines toward beauty by 
nature and it wills to make a good work because such a work reflects 
beauty back to its maker. The prerequisite to this inclination is the 
freedom to operate through the aural sense by reflecting musical sounds 
upon the intellect and allowing the will to pursue sounds which 
delight the intellect, Resultingly, the creative intellect is led by
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the will to a completed work, unique to the intellect and disinterested 
in external aims. Since the primary rule intends to free the intellec­
tual inclination toward beauty, the conjoined spiritual rules of dis­
covery, adaptation, and transformation— and material rules of execution—  
are bound to the primary rule.
The habitus of performance operates through the intellectual 
inclination toward beauty. To perceive beauty through the aural sense 
involves a simplicity of perception but a complexity of essence in 
respect to beauty. First, transcendental beauty is beauty in all things, 
a beauty known to God but not to man— except through the conduit of sen­
sory experience. Secondly, the aural experience of beauty in music is 
beauty perceived aurally; and it either pleases or displeases the intel­
lect as a result of this perception. The aural experience of beauty is 
defined as the aesthetic experience of music, or the perception of aes­
thetic beauty in music. Thirdly, the beauty which becomes connatural 
to the intellect of the performing musician is an aurally pleasing expe­
rience of aesthetic beauty. Connatural beauty, then, is aesthetic beauty 
which conveys intellectual joy through the sound of music. The habitus 
pursues the beauty of connaturality as it intuitively seeks itself and 
the pleasure of satisfying music. In its pursuit, the habitus uses the 
sound to find itself and apply itself to the object being produced. The 
habitus becomes connatural to its object through the beauty of personal 
aural experience.
The academicist, who attempts to produce beauty conceptually and 
positively, has little patience with the subjective nature of connatural­
ity because the unpredictability of connaturality cannot be ruled by the 
positivismof pure objectivity. To avoid connaturality, the academicist
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must rule sound conceptually, that is, to regard sound as an object from 
which nothing transcends. The academicist exercises little concern over 
the pleasurable aspects of sound; he begins and ends with the external 
content of the music; he defines sound as an aural copy of the written 
score, thus logically filtering out any possibility of an inner mystery 
transcending the score.
The academicist's position becomes polarized in respect to con­
temporary music because of the external complexity of this music. A 
personal connaturality with such surface complexity is regarded as 
improbable, unnecessary, and pointless while personal detachment is 
regarded as essential.
Obviously, the academicist lacks confidence in the intuitive per­
ception of contemporary music. As a result, a contemporary work, which 
lacks the beauty it purports to represent visually and conceptually, 
may be judged as conceptually good while being aesthetically weak. In 
other words, the external quality of the work is equated with the aes­
thetic value, the inner sterility notwithstanding.
Maritain argues that all artistic products contain a degree of 
transcendence, but apart from sensory perception, aesthetic beauty is 
muted. The aural perception of complex and unusual music may be 
repulsive to the intellect at first; nevertheless, if the performer 
allows the sound of this music to permeate his intellect, he may grot̂  
to be connatural to the sounds that were initially repulsive. The 
c omplexity of contemporary music appears to present a challenge but 
not an insurmountable task for the performer because all music, tradi­
tional as well as contemporary, must reveal its inner content through
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aural perception; otherwise, the beauty reflected from the composer's 
intent, however meager, may remain isolated from the intellect. Fur­
thermore, contemporary music having much aesthetic value in its aural 
potentiality is also sterilized by artistic striving for pure objectiv­
ity.
Because of the intellectual inclination toward beauty, the 
habitus operates through the intellectual will to create a good work.
The habitus, in its spirituality, perfects a work by the intuition of 
the will; it intuitively "knows" the proper direction of operation 
through connaturality. The principle of disinterestedness ensures 
that a work is performed to delight, initially, the intellect of the 
performer and to produce, resultingly, a good sound, one that aurally 
enhances the performed work. In this way, the habitus is prompted to 
search, probe, and exhaust itself in pursuit of its object: a pleasing 
sound.
To the above end, the virtue of performance draws upon knowledge 
and uses or applies this knowledge to enhance the work being performed. 
The skill of performance, physical and mental, is used to externalize 
the intended work or give it an aural presence. The habitus relies on 
knowledge and skill but only in the context of an undeviating service 
to the aural product. A knowledge of music is speculative; the skill 
of execution is empirical. The habitus of performance is neither as 
rational as wisdom nor as observable as externalization.
A purely technical display of skill, or of performing habits, 
is a substitute for the formality of performance which begins in the 
intellect. A proficient technician may be observably impressive in his
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motions of performance but his mind may also be intellectually detached 
from the aural product. If the proficiency of performance is primary, 
the ego grasps this intent for itself. The ego makes the work a servant 
of the performer's skill, a skill which seeks to enhance itself, thus 
making performance a shallow art, an art of proficient reading and 
execution. If society places great value on observable performance 
results, a performer's "motions" might be misinterpreted as an art of 
depth when it is quite the opposite, that is, a display of good per­
forming habits. The performer himself knows the truth of his intent; 
others can judge his intent only through his works.
The habitus adheres to the primacy of a work, an intent not 
easily observable; however, such an intent can be judged for its spirit­
ual content through the aesthetic experience of music. The habitus 
requires means to externalize its product; therefore, the proficiency 
of execution may be equal to that of display for the sake of display.
The essential difference is that the habitus requires execution to 
serve the work being produced, a work first envisioned by the intel­
lect .
Conceptual methods of performance pertain to the content of a 
written score. The score, and its notation, belong to the speculative 
order of knowledge because it is entirely possible to analyze, plan, 
and execute performance through the contemplation of notation, the 
intent being abstracted from the material content of the score. In 
this sense, the externalization of the product serves the abstracted 
material intent.
The problem with conceptual performance lies in the essence of 
the habitus; that is, the habitus is illogical and nonconceptual.
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M o r e o v e r ,  a  w r i t t e n  s c o r e  i s  t h e  m u s i c a l  w o r k  b u t  o n l y  a s  much o f  t h e  
w o r k  a s  c a n  b e  v i s u a l l y  r e p r e s e n t e d  t o  a  p e r f o r m e r .  T h e  i n n e r  s e c r e t ,  
t h e  a e s t h e t i c  b e a u t y ,  i s  h i d d e n  w i t h i n  t h e  a u r a l  e x p e r i e n c e  o f  t h e  w o r k .
S c o r e  c o n t e m p l a t i o n ,  b y  i t s e l f ,  f a l l s  s h o r t  o f  a e s t h e t i c  i n t e n t  
b e c a u s e  p e r f o r m a n c e  i s  o f  t h e  p r a c t i c a l  o r d e r  a n d  m u s t  p r o d u c e  i t s  p r o ­
d u c t  t h r o u g h  t h e  so u n d  o f  m u s i c ,  a n  e x p e r i e n c e  w h i c h  t r a n s c e n d s  t h e  
s c o r e .  T h e  b e a u t y  o f  m u s i c  i s  h i d d e n  w i t h i n  t h e  s o u n d s  s y m b o l i z e d  b y  
n o t a t i o n  b u t  a c c e s s i b l e  t h r o u g h  a u r a l  p e r c e p t i o n .  S c o r e  n o t a t i o n  i s  
c e r t a i n l y  a  m o re  p o s i t i v e  v e h i c l e  f o r  a n a l y s i s  b u t  t h e  e s s e n c e  o f  
b e a u t y  c a n n o t  b e  s c o r e d  i n  a  p o s i t i v e  s e n s e .  I n  s c o r i n g  h i s  w o r k ,  
t h e  c o m p o s e r  a t t e m p t s  t o  r e t a i n  t h e  b e a u t y  h e  h a d  d i s c o v e r e d  i n  s o u n d ,  
a  d i f f i c u l t  t a s k  s i n c e  o n l y  t h e  o b j e c t i v i t y  o f  s o u n d  c a n  b e  n o t a t e d  
a c c u r a t e l y .  T h e  p e r f o r m e r  m u s t  h e a r  t h e  a u r a l  r e a l i t y  o f  t h e  w o r k  
b e f o r e  h e  c a n  p e r c e i v e  t h e  b e a u t y  h i d d e n  w i t h i n  t h e  o b j e c t i v i t y  o f  
s c o r e  n o t a t i o n .  T h i s  i s  w hy  t h e  h a b i t u s  o f  p e r f o r m a n c e  i s ,  b y  n a t u r e ,  
i l l o g i c a l  a n d  n o n c o n c e p t u a l .
T h o s e  p e r f o r m e r s  m o s t  a d e p t  a t  s c o r e  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  may b e  t h e  
l e a s t  a d e p t  a t  p e r f e c t i n g  a  w o r k  i n  p e r f o r m a n c e  b e c a u s e  t h e  b e a u t y  o f  
t h e  w o r k  m u s t  b e  s p o n t a n e o u s l y  p e r c e i v e d  i n  s o u n d .  T h e y  may know t h e  
m a t e r i a l  i n t e n t  o f  t h e  w o r k  b u t  f a i l  t o  p e r c e i v e  t h e  a p p l i c a t i o n  o f  t h e  
m a t e r i a l  e l e m e n t s  t o  t h e  e l u s i v e  a u r a l  p r o d u c t .  T h e  h a b i t u s  d o e s  n o t  
r e q u i r e  i m p r e s s i v e  t e r m i n o l o g y  t o  p u r s u e  i t s  o b j e c t ;  i t  d o e s  r e q u i r e  
i n t u i t i v e  p e r c e p t i o n .
T h e  r e - c r e a t i o n  o f  t h e  c o m p o s e r ' s  i n t e n t  f a l l s  u n d e r  t h e  a u s ­
p i c e s  o f  a r t i s t i c  o r  a e s t h e t i c  j u d g m e n t ,  R . e - c r e a t i o n  r e q u i r e s  a  c a r e f u l  
b a l a n c e  b e t w e e n  t h e  v i a  i n v e n t i o n i s  an d  t h e  v i a  d i s c i p l i n a e  o f
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performance. If the via inventionis predominates, the work is subjected 
to the personal whim of the performer, an example of artistic anarchy, 
and an emphasis on performer's intent over composer's intent. Con­
versely, the predominance of the via disciplinae encourages conceptual 
score analysis which, by itself, neglects the performer's intuitive 
aural perception of the work— a point which parallels conceptual aims 
in performance.
Re-creation begins with the composed work in its printed or 
external form and, in this, the via disciplinae is necessary for score 
analysis. The totality of the judgment, however, cannot dwell at the 
material level. Score contemplation is a beginning of artistic judg­
ment but, as re-creation, it is limited to the external work and not 
to the work, in the internal sense. Aural perception is an essential 
component of the performer's judgment because the work reveals itself 
in sound. Aesthetic perception requires a prior consent, by the per­
former, to the aural reality of the work and what it may teach him.
Prior consent is the full attention given to the sound of the work as 
conveyed through performance. Aesthetic judgment is intuitive because 
it requires the performer to judge through his connaturality with the 
sound of the work.
The re-creation of a composed work is the initial step toward 
the performer's view of the totality of the work in performance. The 
performed work is the potentiality of the composed work in relation to 
the performer's intellectual uniqueness and performing ability. The 
totality of the performer's view is the creative idea, a comprehensive 
vision containing details in spiritual form, that is, details not worked
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out or externalized. As externalization or execution begins, the per­
former's intuition guides him in pursuit of the envisioned details, 
initially obscure, and which become "fixed" as they are discovered, 
aurally, to fit the original view of the work. In this respect, the 
performer finds it difficult to calculate his progress in advance 
because the fixation of detail occurs at the moment of discovery. The 
sound of a performed work is "right" when he hears the fulfillment of 
his idea, that is, when his intellect becomes connatural to the aural 
product.
The habitus guides the performer to his preferred particular 
sound; the intuition of the habitus probes the composed work for its 
beauty and wills the intellect to pursue it and externalize it. The 
desired sound is validated, then, by connaturality. Apart from his 
habitus, the performer could not know in which direction to proceed, 
the alternative being an academic plan, conceptually designed, and 
derived from the printed score through contemplation. Such a pre­
pared plan is efficient, positive, and, very likely, acceptable; how­
ever, it may divert the performer away from the beauty of the work, 
thereby limiting the aural product to a level below its initial 
potentiality.
Inspiration, or the lack of it, is directly related to the 
depth and intensity of the performer's idea. The flash of inspira­
tion is equated with the sudden and unexpected appearance of a crea­
tive idea— the composer's intent united with the performer's intent 
as the latter suddenly "sees" the potentiality of the work in perform­
ance. Inspiration spurs the performer on to further action, in
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pursuit of detail, and with the hope of externalizing the generality of 
the vision before the limitation of memory fades the initial brilliance 
of the idea. For a moment, the performer knew what he wanted; he envi­
sioned the full potential of the work in performance within an instan­
taneous framework. It remains for the habitus to guide the intellect 
in search of detail and to validate detail by intuition. The conscious 
mind, or the memory, cannot hold the complex unity of the envisioned 
work. The details are revealed through externalization and the exter­
nalized details, in turn, provide an aural presence to the envisioned 
work, in its totality. The aural product is an imperfect fulfillment 
of inspiration, the material imperfection of the luminous perfection 
of the performer's idea.
The sign quality of a musical work supports Maritain's conten­
tion that there is an immateriality to the work which transcends the 
physical presence of a printed score. The direct sign is analogous to 
the creative idea whether it be the compositional idea of the composer 
or the performance idea of the performer. The latter idea is the com­
positional idea transformed by the action of performance. The reversed 
sign is the substance or personality of the performer which enters the 
aural product unintentionally through the action of performance. The 
reversed sign of the composer is a nonconceptual part of the composed 
work which entered the work through the action of composition.
The habitus of performance operates through the direct or inten­
tional sign but because the performer is a man, as well as an artist, 
the reversed or unintentional sign is inevitably commingled with crea­
tive intent. The spiritual nature of the direct and reversed signs
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permeates the material or entitative presence of the printed score. 
Moreover, the sign of the work is nonconceptual, in contrast to the con­
ceptual nature of symbolic notation within the materiality of the work. 
The habitus of performance permeates the surface mechanics by aural 
action and, in this way, becomes connatural to the inner sign hidden 
within the score. The inner sign of the work is analogous to the crea­
tive idea but not to the symbolism of notation, external to the work.
The action of imitation in performance relates to the sign 
aspect of a musical work and also defines the Maritain concept of crea­
tive intuition. A musician's imitative action occurs through the simul­
taneous reading and execution of the score and the expression of a 
creative intent subjectively commingled with the personality of the 
performer. The imitative action of performance is a marriage of the 
entitative work to the intentional and unintentional creative.intent 
of the performer. He begins with the score but permeates it with his 
creative idea, the latter being affected or influenced by the subjec­
tivity of his personality. This is analogous to the direct-reversed 
sign relationship in musical performance and to the relationship of 
the entitative work (score) to the intentional work (aural product).
Imitative performance occurs when the performer executes the 
score while simultaneously putting himself into the work through aural 
perception. Consequently, the visual work is transformed into an aural 
product; a composed work becomes a performed work. In other words, the 
composed work is inadvertently transfigured by the action of perform­
ance; the aural product is the composed work as the performer hears it, 
a transcendence of musical sounds symbolized materially.
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Technically reproducing the score through the primacy of execu­
tion is not imitation, in the formal sense, because strict reproduction 
lacks the self-expression and the personal creative intent of the per­
former. Conversely, slighting or ignoring the entitative work in favor 
of total performer freedom is not imitative because the entitative work 
must be re-created through the action of artistic judgment.
The musical work is a prerequisite to self-expression because 
the performer expresses his self through the work; that is, he expresses 
the work and not himself, in a direct sense. Self-expression, or the 
reversed sign, is a giving of the self, a self-sacrifice to the work 
being made. The self-expression of the personality is in direct con­
trast to the self-centered possessiveness of the ego and its concern 
for individuality. Self-expression is self-sacrifice, a subordination 
of the personality to the work being performed. Self-expression is tied 
to the habitus of performance because the performer focuses upon express­
ing the work, his creative intent through the work, and himself through 
the performance idea. The expression of the self, then, is analogous 
to the unintentional impact of the reversed sign on the action of 
performance.
Technical display enhances the ego because it focuses upon the 
performer and not the work. Technique, in its lower sense, enhances 
the work when it serves the work, an alien practice to the ego which 
grasps and cannot serve. The habitus seeks to produce a good work and 
operates through the self rather than the ego.
A musical work aurally communicates its intentional sign to a 
perceiver of the work. In this way, the interiority of a composition
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is communicated to the performer (and the interiority of a performed work 
is communicated to listeners in general). To perceive the creative 
intent of an artist is to perceive something of his self along with 
the creative idea. This kind of communication is nonconceptual and 
depends upon aural perception; communication, in this sense, is defined 
as a work revealing itself to a perceiver.
The intent to communicate, as an aim of performance, is external 
to the formal definition of communication. The intent to communicate 
effect, knowledge, or proficiency of habit is external to communication, 
in its higher sense, because the aim of performance is to produce a good 
work. Communication, in its higher sense, does not focus upon certain 
components of a work in a direct and conscious fashion. A performed 
work communicates by revealment, indirectly.
The habitus operates through the soul of a work, or its operative 
idea, because this is the inner sphere which intends to make a good work. 
The spirit of the work, or subjectivity of the performer, is an uninten­
tional component of the soul, transcending the soul but not controlling 
it. This is analogous to the self expressing itself in a work, or the 
performer’s self expressing the work. The aural product communicates or 
reveals the soul, in conjunction with the spirit, to the perceiver. Rela­
tive to the composed work, the performer is both perceiver and maker; 
relative to the performed work, a listener is a perceiver of both the 
composed and performed product.
Intentional communication betrays a concern for the self rather 
than the work. The communication of effect, in particular, is concerned 
with the impact of a work on others— another way of saying that the
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performer, in this case, is concerned about how others react to his per­
formance product. The practice of intentional communication also feeds 
the social bias of art because performance for communication is a nat­
ural instrument of social purpose. If the performer consciously attempts 
to communicate external purpose, he unconsciously inhibits the self which 
flows through the aesthetic purpose of a work. If the performer wishes 
to please an audience, he risks displeasing his intellect and inhibiting 
self-expression. This is because self-expression is concerned with the 
work, and the intellect must be pleased with the sound of the work before 
the habitus operatively guides the intellect in perfecting the product. 
What is communicated, then, is the interiority of the work which may 
result in an effect, indirectly.
Performance for use, rather than making, subordinates the crea­
tive intellect to social requirements and promotes the primacy of exter­
nal goals and the incidence of performer satisfaction. A good work is 
one which pleases the performer; a beautiful work is one which the per­
former loves without qualification. Beauty is of no material use; it 
exists to delight the intellect of a perceiver. Performance for use, 
then, inhibits the aesthetic experience of beauty.
To encourage aesthetic priorities in a work, the ego must be 
sacrificed to the work or, in the absence of such sacrifice, the ego 
will demand that the work please others to enhance itself. The habitus 
of performance operates through the aesthetic requirements of art 
because it cannot subordinate itself to external forces, only to the 
work-to-be-made. Performance for use can occur following the opera­
tion of the habitus in making a good work, for itself; similarly,
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performance for use can be concurrent with the operation of the habitus 
so long as the primacy of the primary rule of performance is strictly 
observed. This is consistent with respecting the primacy of the spirit­
ual, internal aim of performance in the presence of external aims.
The suppression of all human ends in performance to meet creative 
ends presents a similar dilemma at another extreme. The danger of sup­
pressing human ends in art is that self-expression, being human, may be 
repressed. This is equated to severing the reversed sign from the direct 
sign for the purpose of purifying artistic intent. Purified performance 
is a sterilized product produced by a dehumanized intent. The removal 
of the performer's personality from his aural product encourages stark 
objectivity, the impersonality of which violates Maritain's concept of 
imitation. Art for an ideal is distinct from art for the xrork, the lat­
ter drawing upon the habitus for its internal function.
The habitus proceeds from the intellect and the intellect is 
rooted in the spiritual self, the person. The habitus is an inner dis­
position of the person which serves a xrork willed by the intellect. 
Consequently, the habitus is not a system of art nor does it serve such 
an ideal; rather, it serves the interiority of a work-to-be-made.
The habitus is spontaneous because the mind is spontaneous; it 
moves freely in various directions to find itself in an object. The 
habitus operates through connaturality because the mind, by nature, 
seeks itself in an object. The intuition of the habitus depends on 
connaturality to find its direction; resultingly, the connaturality of 
intuition is unpredictable and illogical.
Moral virtue and artistic virtue apply to separate ends. The 
former applies to the human acts of the artist, as a man, x^hile the
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latter applies to the artistic acts of the artist, as an artist. Despite 
these diverse ends, a certain relationship exists between the two virtues 
because they both exist in the mind of the man, as a man. If the artist's 
moral virtue, as a man, diminishes, his habitus of art, also a part of 
the man, will eventually diminish from the physical and mental repercus­
sions of the human acts. In this way, the free exercise of moral virtue 
for the good of the man also protects the habitus of art.
In addition to this, moral virtue can indirectly enhance the art­
istic virtue because of the role of self-expression in the practice of 
art. The self or person is directly subject to the operative perfection 
of morality; therefore, the enhancement of the self can enhance the 
habitus in a positive but undefinable xtfay.
Moral virtue can also guide the performer in his use of the per­
formance product in relation to the community and the moral values of the 
community. A performer need not be a "saint" to perform; however, the 
possession of moral virtue is an attribute in helping the performer, as 
a man, to preserve and enhance his habitus of performance while guiding 
his use of the performance product.
The community, on the other hand, must reciprocate by respecting 
the free nature of the habitus and its priority of aesthetic value over 
social value in the making of a performance product. If the aim of per­
formance is the fulfillment of social requirements, the oppressive nature 
of such requirements repress the habitus by ignoring its inclination to 
create a good work. External priorities inhibit the operative nature of 
the habitus, restrict its development, and fabricate the performance pro­
duct to meet social intent. The primacy of social aims in performance
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is a rationalization of the place of fine art in society because this 
primacy loses sight of the spiritual need for art in human life. A 
society which preserves the dignity of spiritual pleasure (such as fine 
art) has less need for the carnal and material pleasures of life.
The conductor, as a performance leader, has a special relation­
ship to the work of fine art because of his leadership role in the prac­
tice of performance— a role which pertains to the instrumentality of a 
performing group. The conductor's first responsibility is to the aural 
product and, in this sense, the habitus of the conductor must flow 
through the work in the same manner as the habitus of the aural agents, 
or instrumentalists, of the work. Hence, the performers, or aural 
agents, become the instruments of the conductor in his making of the 
work.
The conductor's secondary responsibility is to those agents, the 
performing musicians, the instruments of his habitus. If the primary 
responsibility is violated by external forces such as conductor self­
enhancement or social requirements, or if the performance is dehumanized 
by attempts to withdrax/ the self from the work, the secondary responsibil­
ity to the performers will also be threatened. The observance of the 
primary responsibility is essential to the fulfillment of the secondary 
responsibility because the latter is tied to the former.
The existence of the secondary responsibility is rooted in the 
fact that the aural agents of the work are more than mere instruments; 
they are human beings and artists in their own right, each possessing 
his personal degree of habitus and thereby inevitably establishing a
personal relationship to the performed work. If the performing
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musicians become the pawns of external forces, or subject to conductor 
whim unrelated to the work, the performers may be inhibited in their 
inclinations to place themselves into the production of the work. This 
results in the meaningless motions of performance as contrasted with 
the fine art of performance, which adheres to the primacy of the work.
If performance becomes the meaningless motions of execution, the con­
ductor himself is an external threat to the very art he professes to 
lead and exemplify.
The aural perception of a work by its agents soon reveal whether 
the conductor's directives are in line with his habitus and are actually 
perfecting the work being performed. The intellectual joy of making a 
good work spills over to the agents who are intimately involved with 
its execution. When the performers are aurally aware of their personal 
contribution to the general sound of a good work, the habitus of each, 
musician is inclined in the same general direction, united in the desire 
to achieve a satisfying final product. The performing group experience 
reveals certain similarities in the perception of beauty as well as 
unique differences.
The conductor, however, is the principal agent of the performed 
work. If the temptation of material considerations weakens the opera­
tion of his habitus, the expression of the work will also be weakened. 
The repression of the conductor's habitus will mute the habitus of his 
performing group because the primacy of the work is lessened. To 
restore the strength of his habitus, the conductor must subordinate 
himself to the aesthetic requirements of the work, as intuitively per­
ceived by his habitus, thereby becoming a true instrument of the per­
formed work.
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The performance critic also has a special relationship to a per­
formed work because he judges the work but does not perform it. His 
aesthetic judgment, in respect to aurally perceiving a work, is similar 
to the performer's judgment because both performer and critic are per- 
ceivers of the aural product.
The essential difference between the performer and the critic is 
that the performer intuitively applies his judgment to his personal pro­
duction of the work; the critic uses his skill of critique to communicate 
his judgment to a performer x̂ ho is the maker of the work. The performer 
typically judges a work during his execution of the work and applies his 
judgment to a further perfection of the product. The critic judges from 
the execution of the work and applies his critique following the judgment; 
however, it is left to the performer to perfect the work, to use the 
critique, and to judge the product in an ongoing manner. Accordingly, 
in judging the same work, the ongoing operation of his habitus draws 
the performer more deeply into the aural product than the single percep­
tive judgment of the critic. In respect to that particular work, the 
judgment of the performer may have more operative depth in spite of the 
probability that the critic may possess a superior knowledge of perform­
ance. The judgment, in both cases, is intuitive but in the former case 
it is operative while in the latter case it is external.
If the critic judges conceptually, or through preconception, the 
work is less likely to teach him its aesthetic intent. If he judges the 
performer directly, and the work indirectly, the inner spirit of the work 
is subordinated to the performing skill of the musician.
Criticism is intended to improve the performance product by 
intuitively perceiving its inner content. To do this, the critic must
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allow the aural product to permeate his intellect through the aural 
sense, thus perceiving it for what it is and allowing his habitus to 
guide his judgment of the work. A judgment of the performer, and his 
executive ability, can be made through the work because improving the 
work requires, by natural necessity, an improvement in execution as 
well as intent.
The conductor, in his practice of leadership, and the critic, 
in his practice of critique, are both subject to the guidance of the 
habitus because the operative nature of this virtue preserves the pri­
macy of the work. This is because the habitus operates through an 
aural product of performance.
Summary
I. The habitus of performance is a possession of the performer's 
intellect. The habitus is a changed or deepened intellect; hence, it 
gives the performer an intellectual power to perform musical works through 
the inner strength of intuition. The intuition of the habitus adheres to 
the primacy of a work-to-be-performed, a work willed by the intellect.
The habitus perfects its product as the latter aurally pleases the 
intellect.
A. The spontaneous nature of the habitus reflects the spon­
taneous nature of the mind from which it proceeds. The habitus 
flows through the intellectual inclination toward beauty and the 
intellectual will to perfect an object which reflects beauty.
B. The habitus is acquired or developed through its adher­
ence to a willed work, the resulting content being a latent energy 
or source of strength for intuition (and the intuitive production
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of the next work). The acquired habitus is served by innate musi­
cal ability and is enhanced from each production of an aural 
object willed by the intellect.
C. The habitus rules, by reason, over empirical perform­
ing habits and conceptual means of performance.
D. The personal or subjective nature of the habitus requires 
that a performer become connatural to his object. He facilitates 
connaturality by allowing the sound of a work to permeate his intel­
lect through his aural sense. Through the personal effort of con­
naturality, the performer's intuition is stimulated to guide the 
habitus to its determined end: a pleasing work.
E. Since the virtue of art serves a willed work, the 
habitus of performance cannot serve a system of art or an artis­
tic ideal.
II. The primary aim of performance is an aural product created 
for itself. The primary aim involves the principle of disinterested­
ness because the performance of music is a fine art. The principle of 
disinterestedness defines the aural product of performance as a product 
having no necessary use other than its own existence as a good work, a 
good work being a work created to please its creator. Through his prac­
tice of gratuitous performance, the performer needs no necessary reward 
other than the pleasure derived from his aural product. The aim of 
performance, then, is a spiritual aim because it depends upon the per­
former's connaturality with his product. The habitus, and its spiritual 
interiority, operates through the spiritual aim of performance because 
the latter is also intellectual and internal in nature.
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A. The aim of performance defines the technique of per­
formance as technique, in a higher sense. The means of perform­
ance serve a primary intent, that is, to create a good aural pro­
duct. Technique includes both a spiritual aspect and a material 
aspect; but technique, in its higher sense, demands that the mate­
rial rules serve the spiritual rules and the conjoined primary 
rule (which intends to free the natural inclinations of the 
intellect to produce a good work). Technique, in its lower 
sense, is defined as material or external technique, an end in 
itself, and a technique which takes means as ends. The habitus 
operates through technique, in its higher sense, because the 
rules of performance are a possession of the habitus; therefore, 
technique provides the habitus with a content, operative in 
nature, which becomes a means to producing a good work.
B. The aim of performance defines the communication of 
performance as indirect, unintended communication, in a higher 
sense. The work reveals itself in sound to a perceiver, the 
revealment containing both creative intent and the personality 
of the performer. In this way, a composed work reveals itself 
to the performer and the performed work reveals itself to a non­
performer. The external communication of effect, empirical per­
forming habits, or musical knowledge may occur as a result of 
internal communication; however, external communication as a 
direct aim of performance is a violation of the primary aim of 
performance. The habitus operates through the communication of
performance, in a higher sense, because aural perception is
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intellectual in nature (a connaturality of the mind with its 
object).
C. The aim of performance defines the beauty of perform­
ance as the intellectual delight or satisfaction derived from the 
aural perception of a work, or the aural experience of a good or 
pleasing work. A pleasing sound conveys beauty to a performer 
because the intellect is naturally inclined to seek it in an 
object of sound. Since the intellect becomes connatural with a 
pleasing work, the beauty reflected from the work is connatural 
beauty. Connatural beauty is the beauty of aesthetic experience, 
aesthetic beauty being the beauty of aural perception. The aes­
thetic beauty of music is a momentary glimpse of transcendental 
beauty, an infinite beauty known to God but not to man (except 
by means of the aesthetic). Relative to the transcendental realm 
of God, the aural perception of beauty is a human limitation, an 
experience of beauty more intuitive than abstract and more illog­
ical than logical. The conceptual production of beauty, through 
performance, violates the aim of performance because conceptually 
planned performance, by itself, depends upon the contemplative 
abstraction of a work. The spiritual mystery of a work belongs 
to the transcendental realm and is not an abstractable item. 
Moreover, aesthetic beauty cannot be confined to a system of 
performance because the transcendental realm, of which the aes­
thetic is a part, is infinite. The habitus of performance oper­
ates through connatural beauty because the intellect is naturally
inclined towards beauty.
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III. The action of performance is defined as the aim of perform­
ance activated by the performer as he places his self into the produc­
tion and execution of a work. The performer expresses the work directly 
and himself indirectly; thus, the objective reality of the work is com­
mingled with the subjectivity of the performer in the action of perform­
ance, in a higher sense. The habitus operates through the action of 
performance, in its higher sense, because the personal nature of the 
habitus relates to the expression of the self in a work.
A. The action of performance defines artistic judgment as 
the perception and re-creation of the composer's intent. Artis­
tic judgment relates to the communication of the composed work, 
in the formal sense; consequently, the intentional sign of a 
composed work reveals itself aurally to a performer. The xvritten 
score, or entitative structure, of the xrork is the material repre­
sentation of the composer's intent; however, contemplative judg­
ment, by itself, remains on the surface or external level. Artis­
tic judgment includes the assessment of the score but the judgment, 
in totality, transcends the score by the aesthetic judgment of the 
work's sound. The aesthetic judgment requires a full consent, by 
the performer, to the aural reality of the work. This judgment is 
a perceptive judgment which probes the inner mystery of a composed 
work as the performer allows the work to communicate itself to him. 
The habitus operates through such perceptive judgment because the 
judgment is an intuitive action. It focuses upon the inner work 
and requires the performer to put himself into the work to acti­
vate his intuition. Conceptual judgment, by itself, inhibits the
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action of performance because it remains on the surface of the 
inner work and does not penetrate the spiritual depth of the 
creative intent.
B. The action of performance defines the creative idea 
as the performer's vision of his work-to-be-performed. The 
creative idea is comprehensive but complex, complete but momen­
tary, and initially clear but subsequently obscure. The intui­
tive appearance of a creative idea is defined as inspiration.
The habitus operates through artistic vision because the envi­
sioned work must be intuitively externalized by the discovery of 
details, which become fixed as they fit the envisioned product; 
that is, the details must sound right or correct to the per­
former as he applies them to the evolving work. The habitus 
guides the externalized details toward the intended product; con­
sequently, both detail and product evolve simultaneously. The 
conceptual idea, by itself, inhibits the action of performance 
because the preconception of a work must remain on the material 
or external level.
C. The action of performance defines artistic imitation 
as an intermingling of the entitative work (written score), the 
intentional sign (creative idea), and the unintentional sign (per­
former's personality). The action of imitation begins with the 
score but moves beyond the score into the interiority of the work 
by means of aural perception and production. Aurally, the work
is expressed directly and the performer's self is expressed indi­
rectly. The habitus operates through imitation because the work
126
is a sign; that is, it contains a spiritual mystery which must 
be perceived to be expressed. The relationship of the direct 
and reversed signs to the entitative work defines imitation, 
in its higher sense. The performer must put himself into the 
work to initiate the imitative action, a requirement which 
parallels both the action of artistic judgment and the action 
of artistic vision. The material reproduction of the score, 
by itself, inhibits the action of imitation because the objec­
tivity of the entitative work is severed from the subjectivity 
of the performer's intuitive perception.
IV. The moral virtue of the performer, as a man, serves him, as 
an artist, in three ways. First, the free exercise of good moral virtue 
protects the habitus; secondly, the presence of good moral virtue 
enhances the habitus, nonconsciously but profoundly; thirdly, the 
guidance of good moral virtue assists the performer in his use of 
the performance product in relation to the social and moral values 
of the community.
A. The morality of performance makes a distinction 
between self-expression and self-centered expression. Self- 
expression expresses the work directly and itself indirectly, 
a principle in line with the imitative action of performance. 
Furthermore, self-expression is a giving of the self (or self- 
sacrifice) to a work, a principle in contrast with self- 
sacrifice to the systematic practice of art. Self-centered 
expression expresses the ego directly and the work incidently 
by focusing upon the use of the work for self-enhancement. In
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this way, self-centered expression better serves the systematic 
practice of art than the good of a willed aural product. Self- 
expression, which is analogous to the reversed sign, subordi­
nates itself to the work, for the good of the intended work.
The ego enhances itself by using the work to display its indi­
viduality. In this sense, the material execution of a work, 
by itself, serves the ego but not necessarily the work; accord­
ingly, it enhances the performer's individuality but not neces­
sarily his personality. The habitus of performance operates 
through self-expression because the latter serves the good of 
the aural product.
B. The morality of performance makes a distinction 
between the use of performance and the art of performance 
(because the ends are separate). The art of performance per­
fects the product while the use of the product follows its 
production and has external ends not primary to the work. The 
use of a performance product is legitimate if the use strictly 
follows the art of performance, or the aim and action of per­
formance, in its higher sense. The primacy of performance for 
individuality and performance for social requirements subordi­
nates the aesthetic requirements of performance to external 
ends; consequently, the art of performance is severed from aes­
thetic ends. The habitus operates through the art of perform­
ance but not through the primacy of use. To preserve his 
inclination to perform good works, the performer must give 
his intended work precedence over whatever compensation the 
use of this work may entail. To preserve the free nature
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of the habitus in the performance of music, the community must 
reciprocate for the performer's personal responsibility in the 
use of his product. The community can reciprocate by granting 
him the freedom to perform for the good of his product, in the 
primary sense, and for the social value of the product, in the 
secondary sense.
Conclusions
1. The habitus of performance is an intuitive and operative 
disposition which empowers a performer to aurally produce music without 
a logical, conceptual understanding of his productive action. The 
habitus is unpretentious because its relationship to a work is estab­
lished or structured during the momentary perceptions and operative 
functions of production, this being in contrast with the pretentious 
structure of academicism. The performer, in possession of the habitus, 
knows how to perform his music without conscious certainty of how or 
why he knows.
2. The internal power or content of the habitus is largely in 
a preconscious state; that is, the performer is not conscious of its 
content until the intellect becomes connatural with an object— a musi­
cal work, thereby prompting a movement of the habitus from the precon­
scious mind to the conscious mind. The power of the habitus is freed 
through the production of music willed by the intellect (through its 
connaturality with musical sound).
3. The habitus relates to musical performance in the spiritual 
or internal sense. This relationship does not exclude the material or 
external aspect of performance; but rather, the material aspect is
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subordinated to the spiritual aspect, the realm of the habitus. The 
material aspect of performance, by itself, requires a mastery of per­
formance skills and a knowledge of musical concepts; consequently, a 
command of the physical instrument and the printed score is a facilita- 
tive means of producing the aural object.
4. The operation of the habitus flows through the sound of a 
work, as the sound pleases or displeases the performer’s intellect.
The primacy of a musical work indicates that the musician desires some­
thing from the music being produced, this "something" being the delight 
of aesthetic beauty. He needs no additional reason to perform his music. 
If his object offers him nothing, no alternative aim of performance can 
legitimately replace the internal aim.
A musical work, in this sense, is defined as any aural object 
ranging from short, simple songs— to improvised melodies— to more formal 
thematic literature. The work, then, is more likely an object of inter­
nal will than external taste.
5. The performer's connaturality with the sound of his music
is defined as the placing of the self into the work. A performer places 
his self into a work by becoming totally oblivious to his self, and his 
surroundings, and by becoming wholly absorbed in the sound of the music 
and the work that evolves. Within the action of performance, nothing 
other than sound exists; the mind, as served by the aural sense, is 
fixed upon the work and does not wander away to the external world 
without releasing the spell cast over the mind by the work.
6. The art of performance, as discussed in terms of aim and 
action, is not a compartmentalized system of production. The habitus
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operates through its object comprehensively, thereby causing the compo­
nents of performance to be interrelated and overlapped in their contribu­
tion to the final product.
7. The aim, action, and use of performance can occur concur­
rently; however, the use must be subordinated to the primacy of the art 
to preserve the latter in its higher sense. The habitus operates through 
the art of performance and is undeterred by its use, so long as the use 
does not control or dictate the performance product. Since the use of
a performance product is ruled by morality, the use has human ends while 
the art has artistic or aesthetic ends.
8. It is apparent that the most intense operative practice of 
the habitus will occur during the performance rehearsal, while the final 
performance is, to a greater extent, the use of the aural product and, 
to a lesser extent, a continuation of the aural art (the making of the 
work).
9. The content of the habitus is derived and enhanced from the 
performer’s connaturality with his work; therefore, a reciprocal rela­
tionship exists between the development and operation of the habitus, 
the reciprocality focusing upon the art of performance (operation 
enhances development; development enhances operation). Consequently, 
aesthetic delight, perceived as personal enjoyment, facilitates both 
the operation and development of the habitus because the intellect is 
drawn into its object spiritually.
10. The relationship of the habitus to musical performance 
explains why musicians, possessing a habitus of great depth, are able 
to perform musical works without the assistance of a written score and 
without dependence upon conceptual terminology.
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General Conclusion
Maritain shows, through the logic of philosophical argument, 
the illogical nature of the habitus in respect to beauty and the prac- 
tice of fine art. Maritain shows, through conceptual consistency, the 
nonconceptual nature of the habitus. Maritain shows, without dogmatism, 
the unwavering, undeviating thrust of the habitus towards a work-to-be- 
made, willed by the intellect. The paradox of this loyalty is that, to 
be a servant of the work, the habitus must adhere to the unpredictable 
will of the creative intellect.
It is at this point that the spiritual nature of the habitus 
becomes evident. Only the spiritual realm of the intellect could pro­
vide such depth to the'virtue of art, thus causing the resulting com­
plexity of its operative nature. The material level of performance can 
exist in a factory-like environment, under a thoroughly efficient method 
of production— but the habitus finds existence within an oppressive envi­
ronment threatening to its operative freedom. The contrast between the 
motions of performance and the art of performance is amplified by the 
personal nature of the habitus and the impersonal nature of logical art.
■''The illogical nature of the habitus is distinct from the 
irrational nature of habit.
CHAPTER VII
APPLICATIONS TO THE PERFORMANCE PROGRAM IN MUSIC EDUCATION
The Aim of Education and the Aim of Performance 
First, it is necessary to restate Maritain's definition of the 
aim of education. The aim of education is to equip, form, and liberate 
the intelligence to prepare for the development of the intellectual vir­
tues or the h a b i t u s Using this broad definition, the aim of music edu­
cation can be defined as the intent to equip, form, and liberate the
creativity of the spirit, or creative intelligence, to prepare for the
»
development of the habitus of music.
Secondly, it is necessary to restate the aim of performance.
The aim of performance is to create a good work through the sound of
music, a good work being pleasing to the performer and the object upon
owhich the habitus fixates.
The essential point in Maritain's definition of the aim of edu­
cation is the preparation of the intellect for the development of the 
habitus. Education, in the liberal sense, directs its attention to the 
natural intelligence of the student and prepares the mind for the devel­
opment of intellectual virtue. This development occurs through *2
■*"560 chapter 1 above, p. 11.
2See chapter 3 above, p. 32.
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experience in a given object and is not educable in the direct sensed 
To educate for virtue is a pretense because such education is 
invariably external to the development of virtue, a spiritual develop­
ment related to the interiority of the will. This point is consistent 
with the acquiring of the habitus through the aural production of works, 
indirectly and nonconsciously, the works being objects of the creative 
intellect.
Education as formative education is more concerned with the
intellect than the will and recognizes that the school is but a partial
agency in the totality of the educative process (which continues through- 
2out life). Since the nature of man’s mind remains inherently consistent,
the primary aim of education need not be changed or altered to suit 
3modern needs. Secondary aims may be adjusted or adapted to changing 
circumstances and, in fact, periodic reconstruction of the means of 
education is an enrichment of the process, so long as the primary aim 
is preserved and protected.^
The school performance program should avoid, as implied by 
Maritain, direct attempts to make musical "dwarfs" or pseudovirtuosos 
out of student performers. The concept of preparation, as directed 
at the natural intelligence, places the habitus of performance beyond
‘'"Maritain, "Thomist Views on Education," pp. 49-50. Teaching 
toward the natural intelligence helps allay instructional tendencies 
toward overspecialization. Idem, "Some Typical Aspects of Christian 
Education," in The Education of Man, p. 138. For a further discussion 
on specialization see pp. 142-145 below.
^Maritain, "Thomist Views on Education, p. 51; and idem, "Edu­
cation and the Humanities," in The Education of Man, p. 83.
^Maritain, "Thomist Views on Education," p. 52.
^Ibid., pp. 52-53.
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the scope of the school performance program or, at least, beyond any 
direct aim of instruction. Since the development of the habitus 
depends upon a performer's personal relationship to his music, this 
kind of learning is difficult, or conceivably impossible, to reliably 
plan or accurately prepare by the performance instructor. As a con­
sequence of such an aim, performance instruction generally veers 
toward the mastery of musical mechanics, which improves execution 
but, deplorably, encourages the student to express little or nothing 
of himself through his music. He may, in fact, remain aloof from the 
intellectual joy of aural production.
The above consequence occurs because the instructor inadver­
tently confuses efficient and refined performance habits, or external 
technique, with the habitus and confines the habitus of performance to 
technique, in its lower sense. Moreover, the intensity of such surface 
development can alienate the student from his art and make his perform­
ance one of impersonality or boredom. This external approach to stu­
dent performance can do little to assist gifted students who are intel­
lectually inclined to acquire a habitus; and more profoundly, such an 
approach to the average student performer, who desires the enjoyment 
of music in preference to technical development, reaches the point of 
absurdity in its neglect of student will.
The objective of school education, in the liberal sense, is not 
to teach for the acquisition of an art, and the virtues involved, in a 
direct manner; but rather, this agency of education should assist stu­
dents in learning the meaning of an art through the intellect's connat- 
urality with an object, and in comprehending the truth (beauty) which
135
the object yields (to the student).^- Liberal education, then, must 
"see to it that the young person grasps this truth or beauty through 
the natural powers and gifts of his mind and the natural intuitive 
energy of his reason backed up by his whole sensuous, imaginative, 
and emotional dynamism." The meaning of the art of performance is 
defined by the beauty conveyed to the performer through the aural 
experience of his music. "So I should say that the youth is to 
learn and know music in order to understand the meaning of music 
rather than in order to become a composer [or virtuoso]."0
Maritain's definition of the aim of education, and the recon­
ciliation of this definition with the aim of performance, can be fur­
ther clarified by exploring seven misconceptions of educational aims, 
as identified by Maritain.
The Particularization of Means over Ends
To perfect means and disregard ends in education elevates the
importance of means so refined that the end result of their use is
4lost in a maze of method. The concern is with immediacy, or immedi­
ate results, rather than the far-reaching implications of educational 
methods. Such particularization encourages over-teaching, a practice
1Ibid., P. 71.
2Ibid. Maritain uses the term "sensuous" in reference to the 
role the senses play in the intellectual perception of beauty. The 
gift of imagination, of course, also serves the intellect; and the emo­
tional reaction to beauty is a result of the intellectual fulfillment, 
which defines the affective role.
^Maritain, "The Humanities and Liberal Education," in Education 
at the Crossroads, p. 63; also see idem, "Some Typical Aspects of 
Christian Education," pp. 138-139.
^Maritain, "The Aims of Education," p. 3.
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which gives little consideration to spontaneous, unprepared experi­
ences .
The child is so well tested and observed, his needs so well 
detailed, his psychology so clearly cut out, the methods for 
making it easy for him so perfected, that the end of all these 
commendable improvements runs the risk of being forgotten or 
disregarded.
If the performance program confuses performing habits with the 
habitus, the student performer is viewed as a product of the program, 
a measurable product which exits in terms of finality rather than 
potentiality. Quite obviously, the far-reaching implications of per­
formance transcend the observable results during the school years and 
are not measurable in the material sense. In terms of ends, the per­
formance instructor can monitor current student experiences for their 
direction or probable outcomes while fully realizing the limitations 
of such assessment.
Maritain implies that envisioning ends, in spite of human fal­
libility, is preferable to the glorification of means. This is the 
case whether the student intends to pursue a musical career or, on 
the other hand, decides to terminate the performance experience fol­
lowing his school years. Helping the student learn the meaning of 
music is in contrast with molding him into a performer of music. The 
student may, in connection with musical meaning, become a proficient 
performer, but the depth of such proficiency is generally beyond the 
reach of school instruction. The latter point explains why certain 
students become good performers in spite of poor instruction. The 
instructional vision, in looking towards educational ends, determines 1
1Ibid.
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probable outcomes of learning rather than obvious and immediate achieve­
ment .
The Refinement of Material Ends
The second misconception of aims is closely related to the first 
(as discussed above). The education of matter focuses upon the condi­
tioned reflex or sense memorization because it cannot accept the presence 
of a spiritual mystery, the mysterious nature of the person.'*' The posit­
ing of material ends expresses the will of the instructor more than stu­
dent will and challenges the intellect of the instructor more than stu­
dent intellect.
The aim of education, spiritually defined, is more mysterious
and humble than material ends which attempt to define the entire edu-
2cational experience in terms of achievable goals. Since the spiritual 
aim considers the person, as well as the individual, the unpredictable 
movement of student will is respected and the latent power of the stu- 
dent intellect is challenged to function for itself.
Material ends in the performance program are designed to "train" 
the performer to become musically proficient. Materially defined, goals 
and results are externalities to be measured and evaluated by the 
instructor— a way of demonstrating the "effectiveness" of the program 
to the community, administration, and the field in general. There is 
no mystery to a technically proficient performance of music, if such 
external proof of competency is the desired objective. Similarly, 
good external results are equated xtfith desirable student progress 
regardless of the personal relationship of the student to his music.
•'■Ibid., pp. 4, 7-9. ^Ibid., p. 4. ^Ibid., pp. 9-10.
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The primacy of material ends, then, inevitably encourages the imperson­
ality of sterile motions of performance.
The disorientation in performance program directions, of which 
Reimer and Ball write, is a ramification of the material bias in posit­
ing educational aims, as well as a historical incidence of means over 
ends in achieving short-sighted goals.'*’ The disorientation occurs when 
the externally imposed structure of the performance program conflicts 
with the internal, spontaneous demands of musical performance, defined 
as a fine art. Music educators are beginning to realize that pseudo­
virtuosity may be empty of genuine content; however, the material bias 
in aims is continuing because the field is more concerned with its own 
potency than with the inner potentiality of its students.
The performance program, defined by spiritual ends, accepts the 
mystery of personality by encouraging the student to place his self into 
his music, to react aesthetically for himself, and to personally envision 
the potentiality of a work. He is encouraged to commit himself to the 
risk of artistic performance, a spiritual mystery in itself. Spiritual 
ends involve the personal inclinations of the student without excluding 
the material objectives of the program, but also including and, at times, 
emphasizing personal growth not directly controlled or prepared by the 
instructor.
The Pragmatic Approach to Truth
Pragmatic education seeks to verify its objectives with empiri­
cal measurements administered by the instructor, while simultaneously
^See chapter 1 above, p. 4.
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neglecting the truth gained from personal insights of the mind.’*' Prag­
matic education, in its extreme sense, is a doctrine of doubt, or skep­
ticism, because (1) it distrusts in truth not provable by teacher veri­
fication, and (2) it doubts the intellectual power of the student mind.2 
In this way, pragmatic education is directly related to, and supportive 
of, material ends in education because these ends can be verified.
Behavioral objectives are a modern example of the immediacy and 
objective specificity of pragmatic truth. The observed completion of 
certain behaviors is equated with personal insight, an admission that 
the instructor is thinking for his students and assuming that his 
insights into truth are also their insights, to be drawn out and 
measured.
Pragmatic aims in the performance program focus upon the per­
formance behaviors of the student and away from the works-to-be-made. 
Again, the motions of performance are encouraged because each motion 
is a measurable objective to be assessed for itself and not for its 
contribution to the beauty of a work. Similarly, the art of perform­
ance is subordinated to the motions of performance because the perform­
ance action is misconstrued to serve the instructional objectives more 
than the good of an envisioned work.
Conversely, the art of performance demands that both instructor 
and students alike serve the good of a work and that intended objectives 
aim at the perfection of the work rather than the musicianship of the 
student. Furthermore, the aim of education, in the liberal sense, 
demands that the student performer's intellect be challenged by the 1
1Ibid., p. 13. 2Ibid., pp. 12-14.
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aural production of works. It is the power of the student's mind which 
guides him through the work in search of the good object, the right 
sound. This is a personal commitment to a work which cannot be easily 
prepared through performance objectives defined externally, or within 
the context of a lesson plan. The pursuit of aesthetic beauty, within 
the mystery of a work, provides the excitement of the performance expe­
rience and the incentive to continue the art so long as the object 
seems incomplete.
The dangers stemming from the use of behavioral objectives in
music education have been recognized and defined by Bennett Reimer.
It is tragic to have measurement in its narrowest sense exert 
great influence on educational processes, yet this tragedy can 
be witnessed more and more every day. . . .
Another weakness of behavioral objectives is their deaden­
ing effect on educational innovation, which often requires long 
periods of freedom before directions become clear. . . .
. . . The central outcomes of learning in the arts are 
usually characterized by unpredictability, subjectivity, sensi­
tivity, creativity, originality, inwardness. These qualities 
do not always lend themselves to prior stipulation in the same 
way that predictable behaviors do. In fact, they may be stunted 
by the very operations insisted upon by behaviorists as neces­
sary for effective learning.^
When the mystery of the student intellect becomes connatural 
with the mystery of a work, the meaning of the art and the meaning of 
music, as an aural aesthetic, is inescapably conveyed to the student 
in the internal sense. This kind of conveyance was never doubted by 
Maritain, but it is doubted by educators who insist on proving what 
is not necessary to prove, and trivializing what is profound.
^"Aesthetic Behaviors in Music," 
cation, pp. 71-73.
in Toward an Aesthetic Edu-
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Education as Social Conditioning
Education for social adjustment makes a secondary aim of edu­
cation primary by emphasizing learning experiences appropriate for 
adjustment to life in a modern society, or the current society within 
which the school exists.-*- The emphasis of sociologism inadvertently 
encourages educational enslavement to current trends and the perpetual 
reconstruction of educational ends, a practice which neglects the 
spiritual consistency of the primary aim of education, as defined by 
Maritain. The encouragement of utilitarianism is also a by-product 
of sociologism because society, as well as the school itself, finds 
it convenient to use the functional skills of the students to serve 
its own ends and, simultaneously, to label such use as "educational"
Oor beneficial to the learner.
The controversial aims of performance programs: extramusical 
objectives and nonmusical objectives, bear a direct relationship to 
Maritain's conception of sociologism.1̂ If the school performance pro­
gram's primary function is entertainment, this extramusical aim is 
synonymous with Maritain's concept of utilitarianism. If the success 
of the performance program depends upon extrinsic honors, or observ­
able social activity, these nonmusical aims are synonymous with the 
enslavement of performance to material results, as defined by the 
trends or whims of society, or the temporary fads of presentism.
-*-Maritain, "The Aims of Education," p. 15.
2Ibid., p. 17. * 23Ibid., p. 16.
^See chapter 1 above, pp. 3-4.
“’Presentism places its trust in the current, temporary trends 
of the present rather than the established principles of the past.
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The impact of extramusical and nonmusical objectives upon the 
performance program can have a deadening effect upon aesthetic aims in 
performance because the primary aim of performance requires time, 
effort, and a personal commitment to a depth of production that sur­
passes the requirements of external goals. The imposed inversion of 
priorities for the performance program has had the most obvious reper­
cussions at the public school level and has contributed to the disorien­
tation in the field, as discussed above. This is because sociologism 
views musical performance as a servile art rather than a fine art, and 
the student performer as an artisan rather than an artist.
Education for Specialization
Maritain's conception of intellectualism is defined as education 
for dialectical skill, or the possession of concepts, and the narrowness 
of specialization, or overspecialization.̂  The focus of intellectualism 
is upon single areas of emphasis; it is disinclined to view the universal­
ity of a field or its broad potentialities for the learner. The nature 
of intellectualism serves a materialistic philosophy of life through the 
education of matter toward such primary aims as vocational education or 
preparation for college. To achieve its intent, intellectualism may 
ignore, circumvent, or suppress the student's will in implementing the 
narrow scope of its content.
Intellectualism in the performance program has taken two forms, 
one in reaction to the other. Intellectualism as overspecialization 
occurs when the art of performance is equated with technique, in its
-̂ Ibid., pp. 18-19. ^Ibid., p. 19.
143
lower sense. Since technical proficiency is the primary aim, the perform 
ance program focuses upon the performance skills of the student; moreover 
the proficient execution of performance skills is equated with the making 
of a good aural product. Performance, in this sense, is limited to execu 
tion, which in turn is dependent upon technical training, or the refine­
ment of performance skills. Overspecialization occurs when (1) the per­
formance of music is focused upon the performer rather than the musical 
product; and (2) the performance program intends to mold its students 
into performers of music.
Maritain is less critical of specialization which serves an 
intellectual object; however, specialization ttfhich confines an art to 
narrow ends is defined as overspecialization.^ It is overspecializa­
tion which narrows the aim of the performance program; consequently, 
an overspecialized performance program may intend, primarily, to teach 
students to play and/or master an instrument of music, thus accepting
Othe motions of performance as a vehicle of mastery learning.
•^According to Maritain, the amount of educational specialization 
may increase progressively through the school years, but this progres­
sion must be carefully monitored for tendencies toward overspecializa­
tion. "The Humanities and Liberal Education," p. 64. Teacher consider­
ation of student performing interests is, of course, vital for connat- 
urality; however, the exploration of musical works which are less 
desirable, or in which the student is less interested, is a counter­
action to overspecialization. Similarly, the teacher must, at times, 
monitor his personal standards, or relinquish some of his preferences, 
in consideration of student interests and in the interest of lessening 
instructional specialization.
See chapter 1, above, pp. 2-3. Reimer's questions (p. 2) can 
be answered in light of Maritain's conception of technique. A group 
performance experience can be a laboratory for musical exploration if 
technical skill serves the exploration. Rehearsal time is a minimal 
factor if rehearsing and teaching are synonymous activities. If the 
performing group intends, as its primary object, to aurally produce
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Music education reaction to overspecialization has resulted 
in intellectualism, in its second form: the emphasis of conceptual 
musical understandings intending to teach students about the art of 
music.^ Performance action, in this sense, is viewed as an instrument 
of knowledge rather than an artistic endeavor. Envisioning performance 
ideas and applying them to a nonconceptual aural product, a risky and 
challenging adventure, is subordinated to studying the conceptual con­
tent of the scored material. Intellectualism, in its second form, 
regards the scored work as a conceptual finality, from which no spirit­
ual mystery transcends. Conceptually framed, the action of performance 
is limited to a method: a series of planned lessons which logically and 
objectively structure the learner’s experience of music. The adventur­
ous spirit associated with the nonconceptual, spontaneous action of per­
formance is neutralized by a fabrication of the product's content. 
R.esultingly, the unpretentious nature of the fine arts is stifled by 
academic pretense.
The elevation of conceptual performance over proficient perform­
ance succeeds only in transforming the quasi virtuoso into a student 
dilettante. The aesthetic beauty of music, which is conveyed aurally, 
is ignored; the pleasurable experience of aesthetic perception is 
derided for its "sensuous" or shallow nature. Obviously, intellec­
tualism, in its second form, misunderstands the aesthetic experience 
because the academic study of music is erroneously termed a fine art.
works for their own sake, the use of the product for public performances 
is an insignificant threat to the musical understandings and aesthetic 
experiences of the participants.
^See chapter 1 above, p. 5.
^See chapter 1 above, p. 5.
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The art of performance, through the connaturality of mind with 
sound, encourages the student's intellect to probe the depths of music 
aurally and helps define the meaning of music to one who is making his 
first hesitant commitments of his self to the perfection of a work.
The intellectual delight the learner receives from the sound of his 
object is the perception of aesthetic beauty, which defines the mean­
ing of music. Paradoxically, the student performer can learn the mean­
ing of music, as well as becoming a proficient and knowledgeable per­
former; however, the meaning of music cannot be discovered apart from 
the aesthetic experience of beauty. Consequently, intellectualism, 
in either form, makes what is primary to music secondary to music educa­
tion and, more specifically, the performance program.'*'
The Education of Will
The education of will, or voluntarism, subordinates the educa­
tion of the intellect to either an imposed discipline or the free expan- 
sion of the will. Voluntarism, taken as external discipline, neglects 
self-discipline and self-will while voluntarism, taken as free will, 
neglects teacher discipline or institutional authority. Both extremes 
of voluntarism isolate the will from the intellect as if each could 
operate in isolation from the other. To the contrary, the personality
■'■"Methods, programs, organization, educational technique are, 
without doubt, important; but they are, after all, merely secondary. 
First must come the truth to which the teacher should bear witness" 
(Maritain, "Philosophy and Education," in The Education of Man, p. 40). 
In musical performance, the truth of a work is the beauty it conveys to 
the performer. The teacher must also pursue, without pretense, the 
truth of a work through his self-involvement in the aural production. 
There is no easy or logical access to beauty, either for the instruc­
tor or the student.
^Maritain, "The Aims of Education," pp. 20-22.
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is a commingling of both intellect and will because the will seeks to 
adhere to an object, an object to be judged and shaped by the intel­
lect.'*' In this way, the will rules the intellect but is shaped through 
the operation of the intellect and along with the development of the 
intellect. While the aim of education focuses directly on the natural 
intelligence, the will is shaped along with it, indirectly.^
Voluntarism in musical performance is often present in conjunc­
tion with other misconceptions of education. For example, sociologism 
may be imposed by the will of the administration, community, or parents; 
and, at the other extreme, the art of performance may be allowed to 
degenerate into social activity because the teacher has failed to chal­
lenge his students with aesthetic pursuits. Similarly, intellectualism 
is often imposed on the performance program by the instructor or the 
professional leadership in music education.
In respect to the latter, educational leaders and agencies have 
exercised varying degrees of imposition into, and concern with, the per­
formance program and music education in general. The result has been a 
confusing and dictatorial influx of programs, objectives, and guidelines 
descending upon the schools from "above." In this respect, the will of 
the profession has proven to be rather contemptuous of the will of the 
instructor, much less the will of the students.
According to Maritain, modern education is very concerned about 
its field, not because of significant new discovery, but because it has 
lost its own direction.^ This explains the current preoccupation with
^Ibid. ^Ibid., pp. 27-28.
■^Maritain, "Philosophy and Education," p. 41.
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trend, the "bandwagon" mentality.
A second facet of professional over-concern is the unprecedented 
high expectations modern education has placed upon itself. Obviously, 
it has forgotten that the school is only a partial agency, however vital 
it may be to the education of youth. This oversight has encouraged the 
profession to arbitrarily mold minds to get its will done, while fearing 
that a less than total effort might be fatal to its designs.
To the contrary, Haritain insists that for the school to assist 
living, spiritual beings in self-development, more mysteries must be 
left unsolved than solved. The general direction of learning experi­
ences can be assessed but the final result is unassessable, in the 
immediate sense.
Inclusive Education
This educational aim assumes that everything (or anything) neces­
sary to a field of study can be taught through classroom experiences, 
that is, through the preparation of lessons within a specified framework 
of time.^ Again, as discussed above, inclusive education has forgotten 
that the school is but a partial agency in a lifelong educational experi- 
ence. Furthermore, the frantic preparation required to "cover the mate­
rial" offers the learner little opportunity for personal meaning or 
experiential depth. It is the meaning of an art which provides direc­
tion and not, necessarily, mandatory exposure to multifarious experiences. *2
'*'Ibid. , p. 43.
2Haritain, "The Aims of Education," pp. 22-24.
^Ibid., pp. 25-26.
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The inclusive approach to education has induced educators to 
plan supplementary musical experiences for student performers, activ­
ities which, in effect, force the performance program to veer away from 
the primacy of aural creation. Planned experiences in conducting, com­
posing, and score analysis are designed to ensure that students exiting 
the performance program will be complete musicians rather than mere 
performers.
The false premise, from which this aim is derived, is reinforced 
by its relationship to material ends in education, pragmatic approaches 
to education, and intellectualism (in its second form). Moreover, the 
definition of school music, in terms of a partial or directional agency 
in music education, is discounted or disputed by inclusive education. 
Curiously, the supplementary experiences, as outlined above, parallel 
a college music curriculum in scope; therefore, depending on how they 
are applied, any one or all of these experiences may easily take pre­
cedence over the art of performance. If school music programs are 
encouraged to feed the complexities of fine art directly to the school 
musician, then, it must be concluded that music education desires to 
supplant the college music program and its focus upon artistic virtue.
The results of this study imply that the art of performance, 
defined spiritually, requires a self-commitment to aural production by 
instructors and students alike. If this art, by itself, can teach the 
meaning of music to those learners willing to take the risk of such an 
adventure, the imposition of additional experiences is clearly burden­
some and unnecessary for the students involved. It is an unnecessary
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duplication of artistic experience as well as the fragmentation of an 
art into shallow or spurious components.
At the school level, aural creation stimulates the natural 
inclinations of the student's intellect to produce pleasing sounds and 
does so with a minimum of specialization. If supplementary experiences 
are brought into the program, they must be genuinely contributory to 
aural production. In other words, they must be employed as spontaneous 
applications to unforseen needs, all of which serve the productive 
process. Such applications serve aural production by making the work 
more delightful and fulfilling aurally, an improved product sensed by 
the ears of the producer. This sort of subordination to an object of 
creation is alien to inclusive education.
The Reconciliation of Aims
To fulfill the aim of education, the teacher must respect the 
dignity of the learner's mind and its power to think for i t s e l f. T o  
fulfill the aim of performance, the teacher must respect the dignity 
of a work and its power to reveal its inner truth (beauty) to the per­
former. The aims are reconciled by guiding or assisting the student 
in the challenge of aural production and by freeing his intellect to 
become connatural xtfith musical sound, thereby facilitating the percep­
tion of aesthetic beauty in the music through self-fulfillment. This 
reconciliation is inherently fragile or insecure and difficult to 
oversee.
Based on the reconciliation of general aims, the aim of the 
performance program is to assist students in finding meaning in their 1
1Ibid., p. 26.
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"musical making" or aural production, while recognizing that meaningful 
experiences cannot be reliably prepared. - Through the instrumentality of 
musical meaning, the performance program can help form the creative 
intelligence for the development of the habitus, while recognizing that 
the habitus itself cannot be directly taught. Since personal meaning 
motivates the learner to self-commitment, it is concluded that a degree 
of the habitus is acquired by student performers who have achieved con- 
naturality with their music. The development of the habitus, however 
meager or however profound, is a natural result of an internal relation­
ship between the performer and his object.
The aim of education, as defined by Maritain, has three implica­
tions for the performance program:
1. The performance program must direct its attention toward 
the natural intelligence of the student; therefore, its aim should be 
to teach the meaning of music to the student performer, the art of 
performance being the vehicle for the learning intended.
2. To fulfill its primary aim, the performance program must 
avoid teaching toward artistic virtue, that is, to teach for the 
habitus of performance.
3. The teaching of performance skills and musical concepts, 
primary to any of the misconceptions of education, should not define 
the performance program. These material aims are contributory aims of 
the performance program, necessary but secondary because they serve the 
classroom art and its focus upon the learner's connaturality with his 
object.
The aim of performance, as defined in this study, has three
implications for the performance program:
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1. Since the meaning of music, or the perception of aesthetic 
beauty, prepares the intellect for the development of the habitus, an 
immeasurable degree of the habitus is developed as a natural result of 
the student performer's connaturality with his aural object.
2. The habitus, because of its internal depth, is the least 
accessible result of the performance program but one which has far- 
reaching implications for the student in possession of such virtue. 
Consequently, the impact of the habitus upon a student performer's 
musicianship can be profound without being educable, and conspicuous 
without being measurable.
3. The material means of performance, because of their exter­
nal nature, are the most accessible results of the performance program, 
but these are measurable only in the immediate sense. For students, 
the material means, by themselves, lack the inner depth of the habitus 
and, for the instructor, they restrict the farsighted vision required 
of directional oversight.
The Habitus and the Release of Learner Intuition
Maritain's respect for the intellectual power of the learner is
evident in his view of the "agents" in education. The student is the
principal agent of education while the teacher is the ministerial agent,
or one who assists or guides the learner with authority but without
mindless coercion.^ The ministerial role is a position of moral author-
2ity because the teacher must adapt himself to the student. Moral
^Maritain, "The Dynamics of Education," p. 31; idem, "Thomist 
Views on Education," p. 58; and idem, "Some Typical Aspects of Christian 
Education," p. 131.
^Maritain, "The Dynamics of Education," pp. 32-33; and idem, 
"Thomist Views on Education," p. 58.
152
authority, however, is not to be mistaken for permissiveness because 
the teacher must exercise the responsibility of classroom leadership. 
Education begins when the student adapts himself to the teacher, thus 
completing the reciprocality of the process."*"
Maritain's view of the agents in education is in contrast with 
despotic education, in which the teacher is the principal agent, and
Oprogressive education, in which the teacher is no agent at all. The 
two latter extremes of education relate to the extremes of voluntarism, 
which is concerned with the will and not the intellect.
According to Maritain, the will and the intellect are inter­
twined.-^ This is in contrast with the view of the academicist, who 
ignores free will because of the belief that intellectual development 
precedes and defines it; and the empiricist, who denies the existence 
of free will because of the belief that unconscious motivations con­
trol behavior.^ The academic and empirical views relate to the two 
forms of intellectualism, which tends to ignore or suppress the will 
in its intellectual pursuits, materially defined. Maritain is espe­
cially critical of empirical dynamics. "The fact . . . that there are 
unconscious motivations which the subject obeys without knowing them 
furnishes in no manner . . .  an argument against free will, for free 
will begins with intellectual judgment and consciousness.
■*"Maritain, "Philosophy and Education," p. 40.
^Maritain, "The Dynamics of Education," pp. 32-35.
OThe will depends on intellectual judgment but it also controls 
intellectual movement. See Maritain, "The Conquest of Freedom," in 
The Education of Man, pp. 162-163.
4Ibid., pp. 160-161. 5Ibid., p. 161.
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The unconscious motivations, of which Maritain writes, emanate 
from the Freudian unconscious mind, the source of irrational impulse or 
instinct.’*' The spiritual preconscious mind, as defined by Maritain, 
proceeds from the soul of man and is the domain of the intellect and 
the xvd.ll, the rational mind. In other words, reason and will exist, 
not only at the conscious level (the logic of reason and the delibera­
tion of will) but also in the illogical, spontaneous realm of the
Ospiritual preconsciousness, an area which no technique can reach.
The Freudian unconscious mind might influence the preconscious mind 
but it does not control or define the spiritual movement. The will 
emanates from the illogical mind, but this should not be confused 
with irrational motivations.
The liberation of the mind, then, refers to the uninhibited
movement of the preconscious mind to the conscious mind, an internal
act which involves both the intellect and the will. Educational
awareness of the preconscious mind and its movement changes teacher
emphasis ax<ray from external pressure toward the internal aspirations
5of the spirit. The free movement of the preconscious mind is defined 
as the release of intuition or intuitive power. Intuition is defined 
as intellectual insight into truth, a power for x^hich no training 
exists.®
■''Maritain, "The Dynamics of Education," p. 40.
^Ibid., pp. 40-41. ^Ibid., p. 41. ^Ibid., p. 42.
^Ibid.; and idem, "Thomist Views on Education," p. 61.
^Maritain, "The Dynamics of Education," p. 43; and idem, "Thomist 
Views on Education," p. 61.
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Maritain defines truth as the conformity of.the mind with real­
ity.'*' Intuitive insight into truth is confirmed by personal verifica- 
tion; thus, the intellect finds joy or fulfillment in finding truth. 
Liberal education, as defined by Maritain, seeks to liberate student
intuitive power to seek truth for itself, thereby preparing the mind
3to exercise its own power to reason.
The release of intuition can be inhibited by the substitution 
of mechanical drill for insight and the substitution of pre-made for­
mulas for insight because insight must engage the student's self to be 
released.^ These inhibitions relate to the two forms of intellectual- 
ism in education.
Education for intuitive insight can be totally betrayed by 
society if the secondary agent, the teacher, is denied the time or 
the freedom to educate in such a manner. "It is preposterous to ask 
people [teachers] who lead an enslaved life to perform a task of liber-
tr
ation, which the educational task is by essence."'3 The enslavement of 
teachers to society's whims relates to the aim of sociologism in edu­
cation.
How, then, can the teacher help free the intuitive power of the 
learner's mind? The answer appears to encompass the nature of the intel­
lect in two related areas: (1) the intellectual adherence to an object; 
and (2) the intellectual inclination toward fulfillment.
"''Maritain, "Thomist Views on Education," p. 47.
^Ibid. ^Ibid., p. 48. ^Ibid., pp. 57-58.
^Ibid., p. 60.
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The Intellect and Its Object
The instructor must allow the student's mind to adhere to an 
object, one to be studied or made.^ In the case of performance, the 
object specified is a work-to-be-performed. The teacher must choose 
and pursue works which reflect beauty to him and which, in his judgment, 
have the potentiality for reflecting beauty to his students.^ The 
teacher, with moral authority, must lead the way in the judgment of 
potential works; however, a consistent consideration of student choices 
and reactions is necessary to assure the free adherence of the learner's 
mind to the chosen objects. To ignore the second stage of the process 
is to risk student apathy or alienation in respect to the works-in- 
progress .
Maritain admonishes students to create nothing which does not
3reflect beauty to its creator. This philosophical principle relates 
directly to the primary rule of performance. The performer should per­
form nothing which does not please the aural sense.^
In respect to the teacher, he must make certain that the student 
grasps each step of the learning experience no matter how slow the grasp­
ing, this being particularly important in respect to teacher demonstration 
5 ,or explanation. The practice of this philosophical principle encourages 1
1
Ibid., p. 61; and idem, "The Dynamics of Education," p. 44.
^Maritain, "The Dynamics of Education," pp. 44-45.
■̂ Ibid., p. 44. ^See chapter 2 above, pp. 22-23.
-*Ibid.; idem, "The Aims of Education," p. 10; idem, "Some Typical 
Aspects of Christian Education," p. 137; and idem, "The Dynamics of Edu­
cation," pp. 44 and 50.
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the student to place his self into the productive action; for if the stu­
dent is confused or apathetic, the self will remain external to the work, 
internally defined. To avoid the motions of performance, the student 
must perceive the aural reality of his object; to teach for this grasp 
is to appeal to the intuitive power of the student performer.^
The teacher may contribute to student confusion or apathy if he 
presents works in the context of pure objectivity and without a sense of 
personal conviction that beauty is present within the sounds to be pro­
duced. "The first duty of a Teacher is to develop within himself, for 
the sake of truth [beauty], deep-rooted convictions, and frankly to mani­
fest them, while taking pleasure, of course, in having the student develop,
2possibly against them, his own personal convictions."
Maritain also suggests that genuine involvement in a single object 
is preferable to a superficial involvement in several objects.^ In this 
case, freeing the mind refers to student mastery of reason over a single 
object, this being in contrast to burdening his mind with an unreasonable 
quantity of material objectives.^ The music instructor should avoid 
overly high standards in performance by positing too many material objec­
tives for the performance experience; and by attempting to cover an 
excessive amount of material in proportion to the reality of time, stu­
dent ability, and student interest. Such a practice weakens the adher­
ence of the mind to its object because it fragments the performance *2
^"Maritain, "Some Typical Aspects of Christian Education," p. 137.
2Ibid., p. 138.
^Maritain, "The Dynamics of Education," pp. 44-45.
^Ibid., pp. 49-50.
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experience into artistic superficiality. This point bears a direct rela­
tionship to the aim of inclusive education and the fragmentation it 
encourages.
The Intellect and Its Aspirations
The release of intuitive power is facilitated if education adapts
itself to the spontaneous curiosity of the student.'*' Since this is
directed at the natural intelligence, the primary aim of education is
2aptly served and encouraged. The facilitation of student curiosity 
reproportions the classroom experiences to include more intellectual
Oenjoyment and less factual information, objectively conceived. More 
emphasis is given to illumination by personal perception, a subjective 
experience in contrast with the mere dissemination of facts.
In the above context, informal and unsystematic learning is as 
important as, and perhaps preferable to, formal and systematic educa­
tion.^ The instrumentality of "play" is important in learning matters 
of great worth, and great depth, for there is no better way to capture 
student interest and convey the meaning of a field.* 3 Informal learning 
does not diminish the importance of a field but, to the contrary, it 
uses curiosity to a great advantage: to seek truth in an object and 
to risk creative experiences.3
^Maritain, "Thomist Views on Education," p. 72; and idem, "The 
Dynamics of Education," p. 43.
■^Maritain, "Thomist Views on Education," pp. 49-50, 72.
3Ibid., p. 72.




The playing of an instrument is, in the above context, given a 
literal definition. Through connaturality, the student’s curiosity can 
be aroused by the potential sound of a work. The intellectual fulfill­
ment and enjoyment occurs when the sound of his object is perceived as 
"good," an internal, informal discovery.
The Habitus and Intuition
Uninhibited intuitive power is fertile ground for finding the 
meaning of music. Similarly, the development of the habitus is facil­
itated because (1) intellectual adhesion to an object relates to con­
naturality; and (2) the freeing of learner intuition encourages the stu­
dent to place his self into his aural object. The complexity of the 
habitus denies a predictable outcome from such classroom involvement; 
however, the nature of the habitus allows at least the probability that 
its development will be facilitated through the instrumentality of stu­
dent intuitive pox?er.
An important point for emphasis is that the enjoyment of music 
through performance is given a renewed priority in the performance pro­
gram. Maritain believes that, without personal delight, neither the 
meaning of music nor the habitus can make a significant impact upon the 
student during his formative years. It has been established that the 
performance program should not educate for the habitus; however, the 
spontaneous development of this virtue is a profound and commendable 
achievement, not to be disdained or ignored by music education. The 
pathways to meaning, and to the habitus beyond, are cleared through
enj oyment.
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Unless we delight in and are moved by a work of art, we may 
thoroughly discuss and analyze it but we shall never understand 
it. . . . the delight transmitted by beauty thrills not only 
the senses but also, and first of all, the intuitiveness of 
intelligence and spirit. Neither the "historical" approach, 
freeing us from the consideration of the works themselves, nor 
any irrational and merely sensuous "communication of ecstasy" 
is an appropriate method. The good method requires first the 
intuitive delight, both emotional and intellectual, in the 
work's beauty, second, the rational disquisition of the very 
causes of this delight and of the intellectual regulations by 
which the work has been internally and vitally ruled and 
structured. It is necessary to make clear for the understand­
ing of the pupil the inner logic of a Mozart sonata, read and 
discussed from the score. But it is first necessary for the 
pupil to hear the sonata and be delighted in it, and love it 
with his ears and with his heart. Man's senses are not fan]
. . . impure element [to be distrusted], . . . They are not 
unworthy of reason, they naturally serve reason and convey 
its food to it.
%aritain, "The Dynamics of Education," p. 52, n.
CHAPTER VIII
RECOMMENDATIONS
The findings of this study do not support a total regeneration of 
the performance program, to be initiated by the profession itself. In 
other words, Maritain's philosophy of the arts, and of education, does 
not lend itself to extremist tendencies, externally conceived and 
imposed; therefore, the implementation of a "Maritain method" designed 
to turn performance programs upside down would be as arrogant and irre­
sponsible as any methods targeted for replacement.
The findings of this study do support an inversion of priorities 
in the performance program, but the process of inversion would be inter­
nally conceived and developed. Each program, through its teachers, would 
be encouraged to (1) exercise self-examination or introspection for the 
identification and evaluation of present priorities and to (2) implement 
whatever changes might be necessary to correct misconceptions or mis­
directions .
For most performance programs, new priorities would be defined 
by a shift of emphasis away from the external influence of institutional, 
social, or instructional designs to the personal aesthetic inclinations 
of the primary agent: the student. Similarly, the general content of 
the performance experience would remain the same; hox^ever, no single 
area of study or performance activity, which threatens the primary focus, 
would be allowed to dominate or dictate the performance experience.
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A minority of performance programs may find that conscientious 
introspection is a stimulus for a radical change in priorities, inter­
nally conceived. Another minority may find little or no change neces­
sary. Change for the sake of change is as potentially harmful as the 
self-serving resistance to any change at all.
Educational agencies and institutions would, by necessity, be 
required to invert their priorities in the same direction as the per­
formance programs, not for purposes of imposition, but to provide leader­
ship, encouragement, and assistance to school performance programs in 
general. To accomplish this, the profession must abandon its preoccu­
pation with precocious recipes as educational ends. It is recommended, 
therefore, that educators focus their energies upon (1) a renewed recog­
nition of the student as the primary agent in the classroom; (2) a redis­
covery of the nature of fine art; and (3) an unwavering defense of these 
priorities within the context of the performance program.
The Art of Performance and the Classroom Art 
Classroom Aims
Classroom performance, which is typically a group experience, 
should focus its attention upon works rather than students. In other 
words, classroom performance should pursue the making of good works 
more than the making of good musicians.
On the surface, this recommendation may appear to contradict 
the preceding discussion; however, the pursuit of good works is directed 
at the natural intelligence of the student, this being in line with the 
primary aim of education. Furthermore, aural production which is pleas­
ing to the students, as well as the instructor, is in line with the
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primary aim of performance. The pursuit of beauty in performed works 
is, in the internal sense, the top priority of classroom performance. 
Classroom musical production which arouses student curiosity and encom­
passes student intellectual inclinations is defined as a student-centered 
experience.
Student mastery of the instrumental or vocal mechanism is, 
within the framework of the group experience, accomplished through the 
production of works or in service to a musical object. Classroom expe­
riences in skill refinement should be undertaken to help perfect an 
aural object, to improve its musical sound to the satisfaction of the 
students and the instructor, rather than to train for the sake of the 
skill by itself.
The teaching of musical concepts, through score analysis, should 
be prompted by the necessity of producing a work rather than merely know­
ing about the components of works. Terminology and the sign language of 
score notation are a means of production and students must be shown that 
conceptual means serve an aural end, an actual end and not a prepared 
lesson. In the presence of real works, students can come to understand 
why a personal command of score notation is important and how musical 
concepts facilitate the experience of making. The use of selected works 
for the teaching of certain concepts is hot aural production and, 
although the occasional isolation and emphasis of material is desirable, 
the general practice of performance for knowledge is missing the artis­
tic element and cannot be defined as classroom art.
The proponents of "comprehensive musicianship" have posited 
objectives and activities which are intended to make, of the student,
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a complete musician. First, it is true that the student performer should 
be viewed, by his teacher, as something more than a skilled technician. 
Secondly, it is also true that instructional consideration of musical 
knowledge and alternative musical activities are often ignored by the 
performance program in favor of commitments to public appearances.
Nevertheless, the most serious and obvious problem with the pro­
posed method or approach is that it focuses upon the student performer 
rather than the art of performance. Despite different priorities, the 
focus of "comprehensive musicianship" moves in the same direction as 
"technical training," the very specialization it intends to displace in 
importance. Both aims fall into the framework of intellectualism in 
education.
The scope of works authorized by the above method is not to be 
confused with the spontaneous selection or discovery of works by the 
instructor and his students. In respect to the former, the repertoire 
consists of a carefully selected, analyzed, and prepared sequence of 
works. Through suggested implementation, objectives and activities are 
carefully organized, a feature which fails to confront the spiritual 
mystery of art and seems to tolerate a mode of sameness which encour­
ages the sterilization of classroom performance. The implication is 
that the student product is to be a copy of an ideal rather than a per­
former and perceiver in his own right, a learner with personal abilities, 
inclinations, and goals to pursue. A method which tightly controls the 
experience of performance also denies teacher-student freedom to operate 
within an infinity of artistic possibilities for fulfillment.
Again, professional agencies and institutions must accept that, 
inevitably, the teacher knows his students, and their intellectual
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traits, better than any external educational agent. It is the teacher 
who must choose methods and materials which he judges to be connatural, 
or to contain the potentiality of connaturality, with the students in 
his classroom.
Professional advocates of singular approaches to comprehensive 
musicianship have misunderstood the depth of this concept. Through the 
formal action of performance, the student is carried to a personal 
spiritual depth that surpasses the scope of singular approaches. The 
depth of artistic performance is reached nonconceptually and through 
the intellect's connaturality with sound. Each genuine experience of 
art, then, will unquestionably, and immeasurably, enhance a student's 
comprehensive musicianship without direct preparation for this achieve­
ment .
When works-in-progress demand the accomplishment of certain 
material objectives, a prepared lesson plan or published method should 
be spontaneously applied for remedial work. The artistic needs will 
reveal themselves spontaneously, and the instructor's chosen methods 
must be applied experimentally with a constant monitoring of results. 
Conceivably, ineffective methods will be discarded while others proven 
to be effective will be employed. The difficulty of this procedure 
reflects the difficulty of the art of performance.
Classroom performance for effect is, in actuality, a concern 
with the group's sound and a corresponding lesser concern with the 
sound of its object. Performance for effect is concerned with audi­
ence approval, parental approval, or administrative approval, all of 
which are desirable but not as determining factors in the execution of
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the classroom product. The desire to please or impress others threatens 
the primary aim of performance because nonmusical and extramusical con­
cerns can easily dominate the artistic practice.
To neutralize temptation for approval-seeking, each work should 
be produced and performed as if no one, except the producers, were to be 
present to hear the performance. The aim to please should be personally 
defined; that is, the performers should first seek personal pleasure in 
their art and then they can safely aspire to external fulfillment and 
hope that their personal fulfillment will be conveyed to others as well. 
This kind of external approval follows, but does not define, the experi­
ence, and it preserves the primary rule of fine art.
Often, classroom performance for effect is an ego-enhancing 
device which disguises a lack of artistic action. Conversely, perform­
ance for the object engages the self but not the ego; therefore, the art 
of performance teaches the student something of self-commitment to aural 
products.
It is recommended, therefore, that elementary and secondary level 
group performance be directed at the creation of works. The growth of 
external musicianship will occur simultaneously and spontaneously with 
the depth of production. Furthermore, the internal realm of the habitus 
will develop apart from institutional or instructional control, undetect­
able in its growth but profound in its presence.
Classroom Action
The role of artistic judgment in classroom performance begins 
with the choice of literature, the repertoire of works-to-be-performed. 
Judgment, as defined in this study, is an ongoing process which would
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make the selection of works an ongoing process, an intuitive assessment 
of a work's potentiality as it is perceived in sound.
The moral authority of the classroom conductor requires that he 
accept and implement his leadership role in the judgment of works and 
the consequent selection of the performance repertoire. Obviously, by 
visual score assessment alone, he cannot reliably know in advance which 
works will facilitate his group's connaturality with sound. Initially, 
the visual choices are made with the students in mind, in consideration 
of ability and interest, and with a perspective of the appropriateness 
of the literature for future performance commitments. Sight-reading the 
selected works through performance action is a primary determining fac­
tor because, through sound, the visual assessment is affirmed or negated. 
Both the conductor and his students will perceive and react to the initial 
hearing of the work, in terms of pleasure or displeasure, and the group's 
ability will be directly tested by the work's level of difficulty. Most 
works will reveal themselves to be worthy or unworthy of further aural 
action. Some works will require time and effort before a decision can 
be made on the desirability of pursuing a final point of completion, 
thereby providing living proof of the ongoing nature of artistic judgment.
In the case of contemporary music, the classroom conductor must 
accept the probability of his students' initial displeasure with the 
complexity of this music. As the aural sense begins to grow connatural 
with complex music, the instructor can better judge the potentiality of 
contemporary works, while exercising patience and tact with his students. 
Works that remain incomprehensible to the students should be discontinued, 
at least temporarily, and perhaps permanently.
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Externally imposed taste cannot legitimately supersede the 
mind's connaturality with sound, no matter how simple or trite this 
sensory relationship may appear to the teacher. The matter of style 
is secondary to the selection of literature because often a teacher 
purported style of music is, in fact, an imposition of taste upon his 
students. It is preferable that stylistic considerations be a natural 
part of choices made in the light of artistic judgment. Works that 
challenge, as well as please, are not confined to a particular style 
because beauty is present in all works, to a degree. Exploring the 
unfamiliar is desirable because works that unexpectedly arouse curi­
osity or excitement must be discovered. Choices should not be exter­
nally determined by style; they should be a natural result of a con­
naturality with a style, internally perceived. It is probable that the 
practicality of a particular style may be a determining factor in its 
initial choice; however, the essential internal test (its connatural­
ity with the student performers) is the primary factor, one which 
naturally operates within the framework of practicality (so long as 
external taste does not impose itself upon the selective process).
The reality of the work, or its inner mystery, must be assessed 
aurally as it is perceived in sound. This is re-creation in its fullest 
sense. The instructor must teach toward, and demonstrate the presence 
of, the inner work which lies beyond the score, the outer work.
The action of classroom performance requires creation, as well 
as re-creation, because (1) the performing group brings its uniqueness 
into the experience, and (2) the composed work, already complete, is 
incomplete as an object of performance. Artistic judgment helps the
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performer envision the potential product, a creative idea to be pursued 
intuitively. The instructor must teach his students that the perform­
ance idea is more than scored material and more than a single, obvious 
phenomenon to be fulfilled. Artistic vision is more likely to encom­
pass a series of ideas occurring along the way to a completed product. 
The ideas unfold and are to be pursued in detail, the details being 
tested by their application to the evolving work. The teacher must 
take great care in demonstrating how the spontaneous creative ideas 
are tested against, and reflected upon, the evolving product; that is, 
the spawning ideas are more closely tied to the realism of the evolving 
work than the idealism of a lesson plan.
Inspiration is not a teachable concept, in the direct sense; it 
is experienced through discovery. The instructor can provide the set­
ting for inspiration but he cannot prepare it or provide it within a 
lesson plan. He must allow and encourage a free flow of ideas from 
his students, in addition to the spawning of his own ideas, all of 
which are applied to, and tested by, the aural results. The proper 
setting for inspiration is a free and continuous testing of perform­
ance ideas in pursuit of the spontaneous discoveries which promote 
intellectual movement toward its object.
Artistic imitation, as defined in this study, regards the action 
of performance as something more than simple execution or reproduction 
of the score. The classroom conductor who defines performance as the 
execution or externalization of score mechanics is duplicating but not 
imitating. To imitate, the classroom group and its conductor must 
become part of their object through self-commitment. As the work
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evolves in sound, the aural reality becomes the objective work trans­
figured by subjective perception; in other words, the score is trans­
formed into the inner work.
The instructor teaches the imitative action of performance by 
assisting his students in expressing the work through a self­
involvement in the aural reality perceived. This requires the stu­
dents to "lose themselves" in their object.
The Classroom Conductor as Instructor
The classroom conductor is first responsible for the production 
of good aural products, and through this responsibility, he inherits the 
leadership role in classroom art. As the classroom leader, he is also 
responsible to the artists, in terms of guiding the experiences of the 
student performers. In respect to works, his instructional directives 
should relate to experimentation, application, and perception. In 
respect to his students, his instructional directives should apply to 
guidance, assistance, clarification, demonstration, and evaluation. 
Despotic imposition is not a proper part of either instructional mode.
In respect to despotic aims, the classroom conductor must avoid 
defining the performance experience as the dissemination of academic 
rules; the execution of martial drill; art for use; and art for self­
enhancement .
The school conductor must seek beauty in his aural product by 
directing the classroom art in that direction, aurally. He must see 
to it that his students perceive and understand his directives in rela­
tionship to the work-in-progress. In this way, the students can become 
personally involved in the process of innovation and they can personally
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perceive the aural results. In a sense, the student performers, as pro­
ducers or instruments of sound, are closer to the action of performance 
than the conductor. With this in mind, the instructor must ensure that 
the classroom art will not deteriorate into impersonal motions of per­
formance within which external aims or uses predominate. The classroom 
art is truly a "team effort" in service to an object.
The classroom conductor must recognize the spiritual mystery 
inherent in each work of art. In other words, he should avoid dictat­
ing results in advance or defining his classroom art in terms of pre­
conception. It is preferable that the classroom conductor free his 
personal habitus to guide him intuitively to the "good" ends. In this 
way, he will determine means at the moment of production, during the 
momentary action of conducting. Simultaneously, the means are commu­
nicated to the student performers by the practical sign and the aural 
end evolves of itself. Exposure to such creative depth is an irreplace­
able experience for classroom performers because the instructor is a 
personal example of an artist who has freed his creative intellect in 
observance of the primary rule of fine art.
Studio Lessons and Apprenticeship Education
The matter of studio lessons relates to Maritain’s conception of 
apprenticeship education. The apprentice performer aspires to become a 
performer and seeks the guidance of a master teacher in his development. 
Because such education looks toward the habitus, studio lessons are 
beyond the scope of Maritain's conception of classroom education, which 
pertains to the natural intelligence.
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In reality, however, each performance program includes and pro­
vides for studio-like lessons, in which the teacher plays the role of 
the master teacher. Because of this reality, and in resolution of the 
above conflict, it is concluded that studio lessons, private or individ­
ualized, are an exception to the conclusions of this study because the 
focus is upon the student performer; furthermore, the instruction is 
directed toward the artistic virtue or habitus.
Because the student performer is a novice, unrealistic teacher 
expectations are as inappropriate in the studio as in the classroom. A 
minimum of external pressure must be combined with a maximum of positive 
encouragement. The factor of student aspiration also requires an 
increased emphasis upon specialization and an increased student respon­
sibility for personal achievement.
The master teacher must challenge, guide, and encourage his stu­
dent's inner aspirations. As much as possible, the performance material 
should be objects chosen, or at least agreeable to, the student, with 
the master teacher assisting and supervising the works' production.
The teacher, in the studio, demonstrates and corrects through personal 
example; the student apprentice imitates the example through practice 
and application. In other words, the student does the actual making 
while the teacher observes and oversees, but does not dictate, the 
final product.
The refinement of performance skill is a necessary part of the 
studio experience but it does not define its purpose. The acquiring of
r
the habitus is dependent upon the self-commitment of the student to his 
object; and the master teacher must look towards it, recognize its
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presence, give it direction for growth, and provide the setting for 
facilitating this growth.
The Use of Performance and the Performance Program
The Concert
In respect to the primary aim of performance, the concert expe­
rience is the best forum for the performance program to present its 
works to others, a forum similar to the display of visual works in an 
art gallery. The use or display follows the production and does not 
legitimately define it. Some productive action occurs during the con­
cert experience; however, the works are normally and largely produced 
and externalized during the classroom rehearsal, prior to the public 
presentation.
Since the works presented in concert are products of classroom 
action, these works first provided pleasure to the performers during 
the daily classroom activity. In this case, classroom action and 
classroom rehearsing are synonymous experiences. The public concert, 
then, is a natural culmination of the action, the fruits of production 
made available for enjoyment by others.
Concerts presented to satisfy the school calendar, raise funds, 
or enhance public relations supersede artistic priorities unless these 
extramusical elements are relegated to secondary status, a fringe bene­
fit of the art itself.
Because of the perceptive depth involved, the concert experience 
is very likely more aesthetically rewarding to the performers (and con­
ductor) themselves than to an audience, which must perceive with less .
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depth because of external limitations. The responsibility of the audi­
ence is to receive the works and perceive as much as can be perceived 
from an external position.
The Contest
The pursuit of contest ratings can force the performance pro­
gram into a dependence upon nonmusical objectives for demonstrating its 
success or effectiveness. Using contest ratings as a barometer of suc­
cess is outside of the aesthetic realm because the presence of aesthetic 
beauty cannot be confined or limited to external measurement. The ques­
tion of whether the fine arts lend themselves to the competitive arena 
can be answered in terms of disinterestedness. A product of fine art 
must first be created for itself before any use, such as competition, 
can legitimately be undertaken. Consequently, the music contest, 
defined in terms of nonmusical objectives, is in violation of the pri­
mary aim of performance.
Because aspiring for high contest ratings encourages overspe­
cialization, voluntarism (in either extreme), and sociologism, the pur­
suit of ratings may also violate the primary aim of education. In 
respect to sociologism, the performance program may inadvertently encour­
age the community, the school, or parents to use high ratings to advance 
themselves in the eyes of others. As a result, students may gain a 
false impression of themselves, of the intent of the performance pro­
gram, and of the meaning of fine art. Contest ratings, then, can be 
defined as the "false idols" of fine art, the pursuit of which enhances 
observable success to the neglect of internal, aesthetic fulfillment.
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Apart from ratings, the contest experience is desirable if (1) 
the disinterestedness of the product is enhanced through further learn­
ing; and (2) the virtuosity of the student performer is supplemented 
and enhanced by the adjudicator's suggestions. To accomplish this, 
the instructor and his students must retain aesthetical objectives in 
the face of nonaesthetical temptation. They must aspire for conceptual 
and nonconceptual improvement in their aural product, and they should 
seek technical assistance in performance execution, by inquiry if 
necessary.
Artistic Criticism and the Adjudicator
The role of the contest adjudicator can be defined as aesthetic 
criticism, a form of aesthetic judgment of performed works. While the 
performer's aesthetic judgment is an ongoing judgment, the adjudicator's 
criticism is typically a single judgment, external to the productive 
process. In other words, ongoing aesthetic judgment carries the per­
former into his object more deeply over a period of time. The adjudi­
cator's criticism is applicable to the product in its present form. The 
criticism is made in terms of providing direction but it cannot legiti­
mately control the production action in terms of finality. The performer 
judges through the action; the adjudicator judges from the action.
Often, adjudication is a judgment of taste rather than of works. 
This is criticism tainted by preconception because the work is judged 
from views or requirements previously determined by the adjudicator.
The judgment of taste is a negative criticism because the adjudicator 
listens for his preconceptions and judges the work by the presence or 
lack of such taste. To avoid the bias of taste, the adjudicator must
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allow the work to teach him its content by receiving it as a unique 
aural object and perceiving the object in sound, nonconceptually. The 
true adjudicator asks the work to reveal itself to him and then judges 
what it has to say, a way of detecting the inner presence of beauty.
Occasionally, the adjudicator will focus his criticism upon 
the performer rather than the work, a judgment of the performer's 
technique and ability. This kind of judgment confuses the judgment 
of skill with aesthetic criticism while slighting the very object 
from which aesthetic beauty emanates.
The contest adjudicator must exercise aesthetic criticism by 
judging the work without preconception. While focusing upon the work, 
he can judge the performer's technique through his object. The criti­
cism of taste should be avoided in reference to either the performer 
or his work.
The Marching Band
The marching band experience encompasses two art forms: a martial 
art and a fine art. Because these art forms, by nature, are in conflict 
with one another, the marching band presents unique problems to the per­
formance program, as aesthetic education.
Critics of the marching band often deny that this experience has 
aesthetic properties; however, they also ignore the presence of two dis­
tinct art forms within its parameters. The marching band is a fine art 
when it performs musical works for the good of the work. The marching 
band is a martial art when it executes physical movements and patterns 
with military-like discipline, the content of which is learned through 
physical drill or repetition.
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Because the inarching band consists of performing musicians, the 
aesthetic intent should predominate over the martial intent in its oper­
ation. This is in contrast to the drum and bugle corps which equalizes 
martial maneuvers and musical production. Often, the marching band is 
erroneously equated with the drum and bugle corps; resultingly, it is 
viewed as an instrument of martial patterns, and colorful display, 
rather than as an aural instrument enhanced by the visual effects.
Open air acoustics requires a unique approach to aural produc­
tion, thus giving the marching band its unique aesthetic properties.
The sound of the group is affected by the strength of the brass and 
percussion sections and the choice of block-band formation. The 
dynamics of sound are generally louder and are executed with less 
contrast than the concert hall acoustics would require.
Despite the disadvantages of open air acoustics, the aural plea­
sure of performance exists at the marching band level as well as the 
concert band level. The difference is a matter of timbre, complexity 
of sound, and depth. Nevertheless, to regard the marching band as a 
martial art, and nothing else, is a slighting of the aesthetic poten­
tiality of this experience.
The marching band presents problems to the performance program 
when it is given precedence over all other components of the program.
For example, show band marching can require complex martial maneuvers, 
thereby over-commiting classroom time to martial drill and saturating 
the performing band experience with nonaesthetic considerations.
The marching band experience should not define the performance 
program. If this single component of the program threatens to dominate
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the classroom activity, it is the responsibility of the instructor to 
adjust, reduce, or eliminate the threat in preservation of the class­
room art, aurally and aesthetically defined.
The Sports Band
The sports band experience is a controversial, and often abused, 
component of the performance program. The influence of sociologism has 
forced many performance programs to emphasize this experience over all 
of the other components of the program. Consequently, preparation for 
sports band commitments can saturate the classroom activity and force 
the classroom art away from its aesthetic priorities.
A common criticism of sports bands, as expounded in educational 
circles, is that the musical styles typically performed by them lack 
aesthetical content. This study has provided evidence to the contrary. 
The aesthetic beauty of music is not confined to a particular style or 
specified type of production. Furthermore, the artistic production of 
works should not be confused x̂ ith its use. Obviously, the sports band 
object has less depth and complexity than the concert band object; never­
theless, a performer’s connaturality with the sound of his object is as 
important to the sports band experience as any other performance experi­
ence .
The instructor, x<?ith a personal bias in musical taste, may slight 
the sports band object, thereby encouraging the impersonal motions of 
performance. Motions of performance, alloxjed at any musical level, is 
inexcusable. The preparation of the sports band object must be directed 
at the aural good of the work, regardless of the use intended.
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The sports band presents problems to the performance program 
when it is given precedence over all other components of the program. 
Faced with overcommitment, the instructor should adjust, reduce, or 
discontinue any sports band activity which threatens the primacy of 
classroom art. If the primary rule of fine art is observed, the 
sports band product can then be used for its commitments without 
harm to the art itself or the student performers involved.
APPENDIX
180
The Research Design 
Chapter II
The Habitus of Fine Art
Research Questions
1. What is the relationship of the habitus to the intellect?
2. What is the relationship of the habitus to the practical order of 
art?
3. What is the relationship of the habitus to the rules of art?
Chapter III
The Aim of Performance
Research Questions
1. What is the relationship of beauty to performance?
2. What is the relationship of technique to performance?
3. What is the relationship of communication to performance?
Chapter IV
The Action of Performance
Research Questions
1. What is the relationship of artistic judgment to performance?
2. What is the relationship of imitation to performance?
3. What is the relationship of the creative idea to performance?
Chapter V
The Use of Performance
Research Question





1. What is the relationship of the habitus to musical performance?
Chapter VII
Applications to the Performance 
Program in Music Education
Applicative Questions
1. How can Maritain's definition of the aim of education be reconciled 
with the aim of musical performance, as defined by the habitus?
2. How can the habitus of music be developed through the release of 






Selected Works by Jacques Maritain
Approaches to God. Edited by Ruth Nanda Anshen. Translated by Peter 
O'Reilly. New York: Harper and Bros., 1954.
Selected reference:
"The Ways of the Practical Intellect," pp. 84-108.
Art and Faith. Written in collaboration with Jean Cocteau. Translated 
by John Coleman. New York: The Philosophical Library, 1948.
Selected reference:
"Answer to Jean Cocteau," pp. 73-135.
Art and Poetry. Translated by E. de P. Matthews. New York: The 
Philosophical Library, 1943.
Selected reference:
"The Freedom of Song," pp. 71-104.
Art and Scholasticism and the Frontiers of Poetry. Translated by Joseph 
W. Evans. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1962.
Selected references:
"The Speculative Order and the Practical Order," pp. 5-6.
"Making and Doing," pp. 7-9.
"Art an Intellectual Virtue," pp. 10-22.
"Art and Beauty," pp. 23-37.
"The Rules of Art," pp. 38-48.
"The Purity of Art," pp. 49-63.
"Christian Art," pp. 64-69.
"Art and Morality," pp. 70-81.
"An Essay on Art," appendix 1, pp. 85-99.
"Some Reflections on Religious Art," appendix 2, pp. 100-107.
"Apropos an Article by Montgomery Belgion," appendix 4, pp. 
113-115.
The Frontiers of Poetry, pp. 119-150. The same essay is 
translated by F. S. Flint and entitled "Poetry and Religion."
The New Criterion 5 (January 1927): 7-22; and (February 1927): 
214-230.
B e r g s o n i a n  P h i l o s o p h y  a n d  T h o m ism . T r a n s l a t e d  b y  M a b e l l e  L .  A n d i s o n  i n
collaboration with J. Gordon Andison. New York: The Philosophical 
Library, 1955.
Selected reference:
"Intuition and Duration," pp. 146-179.
183
184
Creative Intuition in Art and Poetry. New York: Pantheon Books, 1953.
Selected references:
"Art as a Virtue of the Practical Intellect," pp. 44-65.
"The Preconscious Life of the Intellect," pp. 71-100.
"Creative Intuition and Poetic Knowledge," pp. 106-145.
"Poetry and Beauty," pp. 160-195.
"Beauty and Modern Painting," pp. 209-228.
"Poetic Experience and Poetic Sense," pp. 229-271.
"The Internalization of Music," pp. 300-333.
"The Three Epiphanies of Creative Intuition," pp. 354-405.
Distinguish to Unite: or, The Degrees of Knowledge. Translated under the 
supervision of Gerald B. Phelan. New York: Charles Scribner’s 
Sons, 1959.
Selected references:
" T h e  C o n c e p t , "  a p p e n d i x  1, p p .  387-417.
'"Speculative' and ’Practical,’" appendix 7, pp. 456-464.
Education at the Crossroads. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1943.
Selected references:
"The Aims of Education," pp. 1-28.
"The Dynamics of Education," pp. 29-57.
"The Humanities and Liberal Education," pp. 58-87.
The Education of Man. Edited by Donald and Idella Gallagher. Notre
Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1962; paperback ed., 1967.
Selected references:
"Philosophy and Education," pp. 39-43.
"Thomist Views on Education," pp. 44-82. This essay is 
reprinted from Modern Philosophies and Education, in The Fifty- 
fourth Yearbook of the National Society for the Study of Educa­
tion, pt. 1. Edited by Nelson B. Henry. Chicago: University 
of Chicago Press, 1955.
"Education and the Humanities," pp. 83-102.
"Some Typical Aspects of Christian Education," pp. 129-153.
"The Conquest of Freedom," pp. 159-179.
An Introduction to Philosophy. Newly designed edition. Translated by 
E. I. Watkin. New York: Sheed and Ward, 1962.
Selected reference:
"The Philosophy of Art; Ethics," pp. 193-200.
" L a n g u a g e  a n d  t h e  T h e o r y  o f  S i g n , "  I n  L a n g u a g e :  An E n q u i r y  i n t o  I t s  M ean­
i n g  a n d  F u n c t i o n , p p .  86-101. E d i t e d  b y  R u t h  N a n d a  A s h e n .  New 
Y o r k :  H a r p e r  a n d  B r o s . ,  1957.
Man and the State. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1951; Phoenix 
Books, 1970.
Selected reference:
"The Democratic Charter," pp. 108-146. This essay contains 
a discussion on the relationship of democracy to education.
185
"A Maritain Anthology on Art and Poetry." Thought 2.6 (Autumn 1951): 325- 
341.
This article contains fourteen passages taken from Art and 
Scholasticism, Art and Poetry, The Situation of Poetry, and Art 
and Faith.
The Person and the Common Good. Paperback ed. Translated by John J.
Fitzgerald. Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1966.
Selected reference:
"Individuality and Personality," pp. 31-46.
The Range of Reason. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1952: paperback 
ed., [1961].
Selected references:
"On Human Knowledge," pp. 3-18. Reprinted from Thought 24 
(June 1949): 225-243.
"On Artistic Judgment," pp. 19-21. Reprinted from Liturgi­
cal Arts 11 (February 1943): 46-47.
"On Knowledge Through Connaturality," pp. 22-29. Reprinted 
from The Review of Metaphysics 4 (June 1951): 473-481.
Redeeming the Time. Translated by Harry Lorin Binsse. London: Geoffrey 
Bles, The Centenary Press, 1943.
Selected reference:
"Sign and Symbol," pp. 191-224.
"Reflections on Sacred Art." Liturgical Arts 4 (Third Quarter 1935): 
131-133.
The Responsibility of the Artist. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 
1960.
Selected references:
"Art and Morality," pp. 21-45.
"Art for Art's Sake," pp. 47-65. Reprinted from The Critic 
17 (October-November 1958): 19-20, 65.
"Art for the People," pp. 67-90.
"Poetry and Perfection of Human Life," pp. 91-115.
The Situation of Poetry. Written in collaboration with Raissa Maritain. 
Translated by Marshall Suther. New” York: The Philosophical 
Library, 1955. >
Selected references:
"Concerning Poetic Knowledge," pp. 37-70. This essay is 
translated by Kenelm Foster and entitled "On Poetic Knowledge," 
Blackfriars 25 (November 1944): 422-428; (December 1944): 457- 
463; and 26 (February 1945): 51-54. The same essay is also 
translated by Henry Rago and entitled "Poetry's Dark Night."
The Kenyon Review 4 (Spring 1942): 149-159. Neither the Foster 
translation nor the Rago translation contains Maritain's 'Three 
Philosophical Conclusions,' presented in the Suther translation, 
pp. 64-70.
186
"The Experience of the Poet," pp. 71-85. Material from 
"The Experience of the Poet" and "Concerning Poetic Knowledge" 
is combined into a single article and entitled "Poetic Experi­
ence." The Review of Politics 6 (October 1944): 387-402.
Other Sources
Ball, Charles H. "Thoughts on Music as Aesthetic Education." In Toward 
an Aesthetic Education, pp. 57-62. Edited by Bennett Reimer and 
associates. Washington, D. C.: Music Educators National Confer­
ence, 1971.
Broudy, Harry S. "Educational Theory and the Music Curriculum." In
Perspectives in Music Education: Source Book III, pp. 173-184. 
Edited by Bonnie C. Kowall. Washington, D. C.: Music Educators 
National Conference, 1966.
Dimler, G. Richard. "Creative Intuition in the Aesthetic Theories of 
Croce and Maritain." The New Scholasticism 37 (October 1963): 
472-492.
Flannery, Edward H., trans. Glossary to An Essay on Christian Philosophy, 
by Jacques Maritain. New York: The Philosophical Library, 1955.
Gallagher, Donald, and Gallagher, Idella. The Achievement of Jacques and 
Raissa Maritain: A Bibliography, 1906-1961. New York: Doubleday, 
1962.
___ ____. "Introduction: Toward a Christian Philosophy of Education." In
The Education of Man, pp. 9-36. Edited by Donald Gallagher and 
Idella Gallagher. Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 
1962.
Hanke, John W. Maritain’s Ontology of the Work of Art. The Hague, 
Netherlands: Martinis Nijhoff, 1973.
Hay, Gerald C. , Jr. Maritain1 s Theory of Poetic. Knowledge: A Critical 
Study. Ph.D. dissertation, Catholic University of America,
1964; Ann Arbor, Michigan: Xerox University Microfilms, 64-11,
084, n.d.
Hazo, Samuel John. An Analysis of the Aesthetic of Jacques Maritain.
Ph.D. dissertation, University of Pittsburgh, 1957; Ann Arbor, 
Michigan: Xerox University Microfilms, 24,744, n.d.
Lechner, Robert. "Jacques Maritain: Metaphysical Beauty," In The Aes­
thetic Experience, pp. 49-81. Chicago: Henry Regnery Co., 1953.
Martini, Clare Joseph. Maritain and Music.. Ph.D. dissertation, North­
western University, 1958; Ann Arbor, Michigan: Xerox University 
Microfilms, 58-5769, n.d.
187
Phenix, Phillip H. Realms of Meaning. New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., 
1964.
Prince, Warren F. "Music Education's Split Personality." Music Educa­
tors Journal 61 (November 1974): 27-33.
Reimer, Bennett. "Aesthetic Behaviors in Music." In Toward an Aes­
thetic Education, pp. 65-87. Edited by Bennett Reimer and 
associates. Washington, D. C.: Music Educators National Con­
ference, 1971.
_______. "Patterns for the Future." Music Educators Journal 63
(December 1976): 22-29.
______A Philosophy of Music Education. Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-
~ Hall, Inc., 1970.
Schwadron, Abraham A. "Aesthetic Values and Music Education." In Per­
spectives in Music Education: Source Book III, pp. 185-194.
Edited by Bonnie C. Kowall. Washington, D. C.: Music Educators 
National Conference, 1966.
. Aesthetics: Dimensions for Music Education. Washington, D. C.: 
Music Educators National Conference, 1967.
Tate, J. "Plato, Art and Mr. Maritain." The New Scholasticism 12 
(April 1938): 107-142.
Thomas Aquinas, Saint. Suinma Theologica. 3 vols. Translated by Fathers 
of the English Dominican Province. New York: Benziger Bros.,
Inc., 1947.
Critical Reviews of Maritain1s Works
Belgion, Montgomery. "Art and Mr. Maritain." The Dublin Review 187 
(October-December 1930): 201-215.
Review of Art and Scholasticism, trans. by J. F. Scanlan, 
and published by Scribner's in 1930. This was the first English 
translation of the original French version.
Carey, Graham. "Book Review: The Responsibility of the Artist." Good 
Work 23 (Pentecost 1960): pp. 94-97.
Published in 1960.
Clancy, William P. "The Intuition of Jacques' Maritain." The Commonweal 
59 (December 25, 1953): 309-310.
Review of Creative Intuition in Art and Poetry, 1953.
Donnelly, Francis P. "The Where and Why of Beauty's Pleasure." Thought
5 (September 1930): 261-271.
Review of Art and Scholasticism, 1930.
188
Frank, Joseph. "Maritain's View of Modern Art." The New Republic 132 
(May 30, 1955): 17-18.
R e v i e w  o f  C r e a t i v e  I n t u i t i o n  i n  A r t  an d  P o e t r y , p a p e r b a c k  
ed., 1955.
Gallagher, Donald A. "Future of Education: Specialization or Wisdom?"
The Catholic Worker 13 (September 1946): 1-2, 7.
Review of Education at the Crossroads, 1943.
Hamm, Victor M. "Creative Intuition and Scholasticism." America 90 
(October 31, 1953): 127-129.
Review of Creative Intuition in Art and Poetry, 1953.
Hatzfeld, Helmut. "Book Reviews: The Situation of Poetry." American 
Ecclesiastical Review 132 (April 1955): 283-284.
Published in 1955.
Hausman, Carl R. "Maritain's Interpretation of Creativity in Art."
Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 19 (Winter 1960): 215-219.
Review of Creative Intuition in Art and Poetry, 1953.
Heath, Thomas R. "Book Reviews: Creative Intuition in Art and Poetry." 
The Thomist 17 (October 1954): 583-589.
Published in 1953.
Johnson, F. Ernest. "Can Education Pass Its Test?" Cristendom 9 
(Winter 1944): 126-128.
Review of Education at the Crossroads, 1943.
Little, Arthur. "Jacques Maritain and His Aesthetic." Studies 19 
(September 1930): 467-480.
Review of Art and Scholasticism, 1930.
McLuhan, H. Marshall. "Maritain on Art." Renascence 6 (Autumn 1953): 
40-44.
Review of Creative Intuition in Art and Poetry, 1953.
O'Malley, Frank. "The Education of Man." The Review of Politics 6 
(January 1944): 3-17.
Review of Education at the Crossroads, 1943.
Phelan, Gerald B. "Book Reviews: Art and Scholasticism." The Philo­
sophical Review 41 (November 1932): 638-640.
Published in 1930.
Powers, J. F. "Art, the Moon Prince." The Commonweal 48 (May 14, 1948): 
102-105.
Review of Art and Faith, 1948.
Rauch, Rufus William. "The Esthetic of Maritain." Thought 6 (September
1931): 228-236.
Preview of Art and Scholasticism, 1930.
189
Rexroth, Kenneth. "Enraptured by Maritain." The Nation 190 (February 13 
1960): 150-151.
Review of The Responsibility of the Artist, 1960.
Scott, Nathan A., Jr. "Maritain in His Role as Aesthetician." The 
Review of Metaphysics 8 (March 1955): 480-492.
Review of Creative Intuition in Art and Poetry, 1953.
Sillem, E. A. "Jacques Maritain and the Philosophy of Art." The Dublin 
Review 229 (Second Quarter 1955): 176-187.
Review of Creative Intuition in Art and Poetry, 1953.
Tierney, Michael. "M. Maritain on Education." Studies 33 (March 1944): 
21-29.
Review of Education at the Crossroads, 1943.
Turner, Vincent. "Poets and Painters: M. Maritain on Creative Intuition. 
The Month 12 (November 1954): 270-280.
Review of Creative Intuition in Art and Poetry, 1953.
